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# Safety Assessment of Major Mining Hazards

**Stage 2 –  
Semi-Quantitative Risk Assessment**

**for**



**International Power  
Hazelwood**

**February 2004**

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

International Power Hazelwood (“IPRH”) have commissioned Qest Consulting to assist them in completing a Formal Safety Assessment of the Major Mining Hazards associated with their operations. The scope of this assessment includes the current mine operations as well as the relocation activities and mining of the West Field lease area.

This report presents the results of Stage 2 of this process, which includes a Semi-Quantitative Risk Assessment (SQRA) of the 16 potential Major Mining Hazards identified during Stage 1. This stage also includes the development of bow-tie diagrams to help in understanding the dynamics of each hazard and the identification of the controls, which are critical to the management of each hazard scenario (“the Critical Controls”). A key aspect of this stage of the study is to identify those hazards that are deemed to constitute the final list of Major Mining Hazards that should be taken forward as the subject of the “Critical Control Adequacy Assessment” (Stage 3).

This risk assessment process applied was designed and completed in line with the requirements of the *Occupational Health and Safety (Mines) Regulations 2002*.

This report outlines the methodology and findings of this second stage of the process. Whilst this is a standalone document it is recommended that to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the safety assessment process, this report be read in conjunction with the report from Stage 1.

The SQRA and Critical Control identification process was completed in a workshop held at IPRH on the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> February 2004, facilitated by independent risk consultants from Qest Consulting. The workshop participants were made up of representatives from each relevant mine work area, including Engineering, Maintenance and Operations.

A total of 16 potential Major Mining Hazards were identified in Stage 1 for assessment through the SQRA process. These hazard scenarios and their risk values, as determined by the Risk Assessment Team, are shown in Table 1. This table also shows the 13 hazards that were identified as Major Mining Hazards and which are to be carried forward through the safety assessment process.

The numerical risk values estimated through the SQRA process are expressed in terms of Potential Loss of Life (PLL). PLL is the risk to all individuals who spend time on the site over a year. The overall PLL is the sum the values for each Major Hazard Scenario for the mine. It is the same as the statistically predicted annual fatality rate for the operation. The PLL risk level considers the number of personnel affected by the hazard. As each operation is of differing size, complexity and number of personnel, the PLL values cannot be directly compared between operational sites. Furthermore the SQRA process generates a PLL that is an indicative assessment of the risk using a ‘team based’ approach and as such relies on the collective knowledge of the risk assessment team and availability of relevant statistical information. This further limits the ability for comparison between sites. The strength of the SQRA approach is that it provides an assessment of the hazards relative to each other and as such enables a risk-based framework for safety management to be established. This framework enables risk priorities to be focussed and reductions efforts to be measured.

**Table 1 - Major Mining Hazards and PLL Values**

Rank	ID No.	Hazard Title	PLL value
1	IPRH-NO1	Vehicle incident while accessing worksite	1.15E-02
2	IPRH-IW32	Public vehicle incident during road alterations	1.00E-02
3	IPRH-NO24	Heavy Mobile equipment interactions on mine roads	6.67E-03
4	IPRH-NO4	Dropped objects from major mining plant (onto personnel / equipment)	6.00E-03
5	IPRH-NO37	Failure whilst field jacking of major mining plant	4.40E-03
6	IPRH-IW28	220KV tower incident, including construction activities	2.50E-03
7	IPRH-NO5	Uncontrolled movement of major mining plant	1.65E-03
8	IPRH-NO38	Unplanned movement of equipment	1.37E-03
9	IPRH-NO42	Fall from or tipping of EWP	1.10E-03
10	IPRH-NO26	Batter failure	1.00E-03
11	IPRH-NO39	Confined spaces	3.00E-04
12	IPRH-NO8	Explosion of electrical components on major mining plant	2.20E-04
13	IPRH-NO43	Building fire	2.20E-04
14	IPRH-IW30	Cable incident on public road	1.40E-04
15	IPRH-NO7	Major mining plant fire	1.00E-04
16	IPRH-NO36	Inrush of water into mine	1.60E-05
	IPRH-WF45	Vehicle / plant incident during West Field transfer	Included in NO24
<b>Total Estimated Site (Major Mining Hazard) PLL</b>			<b>4.72E-02</b>

1E-03


 Final list of Major Mining Hazards for Stage 3 assessment.

Based on the current site controls and procedures, the Risk Assessment Team estimated the overall 'Base Case' PLL for the hazards assessed as 4.72E-02 fatalities per year, equivalent to a single fatality every 21.2 years.

The estimated Base Case Risk Profile is shown in Figure 1 (overleaf). This Figure shows that the overall site risk from Major Mining Hazards is relatively concentrated, with 81% of the risk in the top 5 hazards assessed. As such, risk reduction efforts should be focussed towards these hazards.

It must also be noted that the three top hazards in the Base Case estimate, relate to collisions involving mobile vehicles. The collective risk of these hazard scenarios places the operation of mobile equipment as the dominant hazard in the risk profile.

**Figure 1 - IPRH Major Mining Hazards - Base Case Risk Profile**



It is important to note that several hazards in the risk profile relate to interim activities associated with the transfer of mine activities to the West Field lease area. These hazards are in addition to the hazards that will be encountered during the normal mining operations in the West Field area. These hazards have a significant contribution to the overall safety risk profile of the Hazelwood Mine.

It is estimated that following completion of the relocation activities, the overall site risk, from the hazards assessed, would reduce by approximately 40% to a single fatality every 35.9 yrs. In addition, it is important to note that these hazards relate principally to activities to be completed by contractors under IPRH management. This further raises the need to view the controls relating to the selection and management of the contractors as critical to managing this risk.

As described, this stage also included the identification of the controls that are critical to managing the operations Major Mining Hazards. For each hazard scenario the causal pathways were analysed to determine those dominant pathways for which Critical and / or Major Controls are required. This was achieved by comparing each pathway against a pre-determined 'Criticality Criteria', which in turn generates a control classification for the pathway. Qest Consulting defined the Criticality Criteria used for this process in consultation with the workshop team. This criteria was deemed as acceptable based on experience in SQRA for similar operations and has proven successful in identifying a realistic spread of Critical and Major Controls for the hazards assessed. The final stage of this safety assessment is to review the adequacy of the Critical and Major Controls identified for the MMHs and develop a prioritised Safety Action Plan.



## 1.0 INTRODUCTION

International Power Hazelwood (“IPRH”) is planning to expand their mining activities into a new lease area referred to as the West Field. As required by the *Occupational Health and Safety (Mines) Regulations 2002*, IPRH have committed to completing a Formal Safety Assessment of the Major Mining Hazards (“MMH”) associated with this change in the mine operations. In addition, IPRH have identified this as an opportunity to expand the scope of the risk assessment to include their existing mining operations. IPRH commissioned Qest Consulting (“Qest”) to assist them in completing this assessment.

This report details Stage 2 of the Formal Safety Assessment of Major Mining Hazards. This second stage of the process includes a Semi-Quantitative Risk Assessment (SQRA) of the 16 hazards identified as potential Major Mining Hazards during Stage 1<sup>1</sup> of the process. These hazards are described in Section 1.2.

This step will be used to rank the hazards and define the final list of Major Mining Hazards to be taken through to the next stage of the assessment process, which includes a “Critical Control Adequacy Assessment”, and development of a “MMH Safety Action Plan”.

It is recommended that to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the safety assessment process applied, that this report should be read in conjunction with the reporting from Stage 1.

The SQRA approach was selected as the suitable approach for this assessment as it was deemed to provide the required level of analysis to enable IPRH to understand the current mine risk profile from the Major Mining Hazards and the controls currently utilized to ensure these risks are being adequately managed.

Furthermore it was considered that the SQRA process would also satisfy the specific requirements for a Safety Risk Assessment of Major Mining Hazards under *the Occupational Health & Safety (Mines) Regulations 2002*, which requires the process to be:

- Comprehensive and systematic;
- Provide detailed understanding of major hazards;
- Appropriate assessment methodologies;
- Assess hazards cumulatively as well as individually; and
- Documented and available.

The SQRA approach was also considered to achieve the following principal deliverable’s:

- Development of a ‘risk-based’ framework for safety management; and
- Transparent process to enable the clear communication of safety risks to all Stakeholders.

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<sup>1</sup> Qest Consulting Pty Ltd. (2003), Identification of Major Mining Hazards for International Power Hazelwood.



This scope of work was primarily completed in a two day workshop facilitated by Qest on the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> February 2004. Qest also supplied a second facilitator to ensure accurate minutes from the workshops were taken.

The workshop participants were made up of representatives from each relevant function and level of the workforce. A short presentation was completed at the beginning of the workshop, to introduce the participants to the risk assessment process and the definitions used. The risk assessment team is contained in Table 1.1

**Table 1.1 - SQRA Workshop Team**

<b>Name of Participant</b>	<b>Role</b>
Richard Polmear	Mine Engineering Manager
Ian Quail	Operations Manager
Peter Sheridan	Shift Operations Manager
Noel Coxall	Shift Maintenance Supervisor
Bill Estrada	Maintenance Manager
Ian Wilson	Shift Fitter
Peter Kelly	Mining Engineer
Anthony Deakin	Qest Consulting
Brian Williams	Qest Consulting



## 1.1 Description of Hazlewood Mine Operations

An important part in establishing the context of the risk assessment is an Operations Description that outlines the nature of the main aspects of the Hazelwood mining operations and relocation activities for accessing the West Field lease area. A site map showing the current mine and planned West Field Area is shown in Figure 1 (overleaf).

The Hazelwood Mine is located in the Latrobe Valley region of South Eastern Victoria and is part of an integrated Coal Mine and Power Station operation. The operation covers some 3500 hectares, with the mine area covering around 620 hectares.

The mine has been mining a thick brown coal deposit for 40 years with operations having commenced in 1964. The coal seam is up to 100m thick in some places and is mined using large “bucket-wheel dredging machines” which load the coal onto an in-pit conveyor system for transfer to the power station bunkers. Up to four of these ‘laser guided’ “dredgers” and associated conveyor systems operate at various levels in the mine extracting both coal and removing the overburden material. The extensive conveyor system (over 40km in total length) carries the coal at over 2500 tonnes per hour to the bunkers. Additional conveying infrastructure is currently being constructed which will increase this capacity. The operation and maintenance of this mining infrastructure is completed by IPRH with teams of four / five operators per dredger on a rotating roster basis for both day and night shifts.

As part of the relocation to the West Field lease area significant additional bulk earthworks, using heavy vehicle haul trucks, as well as the relocation and diversion of local infrastructure will be required. The infrastructure work includes the relocation of the Strzlecki Highway and the diversion of the Morwell River and major power lines. Such works will be undertaken by contractors under contract management by IPRH.

Significant quantities of water are pumped from aquifers below the seam to maintain wall (batter) and floor stability in the pit. This water is retained with the power station cooling water and becomes a source of fire prevention and dust suppression for the site.

As mining occurs the land is progressively rehabilitated reusing the stockpiled overburden material in accordance with approved environmental management plans.

Figure 1 - Aerial Photo showing mining areas.



**1.2 List of Hazards Assessed**


<b>Hazard No</b>	<b>Hazard Title</b>	<b>MMH Description</b>
<b>IPRH-NO4</b>	Dropped objects from major mining plant (onto personnel or equipment)	Major Mining Plant includes conveyors, stackers & dredgers. Relates to plant components falling, loose material falling or deliberate dumping, and material falling due to minor structural failure. Areas of concern: Lumps of coal falling; Complacency of stacker operator or ground personnel; Ensuring equipment is correctly designed.
<b>IPRH-NO24</b>	Heavy Mobile equipment interactions on mine roads	Relates to incidents during normal heavy mobile plant operations on mine roads. Issue due to sharing of roads between mobile equipment. Hazard excludes light vehicle incidents (NO1), and interactions in loading areas (NO29) as included as separate scenario. Areas of concern: Infrequent users of mine roads; External dumping closer to points of entry; Radio protocols (need for clearer and more positive communication).
<b>IPRH-NO1</b>	Vehicle incident while accessing worksite	Relates to incidents involving vehicles used for transport to work site (onsite access only), predominantly light vehicles (eg. 4wd's). Hazard includes personnel traveling around site for inspections, monitoring, etc. Events include traveling off edge, rollovers, collisions with other equipment / structures / mine walls, etc. Areas of concern: Infrequent users; Radio protocols (clear and positive coms); Higher congestion / volume during
<b>IPRH-NO5</b>	Uncontrolled Movement of major mining plant.	Major Mining Plant includes conveyors, stackers & dredgers. Hazard also relates to use of cranes. Mainly relates to toppling of plant but also includes derailing, collapses, operator error, slippage, toppling due to windload or soft ground, structural failure of plant or ground, etc. Excludes falling loads from cranes and excavator (NO51); falling objects from Major Mining Plant (NO24); Tripper/hopper runaway (NO-19) and Field jacking of equipment (NO37), as included as separate hazards.
<b>IPRH-NO7</b>	Major mining plant fire	Major Mining Plant includes conveyors, stackers & dredgers. Dredger considered biggest risk issue. Excludes Fire/explosion in bunker (NO15) and mobile equipment (NO3), as included as separate hazard scenarios. Areas of concern: Coal build up and mechanical failure.
<b>IPRH-NO8</b>	Explosion of electrical components on major mining plant	Relates principally to HV switching gear (6.6KV and 415V)
<b>IPRH-NO26</b>	Batter failure	Relates to both coal and overburden collapses onto personnel, plant and/or vehicle (eg. dozer, 4wd, pedestrian)

Hazard No	Hazard Title	MMH Description
IPRH-IW28	220KV tower incident, including construction activities.	Relates to incidents involving HV towers either during mine operations around towers or tower erection / construction. Example causes, include structural failure, ground failure, incorrect design, natural forces, etc. Construction activities include - crainage, lifting, heights work. Tower construction to be completed by specialist contractor.
IPRH-IW30	Cable incident on public road	Relates to incidents involving HV line installation or failure during operations. Activity will be completed by specialist contractor. Less than 1 month project. During critical stages the road will be closed.
IPRH-IW32	Public vehicle incident during road alterations	Relates to road alterations during West Field relocations. Traffic Management Plan. Activity will be completed by specialist contractor in line with Vic Roads requirements. Includes public vehicle collisions and public vehicle/mine vehicle collisions.
IPRH-NO36	Inrush of water into mine	Relates to major inrush of water into mining area. Main control is the design of flood mitigation to 1:10,000 yr /event. Also considers risk of catastrophic dam wall failure as well.
IPRH-NO37	Failure whilst field jacking of major mining plant	Maintenance work for Major Mining Plant completed in field, due to size of plant. Hazard relates to jacking of plant for maintenance purposes.
IPRH-NO38	Unplanned movement of equipment	Relates to unplanned / uncontrolled movement of equipment striking personnel or equipment. Includes parts of Major Mining Plant or mine heavy vehicles / equipment. Example scenarios include; equipment runaway, operator error, belt slip, belt runaway, remote startup, vehicles parked up, conveyor anchor post failure, etc. Excludes entanglement in mechanical equipment, as included as separate hazard (NO11).
IPRH-NO39	Confined/registered spaces	Relates to both Confined and Registered Spaces. Includes maintenance work in and around bunkers. Several Registered Spaces but relatively few Confined Spaces. For mine operations (ie. Dredger tubs and Bucket wheel)
IPRH-NO42	Fall from or tipping of EWP	Relates to any equipment used for work at heights, eg. EWP, Cherry picker, JLG, Boom lift, Scissor lifts. Includes EPV (Elevated Platform Vehicle (EPV)
IPRH-NO43	Building fire	Buildings for mine operations include; Control Room, Workshop, Offices.
IPRH-WF45	Vehicle / plant incident during West Field opening up phase.	Relates to major truck and shovel programs. Includes interaction or other incident eg. off edge, into hole. Current phase 1 works at Westfield. Considered by risk assessment team to include NO24.Areas of concern: Dynamic changing nature of work areas; Watering of roads effect LV traction.

## 2.0 SQRA METHODOLOGY

Qest have committed to completing the risk assessment of Major Mining Hazards in line with the requirements outlined in the *OHS (Mines) Regs 2002* and consistent with the principles of the *Australian Standard for Risk Management (AS/NZ 4360:1999)*. The risk assessment process is illustrated in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1 – Risk Assessment Process (as per AS 3460)



Having completed the hazard Identification (HAZID) process in the first stage of the safety assessment, the potential Major Mining Hazards were then the subject of a more detailed risk analysis using a Semi-Quantitative Risk Assessment (SQRA) approach.



The Stage 2 SQRA methodology is described in the following pages and includes the following steps:

1. Understanding the Dynamics of Hazards (Develop Bow-tie diagrams)
2. SQRA – Base Case
3. Identification of Critical Controls

Having identified the hazards for referral to the SQRA process a Risk Register Database, as developed by Qest Consulting, was used to capture the information about each hazard scenario. The data collected using the database fields included: -

- Title of hazardous event
- Scenario description
- Identified causes
- Current control measures
- Comments regarding the hazard

The front-end of the risk register database is shown in Figure 2.2 below. The Data Sheets for each of the hazards assessed are included in Appendix 2.

