



# FINAL REPORT

*IPRH COAL BUNKER FIRE  
(HAZELWOOD SLOT BUNKER)*

3<sup>RD</sup> APRIL 2005



**Panel Of Inquiry:**

- |                |   |
|----------------|---|
| Ian Quail      | - Production Manager                        |
| Romeo Prezioso | - Mine Operations/Fire Service Co-ordinator |
| John O'Bryan   | - 1x7 F/Service Supervisor                  |
| Scott Roberts  | - 2x12 A Roster Deputy H&S Rep.             |

28 April 2005

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## 1: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## 2: PRECAUTIONS TAKEN PRIOR TO THE FIRE

## 3: CAUSE

## 4: CONSEQUENCES

- 4.1 Safety Of Personnel
- 4.2 Plant Damage
- 4.3 Lost Revenue

## 5: FINDINGS

- 5.1. Action's Taken – Post Nov 2003 Fire
- 5.2. Fire Fuel – Ignition Source
- 5.3. Emergency Response Protocol
- 5.4. Command Identification Apparel
- 5.5. Personnel Protection Equipment
- 5.6. Breathing Apparatus (B/A)
- 5.7. Bunker – Fire Protection
- 5.8. Mine Control Centre – Log Sheets
- 5.9. Electrical Isolations
- 5.10. Water Supply
- 5.11. CFA
- 5.12. ESLO
- 5.13. Internal Fires
- 5.14. Traffic Management
- 5.15. Roof Access

## 6: RECOMMENDATIONS

- 6.1. Improve Emergency Response
- 6.2. Improve Fire Fighting Ability
- 6.3. Fire Fuel Reduction
- 6.4. Improve Safety In and Around Bunker

## 7: ACTION PLAN

**APPENDIX 1 – PHOTOGRAPH HAZELWOOD SLOT BUNKER****APPENDIX 2 – CONTROL CENTRE LOG OF EVENTS****APPENDIX 3 – WEATHER LOGS****APPENDIX 4 – REVENUE LOSSES****APPENDIX 5 – NOV 2003 RECOMMENDATIONS****APPENDIX 6 – WITNESS STATEMENTS**

1. ALAN LAINE – OPERATOR STATION
2. ALEX COOPER – MINE OPERATOR
3. BRETT KEY – OPERATOR STATION
4. BRIAN HICKS – MINE OPERATOR
5. BRIAN KERR – SERVICES ASSISTANT UNIT CONTROLLER
6. BRIAN PIROTTA – MINE OPERATOR
7. COLIN LIPMAN – MINE OPERATOR
8. CON KOUMIS – MINE OPERATOR
9. EDDY WEBSTER – MINE OPERATOR
10. GEOFF CRISP – MINE OPERATOR
11. GRAEME VAUX – MINE OPERATOR
12. IAN QUAIL - MINE PRODUCTION MANAGER (Took over as EC From K. Lovett)
13. JOHN TYBURSKI – MINE OPERATOR (CONTROL CENTRE ATTENDANT)
14. KEVIN LOVETT – MINE SHIFT MANAGER (EMERGENCY COMMANDER)
15. MARK WARR – MINE OPERATOR
16. PETER FELSTEAD – MINE OPERATOR
17. PETER TSEBELIS – ASSISTANT UNIT CONTROLLER
18. RAY MURPHY – MINE OPERATOR
19. ROB SHARROCK – SHIFT MANAGER STATION
20. SCOTT ROBERTS – MINE OPERATOR
21. SHAUN O'NEIL – MINE SHIFT TEAM LEADER
22. SID COOK – MINE SHIFT ELECTRICIAN
23. STEVE RIENIETS – MINE MANAGER
24. TONY BRIFFA – MINE OPERATOR
25. WAYNE PONTON – MINE OPERATOR
26. WAYNE VANDERKOOGH – DIAMOND PROTECTION

## 1: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At around 5am Sunday 3<sup>rd</sup> April, a major fire had established itself in the spill belts under M171/M172 conveyors. These conveyors lead into the very top of the bunker located at the West wall and are subjected to a natural draft, which increases during windy conditions. There is a long history of fires in these conveyors with the last one occurring on Nov 2003, the elimination of coal spilled in these areas is difficult to achieve even when washing down.