**Figure 2.2 – Risk Register Database Front-end**



## 2.1 Understanding the Dynamics of Hazards


Drawing upon the information collected during the Hazard Identification stage, the second step in the risk assessment process is to develop an understanding of the dynamics of each of the hazard scenarios. This step entails a rigorous analysis of the initiating causes and pathways leading to each hazard event and the outcomes if the event does occur. In both of these analyses the controls that are in place to either prevent the causes or mitigate the outcomes are also identified.

A bow-tie diagram is used to graphically represent these relationships for the hazard. The bow-tie diagram is then used as a visual tool to assist within the risk assessment workshops through the following stages of the process.

At the centre of the bow-tie diagram is the event under consideration. The left-hand side of the diagram shows the possible 'Initiating Causes' and 'Pathways' leading to the event. The right hand side of the diagram shows the potential consequence(s) if the event occurred. The existing control measures to either prevent the event or mitigate the consequence are shown as well.

An example bow-tie diagram is detailed in Figure 2.3.

**Figure 2.3 - Bow Tie Diagram Structure**



No probabilities are included on the bow-tie diagram, the purpose is to clearly represent the dynamics of the hazard to assist with the further analysis of the hazard. Note that information from these later steps in the process are also included on the bow-ties, including which controls are selected as Critical or Major Controls.

The bow-tie diagrams for each of the hazard scenarios can be found in Appendix 2.


## 2.2 Base Case Safety Risk Assessment

This project step entails taking the work completed in the first steps of the process and considering the information in the Semi-Quantitative Risk Assessment (SQRA) for each of the Major Mining Hazard scenarios identified. This approach enables a numerical risk value (Potential Loss of Life or PLL) to be calculated. This is completed in a workshop environment with the Risk Assessment Team. The outcome of this initial SQRA workshop represents the Base Case safety risk profile which considers the current level of safety controls. The SQRA data and results are also captured using the risk register database and the SQRA process followed is outlined in the following steps (refer to Figure 2.4 for an example of the SQRA worksheet):

### 1) Determining initiating frequency

Whilst considering the information (eg. causes, controls) on the left-hand side of the bow-tie diagram, assess the frequency of the **initiating event** (ie the point where control is lost). The example shows an initiating event that is estimated to occur 0.5 times per annum (ie. 1 in 2 years).

**Figure 2.4: Risk Register SQRA Worksheet**



Frequency	Sample Size	10+	6-10	3-5	2	1	Neg	PLL
5.00E-01	10000000	0	1	25	34	40	9999900	1.08E-05

Annotations: 1 points to the Frequency cell (5.00E-01); 2 points to the Neg cell (9999900); 3 points to the Sample Size cell (10000000); 4 points to the PLL cell (1.08E-05). A note 'Once every 92,807 years' is visible next to the PLL cell.

### 2) Consequence of initiating event

A discussion of the initiating event is held based on people’s experience, observations and industry statistics where known. Taking into account the information (eg. mitigating controls, consequences) on the right hand side of the bow-tie diagrams, the number of times there would be NO FATALITIES is estimated, given that the initiating event has occurred. A method of estimating is outlined below in the ‘Example of Consequence’. In the example above, it was estimated that given 10000000 occurrences of the initiating event, 9999900 of them would not result in a fatality (ie. 100 occurrences would result in 1 or more fatalities).

### 3) Number of fatalities

For the occurrences where 1 or more fatalities were estimated to occur (100 times in the example), the workshop nominates:



- The number of times there would be a single fatality (40 times out of the 100 in the example);
- The number of double fatalities (34 out of 100);
- The number of times there would be 3 to 5 fatalities (25 out of 100);
- The number of times that there would be 6 to 9 fatalities (1 out of 100);
- The number of times that there would be more than 10 fatalities (0 out of 100).

#### 4) Calculation of PLL value

These values are imputed directly into the SQRA worksheet (within the risk register), which calculates PLL values (fatalities per annum) for each hazard by multiplying likelihood by the sum of the consequences.

$$0.5*((0*11.5)+(1*7)+(25*4)+(34*2)+(40*1))/10000000 = \mathbf{0.0000108 \text{ or } 1.08 \times 10^{-5}}$$

#### Example of Consequence (step 2 above);

If the workshop was able to estimate that a large object would be dropped once every 5 years, but could not easily determine a sample size for the distribution of the fatality cases, steps similar to the following may be used to help generate one

- a. Given that the object was dropped, the probability that someone would be in the area affected by the drop would be **X**.
- b. If someone were in the area when the large object was dropped, the probability that they would be hit would be **Y**.
- c. If someone was hit by the large dropped object, the probability that they would be fatally injured would be **Z**

The product of these probabilities (**X x Y x Z**) is the probability that the event would be fatal given that a large object is dropped. If  $X = 0.4$ ,  $Y = 0.1$ , and  $Z = 0.5$ , then this probability would equal 0.02. Or, 2 fatal events in 100 (equivalent to 20 in 1000).

In this case, for step 2 of the SQRA process, there would be 980 occurrences of the initiating event where there would be no fatalities (1000 minus 20). In step 3 of the SQRA process the 20 fatal events would be distributed according to the number of fatalities caused.

The results of the SQRA workshops are presented in Section 4.0 – Findings.

## 2.3 Identification of Critical Controls

This step of the process entails a review of the controls that are currently in place to manage a given hazard scenario and determines those controls that are critical to the safe and effective operation across the site. The purpose of identifying critical controls is to enable future control adequacy assessment and auditing processes to be targeted.

In this assessment, two grades of controls are used that distinguish between those that are crucial to safe operation (a “Critical” control) and those that are very important (a “Major” control). This approach allows for better rationalisation of valuable implementation time and resources across critical, major and other controls.

The Critical Control identification is completed by analysing each of the causal pathways on the bow-tie diagrams, including the allocation of a percentage that each pathway contributes to the occurrence of the hazard. To ensure comprehensiveness a combination of criteria was used to identify the critical controls. This criteria is outlined below.

### Control Criticality Criteria

#### 1. Potential Loss of Life (PLL) contribution

The percentage allocated to each causal pathway for a given hazard is then multiplied by the total PLL for the hazard. This value can then be compared against pre-determined risk criticality criteria to determine the level of controls that need to be in place to prevent, and or mitigate the hazard from occurring in the identified hazard pathways. The “Criticality Criteria” used is outlined in Table 2.1.

**Table 2.1 - Criticality Criteria for PLL Contribution**

Hazard Pathway Risk ( x 10 <sup>-6</sup> )	Control Level Required
1500	1 Critical and 1 Major Control
750	2 Major or 1 Critical Control
250	1 Major Control

#### 2. Causal pathway dominance


Pathways that were considered to contribute to 20% or more to the potential incident occurring were required to have 1 Critical Control (or 2 major controls). This step is designed to ensure that controls which are currently effective in reducing the risk associated with a selected scenario are not overlooked when applying a strictly risk criteria. These controls need to be identified as critical to ensure they are included in the adequacy review process.

#### 3. Frequency of control

Controls that frequently occurred were also reviewed for consideration as Critical Controls.

This process makes substantial use of the bow-tie diagrams developed previously, in conjunction with the risk values developed in the SQRA. Figure 2.5 shows the risk register database screen where each pathway is allocated a percentage of PLL contribution. Figure 2.6 shows the database screen used to select the appropriate number and type of critical controls for each hazard dependent on the PLL contribution and/or pathway dominance.

**Figure 2.5 Database Hazard Identification Worksheet**



**Hazard Identification** [Edit Guidewords] [SQRA Info] [Close]

Number: 3 Hazard / Incident: Pressure Vessel Failure / Explosion (nitrogen, O2, Cylinders) Guideword: Aggressive Release PLL: 2.04E-05


Description: 2 Large O2 tanks, 1 large nitrogen, propane cylinders, acetylene cylinders, compressed air tanks, argon cylinders, O2 cylinders, water boilers, hydraulic accumulators

Pathway	Percentage	PLL	Cause
Collision / impact	14.00%	2.86E-06	Cause
Failure or incorrect component	4.00%	8.16E-07	Cause
Incorrect storage	40.00%	8.16E-06	Cause
Over temperature	15.00%	3.06E-06	Cause
Over filling causing over pressure	5.00%	1.02E-06	Cause
Cylinder failure	1.00%	2.04E-07	Cause
	100.00%		

Causes/Outcomes:

- Loss of control of mobile equipment hitting main storage tanks (lorries, forklifts)
- Incorrect lifting of cylinders
- Incorrect transportation, loose cylinders falls from transporters
- Hit by crane

**Figure 2.6 Database Pathways Worksheet**



**Pathways** [Copy Cause] [Edit Controls] [Edit Guidewords] [SQRA Info] [Close]

Number: 3 Hazard / Incident: Pressure Vessel Failure / Explosion (nitrogen, O2, Cylinders) Guideword: Aggressive Release PLL: 2.04E-05

Description: 2 Large O2 tanks, 1 large nitrogen, propane cylinders, acetylene cylinders, compressed air tanks, argon cylinders, O2 cylinders, water boilers, hydraulic accumulators

Pathway: Collision / impact PLL: 2.86E-06 1 Critical B

Causes/Outcomes:

- Loss of control of mobile equipment hitting main storage tanks (lorries, fork lifts)
- Incorrect lifting of cylinders
- Incorrect transportation, loose cylinders falls from transporters
- Hit by crane

Controls:

Control	Type	Count	Status
Dedicated lifting equipment	Critical B	208	Existing
Off site training for use and handling of oxygen and acetylene	Not Critical	536	Existing
On site training for use and handling of oxygen and propane	Not Critical	538	Existing



The numbered explanatory points below correspond to the parts of the database screens indicated in Figures 2.5 and 2.6

1. For each hazard, the PLL number is taken from the SQRA.
2. Using the information contained on the bowtie for each hazard, the causal pathways are determined, and a definition of each entered into the list.
3. Each causal pathway is then allocated a percentage of the risk, based on its perceived contribution (ie. the greater proportion of the risk that results from a particular pathway, the higher the percentage contribution it gets). The risk contributions from all of the pathways should sum to 100%.
4. The hazard PLL (see 1) is divided amongst the causal pathways (see 2) based on their percentage contributions (see 3). These values can then be compared against the pre-determined risk criticality criteria to determine how many of each control type (Critical and Major) are required for input into the Critical Control Adequacy Assessment.
5. Referring to the relevant bow-tie for the hazard, the required number of Critical and Major controls are nominated on each of the causal pathways, according to the definitions outlined at the beginning of this section. The control numbers, description and Critical and Major rating are then recorded in the text box supplied.

The Critical and Major controls identified in step 5 are referenced in the Data Sheets (Appendix 1) and are listed in Appendix 3.

### 3.0 FINDINGS

This section of the report details the findings from the SQRA process. It must be acknowledged that this method of risk estimation is semi-quantitative and uses a “team-based” approach and as such relies on the collective knowledge of the risk assessment team and availability of relevant statistical information. The accuracy of such estimating is also inherently difficult as the subject deals with very low frequency events. The strength of the SQRA approach is that it provides an assessment of the hazards relative to each other and as such enables a risk-based framework for safety management to be established. This framework enables risk priorities to be focussed and reductions efforts to be measured.

#### 3.1 SQRA Base Case Results


The overall Base Case Potential Loss of Life (PLL) for the 16 hazards assessed, using the SQRA approach, was estimated by the Risk Assessment Team as 4.72E-02 fatalities per year, equivalent to 1 fatality every 21.2 years.

The individual estimated PLL values for each respective hazard scenario assessed, is listed in the following Table 3.1 and graphed in Figures 3.1 and 3.2.

**Table 3.1 - List of Potential Major Mining Hazards and Potential Loss of Life (PLL) Values**

Rank	ID No.	Hazard Title	PLL value
1	IPRH-NO1	Vehicle incident while accessing worksite	1.15E-02
2	IPRH-IW32	Public vehicle incident during road alterations	1.00E-02
3	IPRH-NO24	Heavy Mobile equipment interactions on mine roads	6.67E-03
4	IPRH-NO4	Dropped objects from major mining plant (onto personnel / equipment)	6.00E-03
5	IPRH-NO37	Failure whilst field jacking of major mining plant	4.40E-03
6	IPRH-IW28	220KV tower incident, including construction activities	2.50E-03
7	IPRH-NO5	Uncontrolled movement of major mining plant	1.65E-03
8	IPRH-NO38	Unplanned movement of equipment	1.37E-03
9	IPRH-NO42	Fall from or tipping of EWP	1.10E-03
10	IPRH-NO26	Batter failure	1.00E-03
11	IPRH-NO39	Confined spaces	3.00E-04
12	IPRH-NO8	Explosion of electrical components on major mining plant	2.20E-04
13	IPRH-NO43	Building fire	2.20E-04
14	IPRH-IW30	Cable incident on public road	1.40E-04
15	IPRH-NO7	Major mining plant fire	1.00E-04
16	IPRH-NO36	Inrush of water into mine	1.60E-05
	IPRH-WF45	Vehicle / plant incident during West Field transfer	Included in NO24
<b>Total Estimated PLL</b>			<b>4.72E-02</b>

**Figure 3.1 - IPRH Major Mining Hazard – Base Case Risk Profile**




The Base Case Risk Distribution for Major Mining Hazards is shown in Figure 3.1. This figure shows that 81% of the site fatality risk is concentrated in the top 5 hazards assessed.

These hazards are:

- IPRH-NO1 Vehicle incident while accessing worksite
- IPRH-IW32 Public vehicle incident during road alterations
- IPRH-NO24 Heavy mobile equipment interactions on mine roads
- IPRH-NO4 Dropped objects from major mining plant (onto personnel / equipment)
- IPRH-NO37 Failure whilst field jacking of major mining plant

**Figure 3.2 - IPRH Major Mining Hazard – Base Case Risk Distribution**



It must be noted that the three top hazards in the Base Case estimate, relate to collisions involving mobile vehicles. The collective risk of these hazard scenarios places the operation of mobile equipment as the dominant hazard in the risk profile.



### 3.1.1 Risk Assessment Assumptions

The workshop team assumptions and data used to derive the PLL values are outlined in the following Table 3.2

**Table 3.2 - List of Assumptions**

Hazard No Description	Assumptions
<b>IPRH-NO1 Vehicle Incident while accessing worksite.</b>	Hazard relates to on-site access to work areas (light vehicles). Approx 25 years of history on site. Three Types of incident identified: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Rollovers 1/ 2.5 years = 9% of incidents</li> <li>2. Impact/Collision 1/3 months = 90% of incidents</li> <li>3. Off Edge 1/30 years = 1% of incidents</li> </ol> Of type 2. Impact/ Collision 50% are unoccupied. Of remaining incidents 30% require medical treatment with 2% of these being fatal. Of type 1 Rollovers 90% estimated requiring medical treatment. Of these 2% fatal. Of type 3 Off Edge 100% estimated as medically treated 33% fatal. Multiple occupancy vehicles generally only at shift change (2 hour window). Assumed 10% of fatal events double fatality with 1% Multiple fatality (3-5 fatalities)
<b>IPRH-NO4 Dropped objects from major mining plant (onto personnel / equipment)</b>	Two types of incident considered: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Lumps falling from conveyors/transfers</li> <li>2. Components/pieces of plant dropped or ejected.</li> </ol> For type 1. Initiating event frequency 2/yr. ie 20 major lump incidents in 10 year period. Of these, 10% strike someone with 5% of these being fatal (1 in 20). For type 2. Initiating event frequency 1/5 years. ie 2 major plant/equipment incidents in 10-year period. Of these it was estimated that 1% (1 in 100) would impact personnel and 50% of these impacts would be fatal. Therefore 90% of risk is associated with lump incidents, 10% plant/equipment.
<b>IPRH-NO5 Uncontrolled Movement of major mining plant</b>	Based on site experience. 10 major events in 30 year period. Estimated with current controls in place a potential 1 in 5 yr event. Likely to occur in Maintenance and/or Operational Mode. (personnel in area 90% of the time). Estimated 1 in 20 events impact on personnel. 75% of these impacts to result in a fatality. Estimated that 10% (1 in 10) would be multiple fatality events. Construction activities in the new area (Westfield) do not include Dredgers only conveyors.



Hazard No Description	Assumptions
<b>IPRH-NO7 Major mining plant fire</b>	Frequency of initiating event in pit area (ie fire) 150/yr. Estimated 20% (1 in 5) occur on plant. defined sizeable fire as “capable of spreading beyond ignition area”. le CFA notified 10/year fall into this category with 1/year impacting plant. Estimated that 1 in 1000 of these events would impact personnel and 1% of these leading to a fatality.
<b>IPRH-NO8 Explosion of electrical components on major mining plant</b>	Site history frequency of initiating event 2/30 years (1 in 15). Estimated with improved practices and procedures (cubicle cleaning, maintenance, etc) that initiating event 1/25 years. Estimated areas of potential incident: 1. Dredges and conveyors 80% of incidents 2. Pumps 20% of incidents.
<b>IPRH- NO24 Heavy Mobile equipment interactions on mine roads</b>	Relates to Heavy Mobile Equipment Only. Light vehicles covered in hazard IPRH-NO1 Includes Haul trucks(25-65 tonnes), graders, dozers, water trucks, Low loaders, etc. No significant incidents on site (30 Years) Excludes loading areas, construction and relocation. With increased trucking activity expected incident 1/7.5 years. Two types of incident considered: 1. rear end collision estimated 2% fatal (1 in 50 events) Head on collision estimated 1% fatal (1 in 100 events)
<b>IPRH-NO26 Batter failure</b>	1 Significant incident/year 5% (1 in 20) impacts machines 5% (1 in 50) of these estimated as fatal.
<b>IPRH-NO37 Failure whilst Field jacking of major mining plant</b>	Frequency Of initiation event 1 incident /5 years Estimated that personnel in vicinity 95% of the time when an incident occurs. Estimated that 1 in 100 events would result in a fatality.
<b>IPRH- NO38 Unplanned movement of equipment</b>	Three Areas Considered: 1. Remote unplanned Start-up Of Equipment 2. Unsecured equipment (excludes trippers which was considered specifically elsewhere) 3. Parked Equipment runaway. For 1. Estimated initiating event frequency 1/50 years with current controls. Eg Soft start of conveyors, isolation systems, pre-start alarms, etc. 1 in 20 of these events fatal. For 2. Estimated initiating event frequency 1/30 years, 0.5% (1 in 200) of these being fatal. For 3. Estimated initiating event frequency 1/5 years, 0.1% (1 in 1000) of these being fatal, of which 1% (1 in 100) are double fatality events.
<b>IPRH-NO39 Confined spaces</b>	Very few registered confined spaces activities on site. Approximately 3/year undertaken

Hazard No Description	Assumptions
<b>IPRH-NO42 Fall from or tipping of EWP</b>	Estimated with current controls that fatality rate 1 in 10000 events. Includes EPV (Elevated Platform Vehicle) Frequency Of initiation event 1 incident /50 year 10% (1 in10) Incidents fatal.
<b>IPRH-NO43 Building fire</b>	No known significant fires on30 years Control room has sprinkler system Offices have smoke detectors. Control centre 2 storey, multi exit, steel framed facility Frequency Of initiation event 1 incident /50 year 1/100 of these single fatality 1/1000 of these double fatality.
<b>IPRH-NO36 Inrush of water into mine</b>	Flood inrush potential 1 in 10000 year event. (Site drainage/level) Dam storage potential from catastrophic failure estimated as 1in 1000 year event. Only a potential incident for next 5 years until creek diversion completed. Statutory monitoring and inspection of dams. Probability of fatality higher than flood due to lack of warning (unlike a rain event).
<b>IPRH-IW28 Incident with 220KV towers including construction activities</b>	Includes construction activities, in which site has no experience. Will engage competent contractor to undertake activities. 14 Towers to be relocated Estimated 1 incident per 500 towers Of which (5%)1 in 20 will be fatal.
<b>IPRH-IW30 Cable incident on public road</b>	Specialist contractor undertaking works. Very minimal window. ie Exposure limited to 1 month period.
<b>IPRH- IW32 Public vehicle incident during road alterations</b>	Time of criticality is when cutting in roads to existing infrastructure. Anticipated to be a 2-month time period. Balance of road construction activity separate from public roads. Vic Roads standard Road traffic control systems to be adopted. Estimated that 20 incidents may occur in period, 1 Collision. Fatality rate as per Vic Roads.
<b>IPRH-WF4 Vehicle / plant incident during West Field transfer</b>	Not assessed as a standalone hazard for SQRA as numbers captured in other vehicle/plant hazards. Eg. IPRH – IW32, IPRH – NO24, IPRH- NO1



### 3.1.2 Comparison of QRA and SQRA results for selected Vehicle Incidents

As an exercise to validate the SQRA findings a brief quantitative risk estimate was completed for two of these vehicle incidents. The QRA used the Federal Office of Road Safety, 1995 statistics for fatalities per 100 km travelled for the relevant vehicle types (ie. light vehicles or rigid trucks). The results of this estimate are compared to the SQRA findings in Table 3.3. The calculation sheets for this quantitative risk assessment are included as Appendix 4.

**Table 3.3 – Comparison of QRA and SQRA results for selected Vehicle Incidents**

ID No.	Hazard Title	SQRA PLL value	QRA PLL Value
IPRH-NO1	Vehicle incident while accessing worksite	<b>1 in 87 yrs</b> (1.15E-02 / yr)	<b>1 in 203 yrs</b> (4.93E-03 / yr)
IPRH-NO24A	Heavy Mobile equipment interactions on mine roads For 2004 period (based on estimated distance travelled for 2004 heavy vehicles as 1,695,000 kms)	<b>1 in 150</b> (6.67E-03 / yr)	<b>1 in 113 yrs</b> (8.81E-03 / yr)
IPRH-NO24B	Normal operations (based on estimated distance travelled for normal operations as 250,000 kms)	SQRA completed for current period	<b>1 in 769 yrs</b> (1.30E-03 / yr)

In interpreting the QRA results it must be considered that the risk estimate was based on the following two critical assumptions:

- IPRH mine roads were considered the same condition and utilise the same traffic controls as public roads.
- Traffic conditions for the mine roads are similar to traffic conditions for public roads.

The two risk assessment methods have relatively similar risk estimates. The risk assessment team have assessed the risk of driving light vehicles in the mine is a factor of two higher than on public roads, however the results are still within the same order of magnitude. This slightly higher estimate for light vehicle incidents is justifiable due to the local factors, including the more difficult driving conditions for light vehicles in the mine. These results are also consistent with risk estimates obtained from risk processes for similar mining operations.



### 3.1.3 Contribution of West Field relocation hazards to the risk profile

It is important to note that several hazards in the risk profile relate to interim activities associated with the transfer of mine activities to the West Field lease area. These hazards are in addition to the hazards which will be encountered during the normal mining operations in the West Field area. A summary of these hazards and their affect on the risk profile is included in Table 3.4.

**Table 3.4 - Contribution of West Field relocation to risk profile**

ID No	Hazard Title	PLL value	1 Fatality every ...yrs
IPRH-IW32	Public vehicle incident during road alterations	1.00E-02	100.0
IPRH-NO24A	Heavy Mobile equipment interactions on mine roads	6.67E-03	149.9
IPRH-IW28	Structural failure of 220KV towers	2.50E-03	400.0
IPRH-IW30	Cable incident on public road	1.40E-04	7142.9
<b>Total for West Field relocation activities</b>		1.93E-02	51.8
<b>Total for Hazelwood Major Mining Hazards</b>		4.72E-02	21.2
IPRH-NO24B	Heavy Mobile equipment interactions on mine roads (normal operations) – QRA result	1.30E-03	769.2
<b>MMH Site risk not including relocation activities*</b>		<b>2.79E-02</b>	<b>35.9</b>

\* MMH Risk (not including relocation activities) = (Total mine MMH PLL) – (West Field relocation PLL) + (NO24B PLL)

It is evident from the risk results outlined in Table 3.4 that the activities associated with the relocation to the West Field area are significant in the risk profile of the Hazelwood Mine. Following the relocation to the West Field the risk, from the hazards assessed, would decrease by approximately 40%. In addition, it is important to note that the hazards above relate principally to activities to be completed by contractors under IPRH management. This further raises the need to view the controls relating to selection and management of contractors as critical to managing this risk.

### 3.2 Critical Controls Identified

All of the hazards were reviewed to identify the Critical Controls. The list of controls identified as critical or major using the criticality criteria outlined in section 2.4 is contained in Table 3.5 and included on the Data Sheets which are Appendix 1.

**Table 3.5 - Critical and Major Controls Identified**

Hazard and Id No.	Control	Type (Critical or Major)
<b>IPRH-NO36 Inrush of water into mine</b>	Ancold Regulations (Statutory Dam Inspections, Monitoring, Survey, etc)	Critical
<b>IPRH-NO1 Vehicle Incident while accessing worksite.</b>	Drive to conditions Road maintenance program Supervision Access control through control centre / shift manager Competent personnel Guide posts and reflectors Pre start checks and recording Preventative maintenance program. Remarking of road lines Shiftly fault inspections (reporting) Signage	Critical Critical Critical Major Major Major Major Major Major Major Major
<b>IPRH-NO37 Failure whilst Field jacking of major mining plant</b>	Ballast (excavation and backfill) Ground Assessment Procedure Competent maintenance personnel SOPs Surface drainage Plan	Critical Major Major Major Major
<b>IPRH-NO43 Building fire</b>	Circuit breakers PETE system,	Major Major
<b>IPRH-NO4 Dropped objects from major mining plant (onto personnel / equipment)</b>	Competent personnel Designed conveyor systems (chute size, gradient) Preventative maintenance program Sequencing and breaking design Sequencing of conveyors Cleaning daily or on request (hose down / shovel clean) Competent design engineers Design to prevent spillage Experienced workforce Shiftly fault inspections(reporting) Design Standard	Critical Critical Critical Critical Major Major Major Major Major Major Major Major
<b>IPRH-NO7 Major mining plant fire</b>	Cleaning daily or on request (hose down / shovel clean) Shiftly inspection	Major Major

Hazard and Id No.	Control	Type (Critical or Major)
	Permit System (Hot Work)	Major
<b>IPRH- NO38 Unplanned movement of equipment</b>	Competent maintenance personnel Routine inspection JSA	Major Major Major
<b>IPRH- NO24 Heavy Mobile equipment interactions on mine roads</b>	Drive to conditions Competent personnel Contractor management process (fatigue management, selection process) Preventative maintenance program. Shiftly fault inspections (reporting) Supervision	Major Major Major  Major Major Major
<b>IPRH-NO39 Confined spaces</b>	Confined space procedure CS Training Labelling of confined space	Critical Major Major
<b>IPRH-IW28 Incident with 220KV towers including construction activities</b>	Competent sub-contractors Contractor management process (fatigue management, selection process) Approved construction SMP	Critical Major  Major
<b>IPRH-IW30 Cable incident on public road</b>	Competent sub-contractors Contractor management process (fatigue management, selection process) Approved construction SMP	Critical Major  Major
<b>IPRH-NO29 Batter failure</b>	Digging procedures Face mapping of OB Surcharge removal Surface drainage Plan Crack orientation for dig plan Shift face inspections	Critical Critical Critical Critical Major Major
<b>IPRH-NO5 Uncontrolled Movement of major mining plant</b>	Electronic feedback (survey control) Experienced workforce	Critical Major
<b>IPRH- IW32 Public vehicle incident during road alterations</b>	Enforcement of Vic Roads requirements Construction contractor QA system compliance with Vic Roads requirements	Critical Major
<b>IPRH-NO8 Explosion of electrical components on major mining plant</b>	HV Routine Maintenance (Insulator Cleaning, inspection and servicing) SOP (Isolation / set up sequence) Ticketed electricians to AS Explosion vents (compliance to AS3000)	Major  Major Major Major
<b>IPRH-NO42 Fall from or tipping of EWP</b>	JSA Ticketed operators	Major Major

### 3.3 Selection of Major Mining Hazards for Further Assessment

The Risk Assessment Team ranked and reviewed the list of hazards to identify those hazards that should be considered as MMHs for further analysis in Stage 3 of the process (ie. Control Adequacy Review). The selection of MMHs was achieved through applying two criteria:

1. Comparison of the estimated risk levels against an adopted site defined risk criteria of 1E-03 (1 in 1,000yrs). This step resulted in an initial 10 hazards being identified as MMHs.
2. A team-based review of the remaining six hazards to confirm their relevance for inclusion as MMHs. The objective of this review was to understand the relationships between each hazard, its existing level of control, and the estimated level of risk and/or potential consequences. From this review three additional hazards were identified as constituting MMHs, requiring further control analysis.

As such, 13 hazards were identified as MMHs and taken forward for control analysis. These hazards are shown in Table 3.6.

The three hazard not taken forward were:

- Confined Spaces (NO39)
- Explosion of electrical components (NO8)
- Major mining plant Fire (NO7)

**Table 3.6 - Major Mining Hazards for Stage 3 Assessment**

Rank	ID No.	Hazard Title	PLL value
1	IPRH-NO1	Vehicle incident while accessing worksite	1.15E-02
2	IPRH-IW32	Public vehicle incident during road alterations	1.00E-02
3	IPRH-NO24	Heavy Mobile equipment interactions on mine roads	6.67E-03
4	IPRH-NO4	Dropped objects from major mining plant (onto personnel / equipment)	6.00E-03
5	IPRH-NO37	Failure whilst field jacking of major mining plant	4.40E-03
6	IPRH-IW28	220KV tower incident, including construction activities	2.50E-03
7	IPRH-NO5	Uncontrolled movement of major mining plant	1.65E-03
8	IPRH-NO38	Unplanned movement of equipment	1.37E-03
9	IPRH-NO42	Fall from or tipping of EWP	1.10E-03
10	IPRH-NO26	Batter failure	1.00E-03
11	IPRH-NO39	Confined spaces	3.00E-04
12	IPRH-NO8	Explosion of electrical components on major mining plant	2.20E-04
13	IPRH-NO43	Building fire	2.20E-04
14	IPRH-IW30	Cable incident on public road	1.40E-04
15	IPRH-NO7	Major mining plant fire	1.00E-04
16	IPRH-NO36	Inrush of water into mine	1.60E-05

 Hazards identified for final list of Major Mining Hazards for Stage 3 assessment.



# INTERNATIONAL POWER HAZELWOOD

Safety Assessment of Major Mining Hazards

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## Appendix 1

### Major Mining Hazard Data Sheets



# Hazard Register Data Sheet

**Hazard** IPRH-IW28 220KV tower incident, including construction activities. PLL 2.50E-03

Relates to incidents involving HV towers either during mine operations around towers or tower erection / construction. Example causes, include structural failure, ground failure, incorrect design, natural forces, etc. Construction activities include - crainage, lifting, heights work. Tower construction to be completed by specialist contractor.

<i>Control</i>	%	PLL Contr	Control Class
<b>Causal Pathway Design Fault</b>	4.00%	1.00E-04	None
Design fault			
64 Competent sub-contractors			
33 Contractor management process(fatigue management, selection process)			
65 Approved construction SMP			
93 Joint management with SPI			
127 Powernet for contract management			
66 Ensure risk assessment and SOPs			
<b>Causal Pathway Sabotage</b>	1.00%	2.50E-05	None
Sabotage			
64 Competent sub-contractors			
33 Contractor management process(fatigue management, selection process)			
65 Approved construction SMP			
93 Joint management with SPI			
127 Powernet for contract management			
66 Ensure risk assessment and SOPs			
<b>Causal Pathway Wind loading</b>	10.00%	2.50E-04	1 Major
Wind loading			
64 Competent sub-contractors <span style="float: right;"><b>Major</b></span>			
33 Contractor management process(fatigue management, selection process)			
65 Approved construction SMP			
93 Joint management with SPI			
127 Powernet for contract management			
66 Ensure risk assessment and SOPs			
<b>Causal Pathway Incorrect assembly procedures</b>	50.00%	1.25E-03	1 Critical or 2 Major
Incorrect assembly procedures			
64 Competent sub-contractors <span style="float: right;"><b>Critical</b></span>			
33 Contractor management process(fatigue management, selection process) <span style="float: right;"><b>Major</b></span>			
65 Approved construction SMP <span style="float: right;"><b>Major</b></span>			
93 Joint management with SPI			
127 Powernet for contract management			
66 Ensure risk assessment and SOPs			
<b>Causal Pathway Stability</b>	5.00%	1.25E-04	None
Stability			
64 Competent sub-contractors			
33 Contractor management process(fatigue management, selection process)			
65 Approved construction SMP			
93 Joint management with SPI			
127 Powernet for contract management			
66 Ensure risk assessment and SOPs			

## Hazard Register Data Sheet

**Hazard** IPRH-IW28 220KV tower incident, including construction activities. *PLL* 2.50E-03

Relates to incidents involving HV towers either during mine operations around towers or tower erection / construction. Example causes, include structural failure, ground failure, incorrect design, natural forces, etc. Construction activities include - crainage, lifting, heights work. Tower construction to be completed by specialist contractor.

<i>Control</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>PLL Contr</i>	<i>Control Class</i>
<b>Causal Pathway</b> <b>Equipment/rigging failure</b>	30.00%	7.50E-04	1 Critical or 2 Major
Equipment/rigging failure			
64 Competent sub-contractors			<b>Critical</b>
33 Contractor management process(fatigue management, selection process)			<b>Major</b>
65 Approved construction SMP			
93 Joint management with SPI			
127 Powernet for contract management			
66 Ensure risk assessment and SOPs			
<b>Outcome Pathw</b> <b>Consequence</b>	0.00%	0.00E+00	None
Multiple fatalities			
214 Emergency response procedure			

## Hazard Register Data Sheet

**Hazard** IPRH-IW30 Cable incident on public road

PLL 1.40E-04

Relates to incidents involving HV line installation or failure during operations. Activity will be completed by specialist contractor. Less than 1 month project. During critical stages the road will be closed.

Control	%	PLL Contr	Control Class
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**Causal Pathway** Design/failure of cable support

20.00% 2.80E-05 None

Design of cable support

- 64 Competent sub-contractors
- 33 Contractor management process(fatigue management, selection process)
- 65 Approved construction SMP
- 93 Joint management with SPI
- 127 Powernet for contract management
- 66 Ensure risk assessment and SOPs

**Causal Pathway** Failure to follow assembly procedure

80.00% 1.12E-04 None

Failure to follow assembly procedure

- 64 Competent sub-contractors
- 33 Contractor management process(fatigue management, selection process)
- 65 Approved construction SMP
- 93 Joint management with SPI
- 127 Powernet for contract management
- 66 Ensure risk assessment and SOPs

**Critical**  
**Major**  
**Major**

## Hazard Register Data Sheet

**Hazard IPRH-IW32 Public vehicle incident during road alterations**

PLL 1.00E-02

Relates to road alterations during West Field relocations. Traffic Management Plan. Activity will be completed by specialist contractor in line with Vic Roads requirements. Includes public vehicle collisions and public vehicle/mine vehicle collisions.

<i>Control</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>PLL Contr</i>	<i>Control Class</i>
<b>Causal Pathway Changes to traffic patterns/confusion</b>	70.00%	7.00E-03	1 Critical and 1 Major
Changes to traffic patterns			
63 Enforcement of Vic Roads requirements			<b>Critical</b>
67 Construction contractor QA system compliance with Vic Roads requirements			<b>Major</b>
33 Contractor management process(fatigue management, selection process)			
66 Ensure risk assessment and SOPs			
<b>Causal Pathway Changes to road surface conditions</b>	10.00%	1.00E-03	1 Critical or 2 Major
Changes to road surface conditions			
63 Enforcement of Vic Roads requirements			<b>Critical</b>
67 Construction contractor QA system compliance with Vic Roads requirements			
33 Contractor management process(fatigue management, selection process)			
66 Ensure risk assessment and SOPs			
<b>Causal Pathway Poor visibility</b>	10.00%	1.00E-03	1 Critical or 2 Major
Poor visibility			
63 Enforcement of Vic Roads requirements			<b>Critical</b>
67 Construction contractor QA system compliance with Vic Roads requirements			<b>Major</b>
33 Contractor management process(fatigue management, selection process)			
66 Ensure risk assessment and SOPs			
<b>Causal Pathway Impatience of drivers</b>	10.00%	1.00E-03	1 Critical or 2 Major
Impatience of drivers			
63 Enforcement of Vic Roads requirements			<b>Critical</b>
67 Construction contractor QA system compliance with Vic Roads requirements			
33 Contractor management process(fatigue management, selection process)			
66 Ensure risk assessment and SOPs			

# Hazard Register Data Sheet

**Hazard IPRH-NO24 Heavy Mobile equipment interactions on mine roads**

PLL 6.67E-03

Relates to incidents during normal heavy mobile plant operations on mine roads. Issue due to sharing of roads between mobile equipment. Hazard excludes light vehicle incidents (NO1), and interactions in ,loading areas (NO29) as included as separate scenario .Areas of concern: Infrequent users of mine roads; External dumping closer to points of entry; Radio protocols (need for clearer and more positive communication).

Control	%	PLL Contr	Control Class
<b>Causal Pathway Poor visibility</b>	10.00%	6.67E-04	1 Major

## Rain

- 102 Minimum equipment standards
- 141 Road watering
- 77 Fog lights
- 76 Flashing lights
- 171 Sun glasses supplied
- 192 wipers
- 129 Pre start checks and recording
- 153 Shift changeover meeting
- 17 Cease / delay task in extreme conditions
- 56 Drive to conditions
- 134 Remarking of road lines
- 83 Guide posts and reflectors

**Major**

## Fog

- 102 Minimum equipment standards
- 141 Road watering
- 77 Fog lights
- 76 Flashing lights
- 171 Sun glasses supplied
- 192 wipers
- 129 Pre start checks and recording
- 153 Shift changeover meeting
- 17 Cease / delay task in extreme conditions
- 56 Drive to conditions
- 134 Remarking of road lines
- 83 Guide posts and reflectors

## Dust

- 102 Minimum equipment standards
- 141 Road watering
- 77 Fog lights
- 76 Flashing lights
- 171 Sun glasses supplied
- 192 wipers
- 129 Pre start checks and recording
- 153 Shift changeover meeting
- 17 Cease / delay task in extreme conditions
- 56 Drive to conditions
- 134 Remarking of road lines
- 83 Guide posts and reflectors

## Sun

- 102 Minimum equipment standards
- 141 Road watering
- 77 Fog lights
- 76 Flashing lights
- 171 Sun glasses supplied
- 192 wipers
- 129 Pre start checks and recording

## Hazard Register Data Sheet

**Hazard IPRH-NO24 Heavy Mobile equipment interactions on mine roads**

PLL 6.67E-03

Relates to incidents during normal heavy mobile plant operations on mine roads. Issue due to sharing of roads between mobile equipment. Hazard excludes light vehicle incidents (NO1), and interactions in ,loading areas (NO29) as included as separate scenario .Areas of concern: Infrequent users of mine roads; External dumping closer to points of entry; Radio protocols (need for clearer and more positive communication).

*Control*

% PLL Contr Control Class

- 153 Shift changeover meeting
- 17 Cease / delay task in extreme conditions
- 56 Drive to conditions
- 134 Remarking of road lines
- 83 Guide posts and reflectors

**Causal Pathway Poor road conditions**

2.00% 1.33E-04 None

**Construction**

- 133 Regular grading
- 138 Road maintenance program
- 140 Road surfacing material (borrow areas / import rock)
- 144 Safety walks

**Surfacing**

- 133 Regular grading
- 138 Road maintenance program
- 140 Road surfacing material (borrow areas / import rock)
- 144 Safety walks

**Drainage**

- 133 Regular grading
- 138 Road maintenance program
- 140 Road surfacing material (borrow areas / import rock)
- 144 Safety walks

# Hazard Register Data Sheet

Hazard IPRH-NO24 Heavy Mobile equipment interactions on mine roads

PLL 6.67E-03

Relates to incidents during normal heavy mobile plant operations on mine roads. Issue due to sharing of roads between mobile equipment. Hazard excludes light vehicle incidents (NO1), and interactions in ,loading areas (NO29) as included as separate scenario .Areas of concern: Infrequent users of mine roads; External dumping closer to points of entry; Radio protocols (need for clearer and more positive communication).

Control	%	PLL Contr	Control Class
<b>Causal Pathway Driver error / not following road rules</b>	40.00%	2.67E-03	1 Critical and 1 Major

## Driving to conditions

1 4wd training for IPH personnel			
28 Competent personnel			Major
161 Site induction process			
49 Disciplinary policy			
33 Contractor management process(fatigue management, selection process)			Major
153 Shift changeover meeting			
157 Shift notes			
51 Documented road rules			
160 Signage			
172 Supervision			Critical
88 Incident reporting and CA			
198 Consider publishing mine traffic rules handbook.			New

## Rules

1 4wd training for IPH personnel			
28 Competent personnel			
161 Site induction process			
49 Disciplinary policy			
33 Contractor management process(fatigue management, selection process)			
153 Shift changeover meeting			
157 Shift notes			
51 Documented road rules			
160 Signage			
172 Supervision			
88 Incident reporting and CA			
198 Consider publishing mine traffic rules handbook.			New

## Unfamiliar with conditions

1 4wd training for IPH personnel			
28 Competent personnel			
161 Site induction process			
49 Disciplinary policy			
33 Contractor management process(fatigue management, selection process)			
153 Shift changeover meeting			
157 Shift notes			
51 Documented road rules			
160 Signage			
172 Supervision			
88 Incident reporting and CA			
198 Consider publishing mine traffic rules handbook.			New

## Fatigue / Fitness-For-Work

177 Task rotation			
156 Shift management			
53 Draft drug & Alcohol policy			
6 Annual medical tests available			
60 EAP available			
101 Medical tests / first aid available			
96 Leave policies			

# Hazard Register Data Sheet

## Hazard IPRH-NO24 Heavy Mobile equipment interactions on mine roads

PLL 6.67E-03

Relates to incidents during normal heavy mobile plant operations on mine roads. Issue due to sharing of roads between mobile equipment. Hazard excludes light vehicle incidents (NO1), and interactions in ,loading areas (NO29) as included as separate scenario .Areas of concern: Infrequent users of mine roads; External dumping closer to points of entry; Radio protocols (need for clearer and more positive communication).

*Control*

% PLL Contr Control Class

59 Duty of Care

### Distracted

- 1 4wd training for IPH personnel
- 28 Competent personnel
- 161 Site induction process
- 49 Disciplinary policy
- 33 Contractor management process(fatigue management, selection process)
- 153 Shift changeover meeting
- 157 Shift notes
- 51 Documented road rules
- 160 Signage
- 172 Supervision
- 88 Incident reporting and CA
- 198 Consider publishing mine traffic rules handbook.

**New**

### Driving to conditions

- 1 4wd training for IPH personnel
- 28 Competent personnel
- 161 Site induction process
- 49 Disciplinary policy
- 33 Contractor management process(fatigue management, selection process)
- 153 Shift changeover meeting
- 157 Shift notes
- 51 Documented road rules
- 160 Signage
- 172 Supervision
- 88 Incident reporting and CA
- 198 Consider publishing mine traffic rules handbook.

**New**

### Causal Pathway Mechanical failure

40.00% 2.67E-03 1 Critical and 1 Major

### Mechanical failure

- 130 Preventative maintenance program (light and heavy mobile vehicles)
- 158 Shiftly fault inspections(reporting)
- 28 Competent personnel
- 194 Works Management System
- 169 Spare vehicles
- 16 Call out service
- 57 Dry hire lease arrangements

**Critical  
Major**

### Causal Pathway Over / uneven loading of trucks

2.00% 1.33E-04 None

### Spillage

- 27 Competent operators
- 172 Supervision
- 168 Maintenance procedures
- 139 Road rules



## Hazard Register Data Sheet

**Hazard IPRH-NO24 Heavy Mobile equipment interactions on mine roads**

PLL 6.67E-03

Relates to incidents during normal heavy mobile plant operations on mine roads. Issue due to sharing of roads between mobile equipment. Hazard excludes light vehicle incidents (NO1), and interactions in ,loading areas (NO29) as included as separate scenario .Areas of concern: Infrequent users of mine roads; External dumping closer to points of entry; Radio protocols (need for clearer and more positive communication).

Control	%	PLL Contr	Control Class
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**Causal Pathway Poor road design**

2.00% 1.33E-04 None

Poor road design

- 39 Design of permanent roads & ramps to Vic Roads standard
- 26 Competent mine planner
- 68 Erection of temporary barriers
- 137 Review intersections for traffic management

**Causal Pathway Unauthorised access**

2.00% 1.33E-04 None

Unauthorised access

- 89 Induction process
- 147 Security gates
- 148 Security guard
- 145 Sealed roads as boundary of mine
- 160 Signage
- 2 Access control through control centre / shift manager
- 50 Disseminate haul road info IPH wide
- 199 Security review to be completed.

**New**

**Causal Pathway Poor communication**

2.00% 1.33E-04 None

Poor communication

- 182 Tool box meetings
- 152 Shift changeover
- 84 Hand held and fixed radios
- 28 Competent personnel
- 139 Road rules
- 130 Preventative maintenance program (light and heavy mobile vehicles)
- 50 Disseminate haul road info IPH wide

**Outcome Pathw Consequence**

0.00% 0.00E+00 None

Single fatality or irreversible disability

- 233 Seat belts in all vehicles
- 231 ROPs on mining plant
- 207 Air bags on selected LVs
- 211 Bull bars
- 223 First aid room on site
- 214 Emergency response procedure
- 224 First Aiders on all shifts
- 212 Close proximity to Emergency Services and Hospital
- 213 Diamond Protection for first response

## Hazard Register Data Sheet

<i>Hazard</i>	<i>PLL</i>	<i>PLL Contr</i>	<i>Control Class</i>
<b>IPRH-NO26 Batter failure</b>	1.00E-03		
Relates to both coal and overburden collapses onto personnel, plant and/or vehicle (eg. dozer,4wd,pedestrian)			
<i>Control</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>PLL Contr</i>	<i>Control Class</i>
<b>Causal Pathway Material type / soft formation</b>	35.00%	3.50E-04	1 Major
<b>Material type / soft formation</b>			
48 Digging procedures			<b>Critical</b>
34 Crack monitoring			
154 Shift face inspections			<b>Major</b>
35 Crack orientation for dig plan			<b>Major</b>
107 Monthly engineering face inspections			
29 Computer modelling of stability (internal)			
55 Drilling and testing as required			
7 Annual stability and dewatering reports (externally reviewed)			
92 Investigation pans for fire holes			
105 Modify digging programs as required			
72 Face mapping of Over Burden			<b>Critical</b>
173 Supply of face maps to OB operations			
<b>Causal Pathway Operator Error</b>	10.00%	1.00E-04	None
<b>Not digging to plan</b>			
27 Competent operators			
172 Supervision			
70 Experienced workforce			
46 Dig charts			
157 Shift notes			
62 Electronic feedback (survey control)			
173 Supply of face maps to OB operations			
205 Confirm documented parking procedures about parking at toe of batter.			<b>New</b>
<b>Causal Pathway Water pressure</b>	10.00%	1.00E-04	None
<b>Water pressure</b>			
44 Dewatering			
82 Groundwater profile monitoring			
7 Annual stability and dewatering reports (externally reviewed)			
85 Horizontal bores (relief bores)			
175 Surface drainage Plan			
47 Dig plan design for drainage control			
109 Monthly stability inspections			
88 Incident reporting and CA			
136 Remediation works			
124 Pin lines (monitoring)			

## Hazard Register Data Sheet

<i>Hazard</i>	<i>PLL</i>	<i>1.00E-03</i>	
<b>IPRH-NO26 Batter failure</b>			
Relates to both coal and overburden collapses onto personnel, plant and/or vehicle (eg. dozer,4wd,pedestrian)			
<i>Control</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>PLL Contr</i>	<i>Control Class</i>
<b>Causal Pathway Surcharge / over height</b>	20.00%	2.00E-04	None
<b>Surcharge / over height</b>			
174 Surcharge removal			<b>Critical</b>
48 Digging procedures			
34 Crack monitoring			
154 Shift face inspections			
35 Crack orientation for dig plan			
107 Monthly engineering face inspections			
29 Computer modelling of stability (internal)			
55 Drilling and testing as required			
7 Annual stability and dewatering reports (externally reviewed)			
92 Investigation pans for fire holes			
105 Modify digging programs as required			
72 Face mapping of Over Burden			
173 Supply of face maps to OB operations			
<b>Causal Pathway Surface drainage</b>	23.00%	2.30E-04	None
<b>Surface drainage</b>			
175 Surface drainage Plan			<b>Critical</b>
47 Dig plan design for drainage control			
109 Monthly stability inspections			
88 Incident reporting and CA			
136 Remediation works			
124 Pin lines (monitoring)			
<b>Causal Pathway Heaving</b>	2.00%	2.00E-05	None
<b>Heaving</b>			
44 Dewatering			
82 Groundwater profile monitoring			
7 Annual stability and dewatering reports (externally reviewed)			
85 Horizontal bores (relief bores)			
<b>Outcome Pathw Consequence</b>	0.00%	0.00E+00	None
<b>Multiple fatalities</b>			
223 First aid room on site			
214 Emergency response procedure			
224 First Aiders on all shifts			
212 Close proximity to Emergency Services and Hospital			
213 Diamond Protection for first response			

## Hazard Register Data Sheet

**Hazard** IPRH-NO36 Inrush of water into mine

PLL 1.60E-05

Relates to major inrush of water into mining area. Main control is the design of flood mitigation to 1:10,000 yr /event. Also considers risk of catastrophic dam wall failure as well.

Control	%	PLL Contr	Control Class
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<b>Causal Pathway</b> Water volume of catchment area above design of cut off drains	10.00%	1.60E-06	None
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Water volume of catchment area above design of cut off drains

31 Construction of levy banks at 1 in 10,000 yr event

<b>Causal Pathway</b> Failure / breach of flood protection	10.00%	1.60E-06	None
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Failure

31 Construction of levy banks at 1 in 10,000 yr event

Breach

31 Construction of levy banks at 1 in 10,000 yr event

<b>Causal Pathway</b> Failure of dam wall	80.00%	1.28E-05	None
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Failure of Dam Wall

245 Ancold Regulations (Statutory Dam Inspections, Monitoring, Survey, etc)

**Critical**

<b>Outcome Pathw</b> Consequence	0.00%	0.00E+00	None
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Multiple fatalities

223 First aid room on site

214 Emergency response procedure

224 First Aiders on all shifts

212 Close proximity to Emergency Services and Hospital

213 Diamond Protection for first response

## Hazard Register Data Sheet

**Hazard** IPRH-NO37 Failure whilst field jacking of major mining plant

PLL 4.40E-03

Maintenance work for Major Mining Plant completed in field, due to size of plant. Hazard relates to jacking of plant for maintenance purposes.

<i>Control</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>PLL Contr</i>	<i>Control Class</i>
<b>Causal Pathway Equipment failure</b>	5.00%	2.20E-04	None
Equipment failure			
25 Competent maintenance personnel			
168 Maintenance procedures			
18 Certified and rated jacking equipment			
9 Appropriately stored equipment			
10 Asset register of equipment			
189 Weight / balance diagrams (weight and balance audit)			
210 Annual training in fire fighting			
<b>Causal Pathway Failure to follow procedure</b>	20.00%	8.80E-04	1 Critical or 2 Major
Failure to follow procedure			
25 Competent maintenance personnel			<b>Major</b>
168 Maintenance procedures			<b>Major</b>
<b>Causal Pathway Ground conditions</b>	60.00%	2.64E-03	1 Critical and 1 Major
Ground conditions			
11 Ballast (excavation and backfill)			<b>Critical</b>
243 Ground Assessment Procedure			<b>Major</b>
175 Surface drainage Plan			<b>Major</b>
<b>Causal Pathway Incorrect procedure</b>	10.00%	4.40E-04	1 Major
Incorrect procedure			
25 Competent maintenance personnel			<b>Major</b>
168 Maintenance procedures			<b>Major</b>
18 Certified and rated jacking equipment			
9 Appropriately stored equipment			
10 Asset register of equipment			
189 Weight / balance diagrams (weight and balance audit)			
210 Annual training in fire fighting			
<b>Causal Pathway Ground vibration</b>	5.00%	2.20E-04	None
Seismic			
150 Separation of plant from activity			
166 SOP (Jack & Pack)			
Plant Movements			
150 Separation of plant from activity			
166 SOP (Jack & Pack)			
<b>Outcome Pathw Consequence</b>	0.00%	0.00E+00	None
Multiple fatalities			
223 First aid room on site			
214 Emergency response procedure			
224 First Aiders on all shifts			
212 Close proximity to Emergency Services and Hospital			
213 Diamond Protection for first response			

## Hazard Register Data Sheet

**Hazard IPRH-NO38 Unplanned movement of equipment**

PLL 1.37E-03

Relates to unplanned / uncontrolled movement of equipment striking personnel or equipment. Includes parts of Major Mining Plant or mine heavy vehicles / equipment. Example scenarios include; equipment runaway, operator error, belt slip, belt runaway, remote startup, vehicles parked up, conveyor anchor post failure, etc. Excludes entanglement in mechanical equipment, as included as separate hazard (NO11).

Control	%	PLL Contr	Control Class
<b>Causal Pathway Brake Failure</b>	25.00%	3.42E-04	1 Major
Brake Failure			
142 Routine inspection			<b>Major</b>
143 Safety device testing for major plant			
246 Preventative maintenance program (major mining plant)			
73 Fail safe designs			
121 Permit procedures			
244 Dual Brakes			
<b>Causal Pathway Electrical failure</b>	5.00%	6.84E-05	None
Electrical failure			
142 Routine inspection			
143 Safety device testing for major plant			
246 Preventative maintenance program (major mining plant)			
73 Fail safe designs			
121 Permit procedures			
<b>Causal Pathway Not following procedure</b>	50.00%	6.83E-04	1 Major
Not following procedure			
94 JSA			<b>Major</b>
168 Maintenance procedures			
25 Competent maintenance personnel			<b>Major</b>
<b>Causal Pathway Inadequate anchoring</b>	0.00%	0.00E+00	None
Inadequate anchoring			
41 Designated anchoring points			
119 Pendant ropes			
185 Trestles for specific components			
179 Testing and inspection of Trestles and Pendent ropes (external)			
4 Anchor posts for conveyors			
184 Training of fire man / spotter for Hot Work			
<b>Causal Pathway Wind loading</b>	0.00%	0.00E+00	None
Wind loading			
190 Wind gauges			
191 Wind restrictions in mine			
115 Orientation for wind			
<b>Causal Pathway Mechanical failure</b>	20.00%	2.73E-04	1 Major
Mechanical failure			
142 Routine inspection			<b>Major</b>
143 Safety device testing for major plant			
246 Preventative maintenance program (major mining plant)			
73 Fail safe designs			
121 Permit procedures			

## Hazard Register Data Sheet

**Hazard IPRH-NO38 Unplanned movement of equipment**

PLL 1.37E-03

Relates to unplanned / uncontrolled movement of equipment striking personnel or equipment. Includes parts of Major Mining Plant or mine heavy vehicles / equipment. Example scenarios include; equipment runaway, operator error, belt slip, belt runaway, remote startup, vehicles parked up, conveyor anchor post failure, etc. Excludes entanglement in mechanical equipment, as included as separate hazard (NO11).

Control	%	PLL Contr	Control Class
<b>Outcome Pathw Consequence</b>	0.00%	0.00E+00	None

**Multiple fatalities**

- 223 First aid room on site
- 214 Emergency response procedure
- 224 First Aiders on all shifts
- 212 Close proximity to Emergency Services and Hospital
- 213 Diamond Protection for first response

# Hazard Register Data Sheet

## Hazard IPRH-NO39 Confined/registered spaces

PLL 3.00E-04

Relates to both Confined and Registered Spaces. Includes maintenance work in and around bunkers. Several Registered Spaces but relatively few Confined Spaces. For mine operations (ie. Dredger tubs and Bucket wheel)

*Control* % PLL Contr Control Class

### Causal Pathway Failure to follow procedures

80.00% 2.40E-04 None

#### Failure to follow procedures

- 30 Confined space procedure **Critical**
- 80 Gas testing
- 187 Ventilation fans
- 42 Designated confined space officer
- 36 Confined Space Training **Major**
- 132 Register of confined spaces
- 95 Warning signage at all restricted / confined spaces **Major**
- 128 PPE

- 30 Confined space procedure
- 80 Gas testing
- 187 Ventilation fans
- 42 Designated confined space officer
- 36 Confined Space Training
- 132 Register of confined spaces
- 95 Warning signage at all restricted / confined spaces
- 128 PPE

- 30 Confined space procedure
- 80 Gas testing
- 187 Ventilation fans
- 42 Designated confined space officer
- 36 Confined Space Training
- 132 Register of confined spaces
- 95 Warning signage at all restricted / confined spaces
- 128 PPE

### Causal Pathway Limited exits

10.00% 3.00E-05 None

#### Limited exits

- 30 Confined space procedure
- 80 Gas testing
- 187 Ventilation fans
- 42 Designated confined space officer
- 36 Confined Space Training
- 132 Register of confined spaces
- 95 Warning signage at all restricted / confined spaces
- 128 PPE

### Causal Pathway Lack of ventilation

10.00% 3.00E-05 None

#### Lack of ventilation

- 30 Confined space procedure
- 80 Gas testing
- 187 Ventilation fans
- 42 Designated confined space officer
- 36 Confined Space Training
- 132 Register of confined spaces
- 95 Warning signage at all restricted / confined spaces
- 128 PPE



## Hazard Register Data Sheet

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Hazard IPRH-NO39 Confined/registered spaces

PLL 3.00E-04

Relates to both Confined and Registered Spaces. Includes maintenance work in and around bunkers. Several Registered Spaces but relatively few Confined Spaces. For mine operations (ie. Dredger tubs and Bucket wheel)

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<i>Control</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>PLL Contr</i>	<i>Control Class</i>
<i>Outcome Pathw</i> <b>Consequence</b>	0.00%	0.00E+00	None

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### Multiple fatalities

- 223 First aid room on site
- 214 Emergency response procedure
- 224 First Aiders on all shifts
- 212 Close proximity to Emergency Services and Hospital
- 213 Diamond Protection for first response

## Hazard Register Data Sheet

**Hazard** IPRH-NO4 **Dropped objects from major mining plant (onto personnel or equipment)** *PLL* 6.00E-03

Major Mining Plant includes conveyors, stackers & dredgers. Relates to plant components falling, loose material falling or deliberate dumping, and material falling due to minor structural failure. Areas of concern: Lumps of coal falling; Complacency of stacker operator or ground personnel; Ensuring equipment is correctly designed.

<i>Control</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>PLL Contr</i>	<i>Control Class</i>
<b>Causal Pathway Equipment Failure</b>	10.00%	6.00E-04	1 Major
Equipment Failure			
246 Preventative maintenance program (major mining plant)			<b>Critical</b>
158 Shiftly fault inspections(reporting)			<b>Major</b>
28 Competent personnel			
194 Works Management System			
239 Design Standard			<b>Major</b>

<b>Causal Pathway Blocked Chute</b>	0.00%	0.00E+00	None
Blocked Chute			
246 Preventative maintenance program (major mining plant)			
158 Shiftly fault inspections(reporting)			
28 Competent personnel			
43 Designed conveyor systems (chute size, gradient)			
14 Block chute limits			
122 Permit System			
168 Maintenance procedures			
116 Overload devices			
106 Monitor weightometers on machines			
151 Sequencing of conveyors			
12 Belt alignment limit switches			
195 Install dynamic braking in conveyor systems in WF to match sequence			<b>New</b>
196 Ensure correct barricades are erected during cleaning of major plant			<b>New</b>

<b>Causal Pathway Conveyor Run-on (gradient)</b>	50.00%	3.00E-03	1 Critical and 1 Major
Conveyor Run-on (gradient)			
246 Preventative maintenance program (major mining plant)			<b>Major</b>
158 Shiftly fault inspections(reporting)			
28 Competent personnel			
43 Designed conveyor systems (chute size, gradient)			<b>Critical</b>
14 Block chute limits			
122 Permit System			
168 Maintenance procedures			
116 Overload devices			
106 Monitor weightometers on machines			
151 Sequencing of conveyors			<b>Major</b>
12 Belt alignment limit switches			
195 Install dynamic braking in conveyor systems in WF to match sequence			<b>New</b>
196 Ensure correct barricades are erected during cleaning of major plant			<b>New</b>

## Hazard Register Data Sheet

**Hazard** IPRH-NO4 **Dropped objects from major mining plant (onto personnel or equipment)** *PLL* 6.00E-03

Major Mining Plant includes conveyors, stackers & dredgers. Relates to plant components falling, loose material falling or deliberate dumping, and material falling due to minor structural failure. Areas of concern: Lumps of coal falling; Complacency of stacker operator or ground personnel; Ensuring equipment is correctly designed.

*Control* % *PLL Contr* *Control Class*

**Causal Pathway Overloaded Conveyor**

1.00% 6.00E-05 None

Overloaded Conveyor

- 246 Preventative maintenance program (major mining plant)
- 158 Shiftly fault inspections(reporting)
- 28 Competent personnel
- 43 Designed conveyor systems (chute size, gradient)
- 14 Block chute limits
- 122 Permit System
- 168 Maintenance procedures
- 116 Overload devices
- 106 Monitor weightometers on machines
- 151 Sequencing of conveyors
- 12 Belt alignment limit switches
- 195 Install dynamic braking in conveyor systems in WF to match sequence
- 196 Ensure correct barricades are erected during cleaning of major plant

**New**  
**New**

**Causal Pathway Poor Design**

12.00% 7.20E-04 1 Major

Poor Design

- 24 Competent design engineers
- 126 Plant / AS regulations
- 118 Past experience
- 240 Sequencing and breaking design

**Major**  
**Critical**

## Hazard Register Data Sheet

**Hazard** IPRH-NO4 Dropped objects from major mining plant (onto personnel or equipment) *PLL* 6.00E-03

Major Mining Plant includes conveyors, stackers & dredgers. Relates to plant components falling, loose material falling or deliberate dumping, and material falling due to minor structural failure. Areas of concern: Lumps of coal falling; Complacency of stacker operator or ground personnel; Ensuring equipment is correctly designed.

<i>Control</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>PLL Contr</i>	<i>Control Class</i>
<b>Causal Pathway Operator / Maintenance Error</b>	12.00%	7.20E-04	1 Major
Mis-communication			
84 Hand held and fixed radios			
28 Competent personnel			Major
22 Communication procedures			
172 Supervision			
70 Experienced workforce			Major
197 Introduction of Safe Work Observation Process			New
Dropped Object			
84 Hand held and fixed radios			
28 Competent personnel			
22 Communication procedures			
172 Supervision			
70 Experienced workforce			
197 Introduction of Safe Work Observation Process			New
Fatigue / Fitness-for-Work			
177 Task rotation			
156 Shift management			
53 Draft drug & Alcohol policy			
6 Annual medical tests available			
60 EAP available			
101 Medical tests / first aid available			
96 Leave policies			
59 Duty of Care			
197 Introduction of Safe Work Observation Process			New
Incorrect Fitting			
84 Hand held and fixed radios			
28 Competent personnel			
22 Communication procedures			
172 Supervision			
70 Experienced workforce			
197 Introduction of Safe Work Observation Process			New
<b>Causal Pathway Dirty Conveyor Belt</b>	1.00%	6.00E-05	None
Dirty Conveyor Belt			
74 Finger scrapers			
<b>Causal Pathway Poor Housekeeping</b>	4.00%	2.40E-04	None
Poor Housekeeping			
40 Design to prevent spillage			Major
246 Preventative maintenance program (major mining plant)			
20 Cleaning daily or on request (hose down / shovel clean)			Major
158 Shifty fault inspections(reporting)			
144 Safety walks			

## Hazard Register Data Sheet

**Hazard** IPRH-NO4 Dropped objects from major mining plant (onto personnel or equipment) *PLL* 6.00E-03

Major Mining Plant includes conveyors, stackers & dredgers. Relates to plant components falling, loose material falling or deliberate dumping, and material falling due to minor structural failure. Areas of concern: Lumps of coal falling; Complacency of stacker operator or ground personnel; Ensuring equipment is correctly designed.

*Control* % *PLL Contr* *Control Class*

**Causal Pathway** **Unauthorised Access**

0.00% 0.00E+00 None

Unauthorised Access

- 122 Permit System
- 168 Maintenance procedures
- 28 Competent personnel
- 70 Experienced workforce
- 97 Level 3 induction process
- 160 Signage
- 15 Boundary fences
- 147 Security gates
- 148 Security guard

**Outcome Pathw** **Consequence**

0.00% 0.00E+00 None

Single fatality or irreversible disability

- 238 Spill trays
- 237 Spill mesh
- 223 First aid room on site
- 214 Emergency response procedure
- 224 First Aiders on all shifts
- 212 Close proximity to Emergency Services and Hospital
- 213 Diamond Protection for first response

# Hazard Register Data Sheet

**Hazard** IPRH-NO42 Fall from or tipping of EWP

PLL 1.10E-03

Relates to any equipment used for work at heights, eg. EWP, Cherry picker, JLG, Boom lift, Scissor lifts. Includes EPV (Elevated Platform Vehicle (EPV))

<i>Control</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>PLL Contr</i>	<i>Control Class</i>
<b>Causal Pathway Failure to follow procedures</b>	30.00%	3.30E-04	1 Major
Failure to follow procedures			
181 Ticketed operators (EWP)			<b>Major</b>
71 External training and testing			
33 Contractor management process(fatigue management, selection process)			
114 Operations manual			
94 JSA			<b>Major</b>
<b>Causal Pathway Ground conditions</b>	35.00%	3.85E-04	1 Major
Ground conditions			
181 Ticketed operators (EWP)			<b>Major</b>
71 External training and testing			
33 Contractor management process(fatigue management, selection process)			
114 Operations manual			
94 JSA			<b>Major</b>
<b>Causal Pathway Component failure (Structural / Mechanical)</b>	0.00%	0.00E+00	None
Component failure (Structural / Mechanical)			
5 Annual external testing			
99 Log books			
33 Contractor management process(fatigue management, selection process)			
<b>Causal Pathway Overloading</b>	15.00%	1.65E-04	None
Overloading			
91 Interlock			
176 SWL			
181 Ticketed operators (EWP)			
71 External training and testing			
33 Contractor management process(fatigue management, selection process)			
114 Operations manual			
94 JSA			
<b>Causal Pathway Wind loading</b>	10.00%	1.10E-04	None
Wind loading			
190 Wind gauges			
191 Wind restrictions in mine			
115 Orientation for wind			
<b>Causal Pathway Collision</b>	5.00%	5.50E-05	None
Collision			
170 Spotter			
<b>Causal Pathway Overbalance</b>	5.00%	5.50E-05	None
Overbalance			
181 Ticketed operators (EWP)			
71 External training and testing			
33 Contractor management process(fatigue management, selection process)			
114 Operations manual			
94 JSA			

## Hazard Register Data Sheet

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Hazard IPRH-NO42 Fall from or tipping of EWP

PLL 1.10E-03

Relates to any equipment used for work at heights, eg. EWP, Cherry picker, JLG, Boom lift, Scissor lifts. Includes EPV (Elevated Platform Vehicle (EPV))

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<i>Control</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>PLL Contr</i>	<i>Control Class</i>
<i>Outcome Pathw</i> <b>Consequence</b>	0.00%	0.00E+00	None

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### Multiple fatalities

- 223 First aid room on site
- 214 Emergency response procedure
- 224 First Aiders on all shifts
- 212 Close proximity to Emergency Services and Hospital
- 213 Diamond Protection for first response

## Hazard Register Data Sheet

Hazard	PLL	Contr	Control Class
<b>IPRH-NO43 Building fire</b>	2.20E-04		
Buildings for mine operations include; Control Room, Workshop, Offices.			
<i>Control</i>	%	PLL	Control Class
<b>Causal Pathway Hot work</b>	30.00%	6.60E-05	None
Hot work			
25 Competent maintenance personnel			
<b>Causal Pathway Cooking utensils</b>	5.00%	1.10E-05	None
Cooking utensils			
86 Housekeeping			
123 PETE system,			
19 Circuit breakers			
61 Earth leakage in workshop			
<b>Causal Pathway Electrical fault</b>	50.00%	1.10E-04	None
Electrical fault			
123 PETE system,			
19 Circuit breakers			
61 Earth leakage in workshop			
<b>Causal Pathway Arson</b>	5.00%	1.10E-05	None
Arson			
146 Secured area (gate, fences)			
<b>Causal Pathway Failure to follow no-smoking procedure</b>	10.00%	2.20E-05	None
Failure to follow no-smoking procedure			
111 No-smoking policy			



# Hazard Register Data Sheet

Hazard IPRH-NO5 Uncontrolled Movement of major mining plant.

PLL 1.65E-03

Major Mining Plant includes conveyors, stackers & dredgers. Hazard also relates to use of cranes. Mainly relates to toppling of plant but also includes derailling, collapses, operator error, slippage, toppling due to windload or soft ground, structural failure of plant or ground, etc. Excludes falling loads from cranes and excavator (NO51); falling objects from Major Ming Plant (NO24); Tripper/hopper runaway (NO-19) and Field jacking of equipment (NO37), as included as separate hazards.

Control	%	PLL Contr	Control Class
Causal Pathway <b>Batter collapse</b>	5.00%	8.25E-05	None

## Depressions

- 48 Digging procedures
- 34 Crack monitoring
- 154 Shift face inspections
- 35 Crack orientation for dig plan
- 107 Monthly engineering face inspections
- 44 Dewatering
- 82 Groundwater profile monitoring
- 175 Surface drainage Plan
- 174 Surcharge removal
- 29 Computer modelling of stability (internal)
- 55 Drilling and testing as required
- 7 Annual stability and dewatering reports (externally reviewed)
- 92 Investigation pans for fire holes
- 105 Modify digging programs as required
- 72 Face mapping of Over Burden
- 173 Supply of face maps to OB operations
- 200 Improve info dissemination on ground conditions to mine operators (electronic).

**New**

## Water Pressure

- 48 Digging procedures
- 34 Crack monitoring
- 154 Shift face inspections
- 35 Crack orientation for dig plan
- 107 Monthly engineering face inspections
- 44 Dewatering
- 82 Groundwater profile monitoring
- 175 Surface drainage Plan
- 174 Surcharge removal
- 29 Computer modelling of stability (internal)
- 55 Drilling and testing as required
- 7 Annual stability and dewatering reports (externally reviewed)
- 92 Investigation pans for fire holes
- 105 Modify digging programs as required
- 72 Face mapping of Over Burden
- 173 Supply of face maps to OB operations
- 200 Improve info dissemination on ground conditions to mine operators (electronic).

**New**

# Hazard Register Data Sheet

**Hazard** IPRH-NO5 Uncontrolled Movement of major mining plant.

PLL 1.65E-03

Major Mining Plant includes conveyors, stackers & dredgers. Hazard also relates to use of cranes. Mainly relates to toppling of plant but also includes derailling, collapses, operator error, slippage, toppling due to windload or soft ground, structural failure of plant or ground, etc. Excludes falling loads from cranes and excavator (NO51); falling objects from Major Ming Plant (NO24); Tripper/hopper runaway (NO-19) and Field jacking of equipment (NO37), as included as separate hazards.

Control	%	PLL Contr	Control Class
<b>Causal Pathway Operator error/Design interface</b>	45.00%	7.42E-04	1 Major
<b>Over Edge</b>			
27 Competent operators			
172 Supervision			
70 Experienced workforce			<b>Major</b>
46 Dig charts			
157 Shift notes			
62 Electronic feedback (survey control)			<b>Major</b>
193 Working & backup limits			
201 Improve electronic feedback and control for dredge operators.			<b>New</b>
202 Investigate installing tilt device in dredges.			<b>New</b>
<b>Off Load Bucket</b>			
27 Competent operators			
172 Supervision			
70 Experienced workforce			
46 Dig charts			
157 Shift notes			
62 Electronic feedback (survey control)			
193 Working & backup limits			
201 Improve electronic feedback and control for dredge operators.			<b>New</b>
202 Investigate installing tilt device in dredges.			<b>New</b>
<b>Wheel Drop Cuts</b>			
27 Competent operators			
172 Supervision			
70 Experienced workforce			
46 Dig charts			
157 Shift notes			
62 Electronic feedback (survey control)			
193 Working & backup limits			
201 Improve electronic feedback and control for dredge operators.			<b>New</b>
202 Investigate installing tilt device in dredges.			<b>New</b>
<b>Fatigue / Fitness-For-Work</b>			
177 Task rotation			
156 Shift management			
53 Draft drug & Alcohol policy			
6 Annual medical tests available			
60 EAP available			
101 Medical tests / first aid available			
96 Leave policies			
59 Duty of Care			
<b>Causal Pathway Soft formation/Ground conditions (unknown objects)</b>	30.00%	4.95E-04	1 Major
<b>Soft formation</b>			
112 Ongoing inspection by operator / shift management			
81 Grade control and mine planning			
54 Drainage			
135 Remediation plan for soft areas			

## Hazard Register Data Sheet

**Hazard** IPRH-NO5 Uncontrolled Movement of major mining plant.

PLL 1.65E-03

Major Mining Plant includes conveyors, stackers & dredgers. Hazard also relates to use of cranes. Mainly relates to toppling of plant but also includes derailling, collapses, operator error, slippage, toppling due to windload or soft ground, structural failure of plant or ground, etc. Excludes falling loads from cranes and excavator (NO51); falling objects from Major Ming Plant (NO24); Tripper/hopper runaway (NO-19) and Field jacking of equipment (NO37), as included as separate hazards.

Control	%	PLL Contr	Control Class
<b>Causal Pathway Dump slip</b>	5.00%	8.25E-05	None
Dump slip			
159 Shiftly inspection			
108 Monthly inspection			
58 Dump design (height)			
54 Drainage			
52 Dozer maintenance of dump grades			
125 Placement of material			
<b>Causal Pathway Safety &amp; electrical device failure</b>	1.00%	1.65E-05	None
Safety & electrical device failure			
246 Preventative maintenance program (major mining plant)			
162 Six monthly routine elect. maintenance			
110 Monthly testing of devices by operators			
163 six monthly testing of devices by engineers			
159 Shiftly inspection			
<b>Causal Pathway Incorrect jacking or failure</b>	5.00%	8.25E-05	None
Incorrect jacking or failure			
25 Competent maintenance personnel			
168 Maintenance procedures			
18 Certified and rated jacking equipment			
9 Appropriately stored equipment			
10 Asset register of equipment			
189 Weight / balance diagrams (weight and balance audit)			
21 Cleaning of machines			
203 Ensure JSA is completed for jacking activities in field.			
<b>Causal Pathway Equipment / rope / structure failure</b>	5.00%	8.25E-05	None
Equipment / rope / structure failure			
246 Preventative maintenance program (major mining plant)			
8 Annual structural inspection			
13 Biennial External structural and rope inspections			
25 Competent maintenance personnel			
100 Lubrication procedure			
117 Painting programs			
110 Monthly testing of devices by operators			
163 six monthly testing of devices by engineers			
159 Shiftly inspection			
<b>Causal Pathway Machine standoff</b>	4.00%	6.60E-05	None
Machine standoff			
167 SOP (machine stand off)			
204 Confirm documentation of rules for standoff of machines			<b>New</b>

## Hazard Register Data Sheet

**Hazard** IPRH-NO5 Uncontrolled Movement of major mining plant.

PLL 1.65E-03

Major Mining Plant includes conveyors, stackers & dredgers. Hazard also relates to use of cranes. Mainly relates to toppling of plant but also includes derailing, collapses, operator error, slippage, toppling due to windload or soft ground, structural failure of plant or ground, etc. Excludes falling loads from cranes and excavator (NO51); falling objects from Major Mining Plant (NO24); Tripper/hopper runaway (NO-19) and Field jacking of equipment (NO37), as included as separate hazards.

Control	%	PLL Contr	Control Class
<b>Outcome Pathw Consequence</b>	0.00%	0.00E+00	None
Multiple fatalities			
232 Safety hooks			
216 Escape routes from machine			
223 First aid room on site			
214 Emergency response procedure			
224 First Aiders on all shifts			
212 Close proximity to Emergency Services and Hospital			
213 Diamond Protection for first response			

## Hazard Register Data Sheet

### Hazard IPRH-NO7 Major mining plant fire

PLL 1.00E-04

Major Mining Plant includes conveyors, stackers & dredgers. Dredger considered biggest risk issue. Excludes Fire/explosion in bunker (NO15) and mobile equipment (NO3), as included as separate hazard scenarios. Areas of concern: Coal build up and mechanical failure.

Control	%	PLL Contr	Control Class
<b>Causal Pathway Electrical / mechanical failure</b>	20.00%	2.00E-05	None
Electrical / mechanical failure			
246 Preventative maintenance program (major mining plant)			
159 Shiftly inspection			<b>Major</b>
178 Temperature sensors / protection			
<b>Causal Pathway Grease/Oil build up</b>	20.00%	2.00E-05	None
Grease build up			
38 Degreasing of plant			
155 Shift inspections			
<b>Causal Pathway Coal build up</b>	20.00%	2.00E-05	None
Coal build up			
40 Design to prevent spillage			
246 Preventative maintenance program (major mining plant)			
20 Cleaning daily or on request (hose down / shovel clean)			<b>Major</b>
159 Shiftly inspection			
144 Safety walks			
<b>Causal Pathway Hot work</b>	20.00%	2.00E-05	None
Hot work			
122 Permit System			<b>Major</b>
78 Follow up inspections			
184 Training of fire man / spotter for Hot Work			
<b>Causal Pathway Housekeeping</b>	20.00%	2.00E-05	None
Housekeeping			
20 Cleaning daily or on request (hose down / shovel clean)			<b>Major</b>
159 Shiftly inspection			
144 Safety walks			
<b>Causal Pathway External fire</b>	0.00%	0.00E+00	None
External fire			
120 Perimeter slashing			
75 Fire brakes			
113 On-site fire fighting tankers			
<b>Causal Pathway Lightning</b>	0.00%	0.00E+00	None
Lightning			
98 Lightning rods on major plant			
<b>Causal Pathway Spot fire from vehicle / plant</b>	0.00%	0.00E+00	None
Spot fire from vehicle / plant			
104 Modified exhausts			
103 Modified braking systems			
186 Vehicle washing			
246 Preventative maintenance program (major mining plant)			
112 Ongoing inspection by operator / shift management			
45 Diesel powered vehicles			

## Hazard Register Data Sheet

**Hazard** IPRH-NO7 Major mining plant fire

PLL 1.00E-04

Major Mining Plant includes conveyors, stackers & dredgers. Dredger considered biggest risk issue. Excludes Fire/explosion in bunker (NO15) and mobile equipment (NO3), as included as separate hazard scenarios. Areas of concern: Coal build up and mechanical failure.

<i>Control</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>PLL Contr</i>	<i>Control Class</i>
<b>Causal Pathway Belt fire</b>	0.00%	0.00E+00	None

Belt fire

- 246 Preventative maintenance program (major mining plant)
- 158 Shiftly fault inspections(reporting)
- 28 Competent personnel
- 194 Works Management System
- 79 FRAS belts

<i>Outcome Pathw</i>	<i>Consequence</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>PLL Contr</i>	<i>Control Class</i>
<b>Multiple fatalities</b>		0.00%	0.00E+00	None

- 222 Fire extinguishers on all plant
- 221 Fire extinguishers (testing and inspection)
- 209 Annual testing of extinguishers
- 230 Reticulated fire water protection to all major mining plant
- 210 Annual training in fire fighting
- 226 LV fitted with hoses
- 217 Escape routes from MMP
- 214 Emergency response procedure
- 206 Adequate fire water pressure and supply
- 113 On-site fire fighting tankers
- 208 Annual spray pattern testing

## Hazard Register Data Sheet

<i>Hazard</i>	<i>PLL</i>	<i>PLL Contr</i>	<i>Control Class</i>
<b>IPRH-NO8 Explosion of electrical components on major mining plant</b> Relates principally to HV switching gear (6.6KV and 415V)	2.20E-04		
<i>Control</i>	%	<i>PLL Contr</i>	<i>Control Class</i>
<b>Causal Pathway Failure to follow procedures / operator error</b> Failure to follow procedures / operator error	60.00%	1.32E-04	None
25 Competent maintenance personnel			<b>Major</b>
180 Ticketed / competent electricians			<b>Major</b>
165 Plant isolation procedures			<b>Major</b>
<b>Causal Pathway Faulty equipment</b> Faulty equipment	10.00%	2.20E-05	None
87 HV Routine Maintenance (Insulator Cleaning, inspection and servicing)			<b>Major</b>
<b>Causal Pathway Housekeeping (dust build up leading to flash over)</b> Housekeeping (dust build up leading to flash over)	30.00%	6.60E-05	None
87 HV Routine Maintenance (Insulator Cleaning, inspection and servicing)			<b>Major</b>
<b>Outcome Pathw Consequence</b> Multiple fatalities	0.00%	0.00E+00	None
220 Explosion vents (compliance to AS3000)			<b>Major</b>
229 Procedure for electrically isolating personnel			
128 PPE			
223 First aid room on site			
214 Emergency response procedure			
224 First Aiders on all shifts			
212 Close proximity to Emergency Services and Hospital			
213 Diamond Protection for first response			

# Hazard Register Data Sheet

Hazard IRPH-NO1 Vehicle incident while accessing worksite

PLL 1.15E-02

Relates to incidents involving vehicles used for transport to work site (onsite access only), predominantly light vehicles (eg. 4wd's). Hazard includes personnel traveling around site for inspections, monitoring, etc. Events include traveling off edge, rollovers, collisions with other equipment / structures / mine walls, etc. Areas of concern: Infrequent users; Radio protocols (clear and positive coms); Higher congestion / volume during

Control	%	PLL Contr	Control Class
Causal Pathway <b>Poor visibility</b>	20.00%	2.30E-03	1 Critical and 1 Major

## Rain

- 102 Minimum equipment standards
- 141 Road watering
- 77 Fog lights
- 76 Flashing lights
- 171 Sun glasses supplied
- 192 wipers
- 129 Pre start checks and recording **Major**
- 153 Shift changeover meeting
- 17 Cease / delay task in extreme conditions
- 56 Drive to conditions **Critical**
- 134 Remarking of road lines **Major**
- 83 Guide posts and reflectors **Major**

## Dust

- 102 Minimum equipment standards
- 141 Road watering
- 77 Fog lights
- 76 Flashing lights
- 171 Sun glasses supplied
- 192 wipers
- 129 Pre start checks and recording
- 153 Shift changeover meeting
- 17 Cease / delay task in extreme conditions
- 56 Drive to conditions
- 134 Remarking of road lines
- 83 Guide posts and reflectors

## Fog

- 102 Minimum equipment standards
- 141 Road watering
- 77 Fog lights
- 76 Flashing lights
- 171 Sun glasses supplied
- 192 wipers
- 129 Pre start checks and recording
- 153 Shift changeover meeting
- 17 Cease / delay task in extreme conditions
- 56 Drive to conditions
- 134 Remarking of road lines
- 83 Guide posts and reflectors

## Sun

- 102 Minimum equipment standards
- 141 Road watering
- 77 Fog lights
- 76 Flashing lights
- 171 Sun glasses supplied
- 192 wipers
- 129 Pre start checks and recording



# Hazard Register Data Sheet

**Hazard IRPH-NO1 Vehicle incident while accessing worksite**

PLL 1.15E-02

Relates to incidents involving vehicles used for transport to work site (onsite access only), predominantly light vehicles (eg. 4wd's). Hazard includes personnel traveling around site for inspections, monitoring, etc. Events include traveling off edge, rollovers, collisions with other equipment / structures / mine walls, etc. Areas of concern: Infrequent users; Radio protocols (clear and positive coms); Higher congestion / volume during

<i>Control</i>	%	<i>PLL Contr</i>	<i>Control Class</i>
153 Shift changeover meeting			
17 Cease / delay task in extreme conditions			
56 Drive to conditions			
134 Remarking of road lines			
83 Guide posts and reflectors			

**Causal Pathway Poor road conditions**

10.00% 1.15E-03 1 Critical or 2 Major

**Construction**

- 133 Regular grading
- 138 Road maintenance program
- 140 Road surfacing material (borrow areas / import rock)
- 144 Safety walks
- 188 Washing of roads

**Critical**

**Surfacing**

- 133 Regular grading
- 138 Road maintenance program
- 140 Road surfacing material (borrow areas / import rock)
- 144 Safety walks
- 188 Washing of roads

**Drainage**

- 133 Regular grading
- 138 Road maintenance program
- 140 Road surfacing material (borrow areas / import rock)
- 144 Safety walks
- 188 Washing of roads

# Hazard Register Data Sheet

**Hazard IRPH-NO1 Vehicle incident while accessing worksite**

PLL 1.15E-02

Relates to incidents involving vehicles used for transport to work site (onsite access only), predominantly light vehicles (eg. 4wd's). Hazard includes personnel traveling around site for inspections, monitoring, etc. Events include traveling off edge, rollovers, collisions with other equipment / structures / mine walls, etc. Areas of concern: Infrequent users; Radio protocols (clear and positive coms); Higher congestion / volume during

<i>Control</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>PLL Contr</i>	<i>Control Class</i>
<b>Causal Pathway Driver error / not following road rules</b>	50.00%	5.74E-03	1 Critical and 1 Major

## Driving to conditions

- 1 4wd training for IPH personnel
- 28 Competent personnel
- 161 Site induction process
- 49 Disciplinary policy
- 33 Contractor management process(fatigue management, selection process)
- 153 Shift changeover meeting
- 157 Shift notes
- 51 Documented road rules
- 160 Signage
- 172 Supervision
- 88 Incident reporting and CA

**Critical**

**Critical**

## Rules

- 1 4wd training for IPH personnel
- 28 Competent personnel
- 161 Site induction process
- 49 Disciplinary policy
- 33 Contractor management process(fatigue management, selection process)
- 153 Shift changeover meeting
- 157 Shift notes
- 51 Documented road rules
- 160 Signage
- 172 Supervision
- 88 Incident reporting and CA

## Unfamiliar with conditions

- 1 4wd training for IPH personnel
- 28 Competent personnel
- 161 Site induction process
- 49 Disciplinary policy
- 33 Contractor management process(fatigue management, selection process)
- 153 Shift changeover meeting
- 157 Shift notes
- 51 Documented road rules
- 160 Signage
- 172 Supervision
- 88 Incident reporting and CA

## Distracted

- 1 4wd training for IPH personnel
- 28 Competent personnel
- 161 Site induction process
- 49 Disciplinary policy
- 33 Contractor management process(fatigue management, selection process)
- 153 Shift changeover meeting
- 157 Shift notes
- 51 Documented road rules
- 160 Signage
- 172 Supervision

# Hazard Register Data Sheet

## Hazard IRPH-NO1 Vehicle incident while accessing worksite

PLL 1.15E-02

Relates to incidents involving vehicles used for transport to work site (onsite access only), predominantly light vehicles (eg. 4wd's). Hazard includes personnel traveling around site for inspections, monitoring, etc. Events include traveling off edge, rollovers, collisions with other equipment / structures / mine walls, etc. Areas of concern: Infrequent users; Radio protocols (clear and positive coms); Higher congestion / volume during

### Control

88 Incident reporting and CA

### Fatigue / Fitness-for-Work

177 Task rotation

156 Shift management

53 Draft drug & Alcohol policy

6 Annual medical tests available

60 EAP available

101 Medical tests / first aid available

96 Leave policies

59 Duty of Care

% PLL Contr Control Class

## Causal Pathway Mechanical failure

7.00% 8.04E-04 1 Critical or 2 Major

### Mechanical failure

130 Preventative maintenance program (light and heavy mobile vehicles)

Major

158 Shiftly fault inspections(reporting)

Major

28 Competent personnel

194 Works Management System

169 Spare vehicles

16 Call out service

57 Dry hire lease arrangements

## Causal Pathway Spillage

2.00% 2.30E-04 None

### Over / uneven / unsecured loading of trucks

37 Current statutory licence

27 Competent operators

172 Supervision

168 Maintenance procedures

139 Road rules

## Causal Pathway Poor road design

2.00% 2.30E-04 None

### Poor road design

39 Design of permanent roads & ramps to Vic Roads standard

26 Competent mine planner

68 Erection of temporary barriers

137 Review intersections for traffic management

149 Separation of LV and HV

## Causal Pathway Unauthorised access

5.00% 5.74E-04 1 Major

### Unauthorised access

89 Induction process

147 Security gates

148 Security guard

145 Sealed roads as boundary of mine

160 Signage

Major

2 Access control through control centre / shift manager

Major

50 Disseminate haul road info IPH wide

## Hazard Register Data Sheet

**Hazard** IRPH-NO1 Vehicle incident while accessing worksite

PLL 1.15E-02

Relates to incidents involving vehicles used for transport to work site (onsite access only), predominantly light vehicles (eg. 4wd's). Hazard includes personnel traveling around site for inspections, monitoring, etc. Events include traveling off edge, rollovers, collisions with other equipment / structures / mine walls, etc. Areas of concern: Infrequent users; Radio protocols (clear and positive coms); Higher congestion / volume during

*Control* % PLL Contr Control Class

**Causal Pathway Poor communication**

2.00% 2.30E-04 None

Poor communication

- 182 Tool box meetings
- 152 Shift changeover
- 84 Hand held and fixed radios
- 28 Competent personnel
- 139 Road rules
- 130 Preventative maintenance program (light and heavy mobile vehicles)
- 50 Disseminate haul road info IPH wide

**Causal Pathway Inadequate windrow / guard rails**

2.00% 2.30E-04 None

Inadequate windrow / guard rails

- 32 Construction of windrows
- 131 Program for replacing windrows
- 90 Install guard rails as required

**Major**

**Outcome Pathw Consequence**

0.00% 0.00E+00 None

Multiple fatalities

- 233 Seat belts in all vehicles
- 231 ROPs on mining plant
- 207 Air bags on selected LVs
- 211 Bull bars
- 223 First aid room on site
- 214 Emergency response procedure
- 224 First Aiders on all shifts
- 212 Close proximity to Emergency Services and Hospital
- 213 Diamond Protection for first response

## Hazard Register Data Sheet

**Hazard** IRPH-WF45 Vehicle / plant incident during West Field opening up phase. *PLL* 0.00E+00

Relates to major truck and shovel programs. Includes interaction or other incident eg. off edge, into hole. Current phase 1 works at Westfield. Considered by risk assessment team to include NO24. Areas of concern: Dynamic changing nature of work areas; Watering of roads effect LV traction.

<i>Control</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>PLL Contr</i>	<i>Control Class</i>
<b>Causal Pathway Poor visibility</b>	0.00%	0.00E+00	None

### Rain

- 102 Minimum equipment standards
- 141 Road watering
- 77 Fog lights
- 76 Flashing lights
- 171 Sun glasses supplied
- 192 wipers
- 129 Pre start checks and recording
- 153 Shift changeover meeting
- 17 Cease / delay task in extreme conditions
- 56 Drive to conditions
- 134 Remarking of road lines
- 83 Guide posts and reflectors

### Dust

- 102 Minimum equipment standards
- 141 Road watering
- 77 Fog lights
- 76 Flashing lights
- 171 Sun glasses supplied
- 192 wipers
- 129 Pre start checks and recording
- 153 Shift changeover meeting
- 17 Cease / delay task in extreme conditions
- 56 Drive to conditions
- 134 Remarking of road lines
- 83 Guide posts and reflectors

### Fog

- 102 Minimum equipment standards
- 141 Road watering
- 77 Fog lights
- 76 Flashing lights
- 171 Sun glasses supplied
- 192 wipers
- 129 Pre start checks and recording
- 153 Shift changeover meeting
- 17 Cease / delay task in extreme conditions
- 56 Drive to conditions
- 134 Remarking of road lines
- 83 Guide posts and reflectors

### Sun

- 102 Minimum equipment standards
- 141 Road watering
- 77 Fog lights
- 76 Flashing lights
- 171 Sun glasses supplied
- 192 wipers
- 129 Pre start checks and recording
- 153 Shift changeover meeting

## Hazard Register Data Sheet

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**Hazard** IRPH-WF45 Vehicle / plant incident during West Field opening up phase. *PLL* 0.00E+00

Relates to major truck and shovel programs. Includes interaction or other incident eg. off edge, into hole. Current phase 1 works at Westfield. Considered by risk assessment team to include NO24. Areas of concern: Dynamic changing nature of work areas; Watering of roads effect LV traction.

<i>Control</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>PLL Contr</i>	<i>Control Class</i>
17 Cease / delay task in extreme conditions			
56 Drive to conditions			
134 Remarking of road lines			
83 Guide posts and reflectors			

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**Causal Pathway** **Poor road conditions**

0.00% 0.00E+00 None

**Construction**

- 133 Regular grading
- 138 Road maintenance program
- 140 Road surfacing material (borrow areas / import rock)
- 144 Safety walks

**Surfacing**

- 133 Regular grading
- 138 Road maintenance program
- 140 Road surfacing material (borrow areas / import rock)
- 144 Safety walks

**Drainage**

- 133 Regular grading
- 138 Road maintenance program
- 140 Road surfacing material (borrow areas / import rock)
- 144 Safety walks

# Hazard Register Data Sheet

**Hazard** IRPH-WF45 Vehicle / plant incident during West Field opening up phase. *PLL* 0.00E+00

Relates to major truck and shovel programs. Includes interaction or other incident eg. off edge, into hole. Current phase 1 works at Westfield. Considered by risk assessment team to include NO24. Areas of concern: Dynamic changing nature of work areas; Watering of roads effect LV traction.

<i>Control</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>PLL Contr</i>	<i>Control Class</i>
<b>Causal Pathway</b> Driver error / not following road rules	0.00%	0.00E+00	None

## Driving to conditions

- 1 4wd training for IPH personnel
- 28 Competent personnel
- 161 Site induction process
- 49 Disciplinary policy
- 33 Contractor management process(fatigue management, selection process)
- 153 Shift changeover meeting
- 157 Shift notes
- 51 Documented road rules
- 160 Signage
- 172 Supervision
- 88 Incident reporting and CA

## Rules

- 1 4wd training for IPH personnel
- 28 Competent personnel
- 161 Site induction process
- 49 Disciplinary policy
- 33 Contractor management process(fatigue management, selection process)
- 153 Shift changeover meeting
- 157 Shift notes
- 51 Documented road rules
- 160 Signage
- 172 Supervision
- 88 Incident reporting and CA

## Unfamiliar with conditions

- 1 4wd training for IPH personnel
- 28 Competent personnel
- 161 Site induction process
- 49 Disciplinary policy
- 33 Contractor management process(fatigue management, selection process)
- 153 Shift changeover meeting
- 157 Shift notes
- 51 Documented road rules
- 160 Signage
- 172 Supervision
- 88 Incident reporting and CA

## Fatigue / Fitness-For-Work

- 177 Task rotation
- 156 Shift management
- 53 Draft drug & Alcohol policy
- 6 Annual medical tests available
- 60 EAP available
- 101 Medical tests / first aid available
- 96 Leave policies
- 59 Duty of Care

## Distracted

- 1 4wd training for IPH personnel
- 28 Competent personnel

## Hazard Register Data Sheet

**Hazard** IRPH-WF45 Vehicle / plant incident during West Field opening up phase. *PLL* 0.00E+00

Relates to major truck and shovel programs. Includes interaction or other incident eg. off edge, into hole. Current phase 1 works at Westfield. Considered by risk assessment team to include NO24. Areas of concern: Dynamic changing nature of work areas; Watering of roads effect LV traction.

<i>Control</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>PLL Contr</i>	<i>Control Class</i>
161 Site induction process			
49 Disciplinary policy			
33 Contractor management process(fatigue management, selection process)			
153 Shift changeover meeting			
157 Shift notes			
51 Documented road rules			
160 Signage			
172 Supervision			
88 Incident reporting and CA			

**Causal Pathway Mechanical failure** 0.00% 0.00E+00 None

### Mechanical failure

- 130 Preventative maintenance program (light and heavy mobile vehicles)
- 158 Shiftly fault inspections(reporting)
- 28 Competent personnel
- 194 Works Management System
- 169 Spare vehicles
- 16 Call out service
- 57 Dry hire lease arrangements

**Causal Pathway Spillage** 0.00% 0.00E+00 None

### Over / uneven loading of trucks

- 27 Competent operators
- 172 Supervision
- 168 Maintenance procedures
- 139 Road rules

**Causal Pathway Poor road design** 0.00% 0.00E+00 None

### Poor road design

- 39 Design of permanent roads & ramps to Vic Roads standard
- 26 Competent mine planner
- 68 Erection of temporary barriers
- 137 Review intersections for traffic management

**Causal Pathway Unauthorised access** 0.00% 0.00E+00 None

### Unauthorised access

- 89 Induction process
- 147 Security gates
- 148 Security guard
- 145 Sealed roads as boundary of mine
- 160 Signage
- 2 Access control through control centre / shift manager
- 50 Disseminate haul road info IPH wide

**Causal Pathway Poor communication** 0.00% 0.00E+00 None

### Poor communication

- 182 Tool box meetings
- 152 Shift changeover
- 84 Hand held and fixed radios
- 28 Competent personnel
- 139 Road rules
- 130 Preventative maintenance program (light and heavy mobile vehicles)
- 50 Disseminate haul road info IPH wide



## Hazard Register Data Sheet

**Hazard** IRPH-WF45 Vehicle / plant incident during West Field opening up phase. *PLL* 0.00E+00

Relates to major truck and shovel programs. Includes interaction or other incident eg. off edge, into hole. Current phase 1 works at Westfield. Considered by risk assessment team to include NO24. Areas of concern: Dynamic changing nature of work areas; Watering of roads effect LV traction.

<i>Control</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>PLL Contr</i>	<i>Control Class</i>
<b>Causal Pathway</b> <b>Dynamic changing environment</b>	0.00%	0.00E+00	None

Internal roads and dig and dump sites / routes / infrastructure works / patterns

- 183 Traffic management plans
- 182 Tool box meetings
- 23 Communication via pay dockets / notice boards
- 3 Additional traffic controls (signage, bollards, gates, lights, etc) as required
- 69 Escorting of infrequent visitors to WF operational areas

<b>Outcome Pathw</b> <b>Consequence</b>	0.00%	0.00E+00	None
<b>Multiple fatalities</b>			

- 233 Seat belts in all vehicles
- 231 ROPs on mining plant
- 207 Air bags on selected LVs
- 211 Bull bars
- 223 First aid room on site
- 214 Emergency response procedure
- 224 First Aiders on all shifts
- 212 Close proximity to Emergency Services and Hospital
- 231 ROPs on mining plant
- 213 Diamond Protection for first response



## Appendix 2


### Bow-Tie Diagrams

Bow-tie Diagram

Area	Normal Operations
Guideword	Collisions
Hazard Number	IPH-NO1
Hazard/ Incident	Vehicle incident while accessing worksite


Document Revision Record

Rev	Description	Prepared by	Date	Approved by	Date	Reviewed by	Date
A	Draft (for Qest comment)	Matthew Wallace	January 2004	Anthony Deakin	January 2004		
B	Draft (for Client comment)						



Area	Normal Operations
Guideword	Dropped Object
Hazard Number	IPH-NO4
Hazard/ Incident	Dropped objects from major mining plant (onto personnel, equipment)

Rev	Description	Prepared by	Date	Approved by	Date	Reviewed by	Date
A	Draft (for Oest comment)	Matthew Wallace	January 2004	Anthony Deakin	January 2004		
B	Draft (for Client comment)						




Bow-tie Diagram

Area	Normal Operations
Guideword	Dropped Object / Structural Failure
Hazard Number	IPH-N05
Hazard/ Incident	Toppling of major mining plant

Document Revision Record

Rev	Description	Prepared by	Date	Approved by	Date	Reviewed by	Date
A	Draft (for Cest comment)	Matthew Wallace	January 2004	Anthony Deakin	January 2004		
B	Draft (for Client comment)						




Bow-tie Diagram

Area	Normal Operations
Guideword	Fire and Explosion
Hazard Number	IPH-NO7
Hazard/ Incident	Major mining plant fire

Document Revision Record

Rev	Description	Prepared by	Date	Approved by	Date	Reviewed by	Date
A	Draft (for Qest comment)	Matthew Wallace	January 2004	Anthony Deakin	January 2004		
B	Draft (for Client comment)						




Bow-tie Diagram

Area	Normal Operations
Guideword	Fire and Explosion
Hazard Number	IPH-NO8
Hazard/ Incident	Explosion of electrical components on major mining plant

Document Revision Record

Rev	Description	Prepared by	Date	Approved by	Date	Reviewed by	Date
A	Draft (for Qest comment)	Matthew Wallace	January 2004	Anthony Deakin	January 2004		
B	Draft (for Client comment)						




Bow-tie Diagram

Area	Normal Operations
Guideword	Collision
Hazard Number	IPH-NO24
Hazard/ Incident	Mobile equipment interactions on mine roads

Document Revision Record

Rev	Description	Prepared by	Date	Approved by	Date	Reviewed by	Date
A B	Draft (for Qest comment) Draft (for Client comment)	Matthew Wallace	January 2004	Anthony Deakin	January 2004		






Bow-tie Diagram

Area	Normal Operations
Guideword	Structural Failure
Hazard Number	IPH-NO26
Hazard/ Incident	Batter failure

Document Revision Record

Rev	Description	Prepared by	Date	Approved by	Date	Reviewed by	Date
A	Draft (for Qest comment)	Matthew Wallace	January 2004	Anthony Deakin	January 2004		
B	Draft (for Client comment)						




Bow-tie Diagram

Area	Infrastructure Works (Westfield)
Guideword	Structural Failure
Hazard Number	IPH-IW28
Hazard/ Incident	Structural failure of 220KV towers

Document Revision Record

Rev	Description	Prepared by	Date	Approved by	Date	Reviewed by	Date
A	Draft (for Qest comment)	Matthew Wallace	January 2004	Anthony Deakin	January 2004		
B	Draft (for Client comment)						




Bow-tie Diagram

Area	Infrastructure Works (Westfield)
Guideword	Dropped Object / Collision
Hazard Number	IPH-IW30
Hazard/ Incident	Cable incident on public road

Document Revision Record

Rev	Description	Prepared by	Date	Approved by	Date	Reviewed by	Date
A	Draft (for Qest comment)	Matthew Wallace	January 2004	Anthony Deakin	January 2004		
B	Draft (for Client comment)						




Bow-tie Diagram

Area	Infrastructure Works (Westfield)
Guideword	Collision
Hazard Number	IPH-IW32
Hazard/ Incident	Public vehicle incident during road alterations

Document Revision Record

Rev	Description	Prepared by	Date	Approved by	Date	Reviewed by	Date
A	Draft (for Qest comment)	Matthew Wallace	January 2004	Anthony Deakin	January 2004		
B	Draft (for Client comment)						




Bow-tie Diagram

Area	Normal Operations
Guideword	Natural Forces
Hazard Number	IPH-NO36
Hazard/ Incident	Inrush of water into mine

Document Revision Record

Rev	Description	Prepared by	Date	Approved by	Date	Reviewed by	Date
A	Draft (for Qest comment)	Matthew Wallace	January 2004	Anthony Deakin	January 2004		
B	Draft (for Client comment)						




Bow-tie Diagram

Area	Normal Operations
Guideword	Dropped Object
Hazard Number	IPH-NO37
Hazard/ Incident	Field jacking of major mining plant

Document Revision Record

Rev	Description	Prepared by	Date	Approved by	Date	Reviewed by	Date
A	Draft (for Qest comment)	Matthew Wallace	January 2004	Anthony Deakin	January 2004		
B	Draft (for Client comment)						




Bow-tie Diagram

Area	Normal Operations
Guideword	Mechanical Failure / Dropped Object
Hazard Number	IPH-NO38
Hazard/ Incident	Unplanned movement of equipment

Document Revision Record

Rev	Description	Prepared by	Date	Approved by	Date	Reviewed by	Date
A	Draft (for Qest comment)	Matthew Wallace	January 2004	Anthony Deakin	January 2004		
B	Draft (for Client comment)						




Bow-tie Diagram

Area	Normal Operations
Guideword	Emissions
Hazard Number	IPH-NO39
Hazard/ Incident	Confined spaces

Document Revision Record

Rev	Description	Prepared by	Date	Approved by	Date	Reviewed by	Date
A	Draft (for Qest comment)	Matthew Wallace	January 2004	Anthony Deakin	January 2004		
B	Draft (for Client comment)						






Bow-tie Diagram

Area	Normal Operations
Guideword	Dropped Object
Hazard Number	IPH-NO42
Hazard/ Incident	Fall from or tipping of EWP

Document Revision Record

Rev	Description	Prepared by	Date	Approved by	Date	Reviewed by	Date
A	Draft (for Qest comment)	Matthew Wallace	January 2004	Anthony Deakin	January 2004		
B	Draft (for Client comment)						




Bow-tie Diagram

Area	Normal Operations
Guideword	Fire and Explosion
Hazard Number	IPH-NO43
Hazard/ Incident	Building fire

Document Revision Record

Rev	Description	Prepared by	Date	Approved by	Date	Reviewed by	Date
A	Draft (for Qest comment)	Matthew Wallace	January 2004	Anthony Deakin	January 2004		
B	Draft (for Client comment)						




Bow-tie Diagram

Area	West Field
Guideword	Collisions
Hazard Number	IPH-WF45
Hazard/ Incident	Vehicle / plant incident during West Field transfer

Document Revision Record

Rev	Description	Prepared by	Date	Approved by	Date	Reviewed by	Date
A	Draft (for Qest comment)	Matthew Wallace	January 2004	Anthony Deakin	January 2004		
B	Draft (for Client comment)						





# INTERNATIONAL POWER HAZELWOOD

Safety Assessment of Major Mining Hazards

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## Appendix 3

### SQRA Worksheets

# SQRA

## IPRH- 220KV tower incident, including construction activities.

Date	Frequency	Sample Size	10+	6 - 10	3 - 5	2	1	Neg	PLL	SQRA 1	PLL
3/02/2004	2.50E-02	1,000	0	0	0	0	100	900	2.50E-03	SQRA 1	2.50E-03

## IPRH- Cable incident on public road IW30

Date	Frequency	Sample Size	10+	6 - 10	3 - 5	2	1	Neg	PLL	SQRA 1	PLL
3/02/2004	1.00E-02	1,000	0	0	1	1	8	990	1.40E-04	SQRA 1	1.40E-04

## IPRH- Public vehicle incident during road alterations IW32

Date	Frequency	Sample Size	10+	6 - 10	3 - 5	2	1	Neg	PLL	SQRA 1	PLL
4/02/2004	1.00E-01	1,000	0	0	0	0	100	900	1.00E-02	SQRA 1	1.00E-02

## IPRH- Heavy Mobile equipment interactions on mine roads NO24

Date	Frequency	Sample Size	10+	6 - 10	3 - 5	2	1	Neg	PLL	SQRA 1	PLL
3/02/2004	1.33E-01	1,000	0	0	0	0	50	950	6.67E-03	SQRA 1	6.67E-03
5/03/2004	1.20E-01	1,000	0	0	0	0	50	950	6.00E-03	SQRA 2	6.00E-03

## IPRH- Batter failure NO26

Date	Frequency	Sample Size	10+	6 - 10	3 - 5	2	1	Neg	PLL	SQRA 1	PLL
3/02/2004	1.00E+00	10,000	0	0	0	0.01	9.99	9,990	1.00E-03	SQRA 1	1.00E-03
5/03/2004	8.50E-01	10,000	0	0	0	0.01	9.99	9,990	8.51E-04	SQRA 2	8.51E-04

## IPRH- Inrush of water into mine NO36

Date	Frequency	Sample Size	10+	6 - 10	3 - 5	2	1	Neg	PLL	SQRA 1	PLL
4/02/2004	1.00E-03	1,000	0	0	1	3	6	990	1.60E-05	SQRA 1	1.60E-05

## IPRH- Failure whilst field jacking of major mining plant NO37

Date	Frequency	Sample Size	10+	6 - 10	3 - 5	2	1	Neg	PLL	SQRA 1	PLL
3/02/2004	2.00E-01	1,000	0	0	0	2	18	980	4.40E-03	SQRA 1	4.40E-03
6/03/2004	1.43E-01	1,000	0	0	0	2	18	980	3.15E-03	SQRA 2	3.15E-03

## IPRH- Unplanned movement of equipment NO38

Date	Frequency	Sample Size	10+	6 - 10	3 - 5	2	1	Neg	PLL	SQRA 1	PLL
3/02/2004 Unsecured equipment	3.30E-02	1,000	0	0	0	0	5	995	1.65E-04	SQRA 1	1.37E-03
3/02/2004 Remote Startup	2.00E-02	1,000	0	0	0	0	50	950	1.00E-03	SQRA 1	1.37E-03
3/02/2004 Parked equipment runaway	2.00E-01	10,000	0	0	0	0.1	9.9	9,990	2.02E-04	SQRA 1	1.37E-03

# SQRA

## IPRH- Unplanned movement of equipment NO38

Date	Frequency	Sample Size	10+	6 - 10	3 - 5	2	1	Neg	PLL	SQRA 2
!6/03/200*Parked equipment runaway	1.80E-01	10,000	0	0	0	0.1	9.9	9,990	1.82E-04	1.23E-03
!6/03/200*Unsecured equipment	2.97E-02	1,000	0	0	0	0	5	995	1.49E-04	
!6/03/200*Remote Startup	1.80E-02	1,000	0	0	0	0	50	950	9.00E-04	

## IPRH- Confined/registered spaces NO39

Date	Frequency	Sample Size	10+	6 - 10	3 - 5	2	1	Neg	PLL	SQRA 1
3/02/2004	3.00E+00	10,000	0	0	0	0	1	9,999	3.00E-04	3.00E-04

## IPRH- Dropped objects from major mining plant (onto personnel or equipment) NO4

Date	Frequency	Sample Size	10+	6 - 10	3 - 5	2	1	Neg	PLL	SQRA 1
3/02/2004 Lumps From Conveyors	1.00E+00	1,000	0	0	0	0	5	995	5.00E-03	6.00E-03
3/02/2004 Pieces of plant	2.00E-01	1,000	0	0	0	0	5	995	1.00E-03	
Date	Frequency	Sample Size	10+	6 - 10	3 - 5	2	1	Neg	PLL	SQRA 2
!5/03/200*Pieces of plant	1.96E-01	1,000	0	0	0	0	2.5	998	4.90E-04	5.49E-03
!5/03/200*Lumps from conveyors	5.00E-01	1,000	0	0	0	0	10	990	5.00E-03	

## IPRH- Fall from or tipping of EWP NO42

Date	Frequency	Sample Size	10+	6 - 10	3 - 5	2	1	Neg	PLL	SQRA 1
3/02/2004	2.00E-02	1,000	0	0	0	5	45	950	1.10E-03	1.10E-03

## IPRH- Building fire NO43

Date	Frequency	Sample Size	10+	6 - 10	3 - 5	2	1	Neg	PLL	SQRA 1
4/02/2004	2.00E-02	1,000	0	0	0	1	9	990	2.20E-04	2.20E-04

## IPRH- Uncontrolled Movement of major mining plant. NO5

Date	Frequency	Sample Size	10+	6 - 10	3 - 5	2	1	Neg	PLL	SQRA 1
3/02/2004	2.00E-01	1,000	0	0	0	0.75	6.75	993	1.65E-03	1.65E-03

## IPRH- Major mining plant fire NO7

Date	Frequency	Sample Size	10+	6 - 10	3 - 5	2	1	Neg	PLL	SQRA 1
3/02/2004	1.00E+00	10,000	0	0	0	0	1	9,999	1.00E-04	1.00E-04
Date	Frequency	Sample Size	10+	6 - 10	3 - 5	2	1	Neg	PLL	SQRA 2
!5/03/200*No risk reduction was anticipated for this hazard	1.00E+00	10,000	0	0	0	0	1	9,999	1.00E-04	1.00E-04

## IPRH- Explosion of electrical components on major mining plant NO8

Date	Frequency	Sample Size	10+	6 - 10	3 - 5	2	1	Neg	PLL	SQRA 1
3/02/2004	4.00E-02	1,000	0	0	0	0.5	4.5	995	2.20E-04	2.20E-04

# SQRA

## IRPH- Vehicle incident while accessing worksite NO1

Date	Frequency	Sample Size	10+	6 - 10	3 - 5	2	1	Neg	PLL	SQRA 1	1.15E-02
3/02/2004	4.43E+00	1,000	0	0	0.02292	0.2292	2.0399	998	1.15E-02	SQRA 2	1.02E-02
Date	Frequency	Sample Size	10+	6 - 10	3 - 5	2	1	Neg	PLL	SQRA 1	1.15E-02
!5/03/2004	3.95E+00	1,000	0	0	0.02292	0.2292	2.0399	998	1.02E-02	SQRA 2	1.02E-02

## IRPH- Vehicle / plant incident during West Field opening up phase. WF45

Date	Frequency	Sample Size	10+	6 - 10	3 - 5	2	1	Neg	PLL	SQRA 1	0.00E+00
4/02/2004	0.00E+00	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00E+00	SQRA 1	0.00E+00



## Appendix 4

### Quantitative Risk Estimate of Selected Vehicle Hazards –

**IPH-NO1 - Vehicle incident while accessing worksite**  
**IPH-NO24 - Heavy Mobile equipment interactions on mine roads**



<b>Risk Estimate for IPH Light Vehicle accessing worksites (NO01)</b>			
<b>Data:</b>			
FORS Light vehicle fatal accident rate	5.20E-09	fatalities per km travelled	Reference: Table 2 of Monograph 17, Federal Office of Road Safety. 1995. Fatalities per 100 km travelled for all crashes involving a passenger vehicle.
Distance travelled by IPH LV fleet	947500	km per year	
<b>Calculation:</b>			
IPH LV fatal accident rate	4.93E-03	fatalities per year	Data supplied by IPH. Distance travelled by IPH's normal operational fleet (comprising of mostly 4 wheel drive vehicles) and excluding Contractors 4x4's and trucks was 947,500 km in the 12 months to Dec 2003.
No. of people exposed	1		
Fatality Rate	100%		
<b>PLL for IPH LV Incident</b>		<b>4.93E-03 fatalities per year</b>	
	or 1 fatality every	203 years	
<b>Key Assumptions:</b>			
1. One occupant per vehicle (driver).			
2. IPH mine roads are of the same condition and utilise the same traffic controls as public roads.			
3. Traffic conditions for the mine roads are similar to traffic conditions for public roads.			

<b>Risk Estimate for IPH Heavy Mobile equipment interactions on mine roads (NO24)</b>			
<b>Data:</b>			
FORS Heavy vehicle fatal accident rate	5.20E-09	fatalities per km travelled	Reference: Table 2 of Monograph 17, Federal Office of Road Safety. 1995. Fatalities per 100 km travelled for all crashes involving a rigid truck.
Distance travelled by IPH OB HV fleet 04	1695000	km per year	
<b>Calculation:</b>			
IPH HV fatal accident rate	8.81E-03	fatalities per year	Data supplied by IPH. The OB contract for the 2003 / 2004 summer period (approx Nov 2003 - May 2004) involves approximately 2,450,000 kms of truck movement. This figure includes water trucks and graders, but not light vehicles or maintenance vehicles. This has been annualised for 04 period considering 3 of the 7months of the contract has been completed and the trucks would normally travel an estimated 250,000kms during normal operations.
No. of people exposed	1		
Fatality Rate	100%		
<b>PLL for IPH OB HV Incident for o4 period</b>		<b>8.81E-03 fatalities per year</b>	Fatality rate is 100% because the fatal vehicle accident rate already allows for a fatality having occurred.
	or 1 fatality every	113 years	
<b>Data:</b>			
FORS Heavy vehicle fatal accident rate	5.20E-09	fatalities per km travelled	Data supplied by IPH for estimated kms travelled during normal operations being 250,000kms per annum. This figure includes water trucks and graders, but not light vehicles or maintenance vehicles.
Distance travelled by IPH OB HV fleet 03 /04	250000	km per year	
<b>Calculation:</b>			
IPH HV fatal accident rate	1.30E-03	fatalities per year	
No. of people exposed	1		
Fatality Rate	100%		
<b>PLL for IPH OB HV Incident for normal operations</b>		<b>1.30E-03 fatalities per year</b>	
	or 1 fatality every	769 years	
<b>Key Assumptions:</b>			
1. One occupant per vehicle (driver).			
2. IPH mine roads are of the same condition and utilise the same traffic controls as public roads.			
3. Traffic conditions for the mine roads are similar to traffic conditions for public roads.			