The fire was first noticed at around 0500hrs and officially reported to the mine control centre at 0510hrs. Additional mine personnel were immediately dispatched to the scene and it was quickly recognised that the fires could develop past the capability of IPRH resources. The Country Fire Authority in Morwell was contacted for assistance at 0515hrs. A sudden change in weather pattern prompted the urgency for the assistance of outside services.

Weather logs taken at the time of the incident indicate a mild South/East wind, which dramatically changed to a North/West direction at 0500am in morning with high wind speeds of 70km/hr and averaging 35km/hr over a 5hr period. The outside temperature also rose sharply from 20 to 26 Degrees Celsius. (APPENDIX 3)

A dramatic change in the weather, in conjunction with a collapsed centre-carrying Idler (bearing) on M171 conveyor located at the very top of the bunker provided the ignition source. With the assistance of extremely high winds speeds, the fire spread quickly through the South End and the surrounding areas at ground level.

Fire on the ground and in the bunker was fought by approximately 60 CFA, Mine, Power Station and Alliance personnel.

Assistance was also brought in from Dandenong and the Metropolitan Fire Brigade in Burwood – These Units specialise in elevated platforms, which are not available in the Valley. (Photograph on front cover)

With the assistance of the outside services the fire was extinguished safely. Some of the fire fighters suffered minor first aid treatment injuries mainly dust in eyes.

Compulsory washing down of bunker was only completed 2 weeks prior to the fire. Maintenance logs revealed no backlog or outstanding idler's requiring maintenance at the time.

Coal supplies to the South End of bunker (which had ceased at approx 0515am) recommenced at approximately 1310 via M182/M172. M171 was out of service for the remaining 2 days whilst minor electrical repairs were made to M181 conveyor.

Plant damage was minor confined to electrical cables along M181 and water damage to the Bunker lift. Both were back and operating within 3-4 days of the fire. The spill belts on M172/M172 conveyors were cut away.

## **2: PRECAUTIONS TAKEN PRIOR TO THE FIRE**

Due to mild weather leading up to the fire no special precautions were issued for the mine or bunker, which is always manned with two mine personnel.

Compulsory washing down of bunker was completed 2 weeks prior to the fire.

Conveyor maintenance was and continues to be conducted on a weekly basis min 10hr/week

Action of recommendations taken form the Nov 2003 fire which were completed are as follows:

- a) An increase of bunker wash down program intervals
- b) Additional operators trained in the use of Breathing Apparatus Equipment
- c) Set –up of two new Emergency Response Trailers
- d) Installation of two high volume fog type sprays in the bunker - one at the North end West wall and one at the South end West wall.
- e) Up-grade of fire fighting equipment and water supply within the bunker.

For the Status and information on Nov 2003 list of recommendations please refer to a (Appendix 5)

## **3: CAUSE**

Upon inspection after the fire a collapsed centre carrying Idler (bearing) on M171 conveyor located at the very top of the bunker provided the ignition source. This Idler had not been reported or recorded in the Maintenance logs prior to the fire occurring.

## **4: CONSEQUENCES**

### **4.1 Safety Of Personnel**

The most important outcome regarding the fire was that it was fought in a safe manner and that as a consequence there were no serious injuries apart a few minor first aid treatment injuries. i.e. dust in eyes and tripping.

### **4.2 Plant Damage**

Plant damage was superficial with repair costs estimated at no more than \$10000 comprising the following:

- M171/M181 conveyor power cables – minor electrical damage
- Bunker Lift – Minor water damage to electrics and external cladding
- Translucent roofing sheets and timber walkways on roof damaged – were due to be replaced in the near future.
- M171/M172 spill belts were cut away.

### **4.3 Lost Revenue**

Generation losses at the station commenced at approx 0900hrs – some 4hrs after the initial fire had commenced. (By 9am the majority of fire fighting was complete)

Coal supply delays to the South End of bunker was for approx 8hr although coal supply to the North End was maintained throughout the emergency.

Due to the large volumes of water used in fighting the bunker fire, a slurry of coal poured onto and around the conveyor lines, located directly under the bunker slots.(typically lines 7and8) This created difficulties in re-establishing the operation of those conveyors, and in turn attributed to increased loss in generation.

Total Revenue Loss ---- Actual against Theoretical - \$381k. – (APPENDIX 4)

## **5: FINDINGS**

### **5.1 Post Nov 2003 Fire Recommendations**

Action's implemented following the previous fire in Nov 2003 had assisted in the the quick containment of the fire preventing it from spreading throughout the bunker and potentially causing further plant damage.

### **5.2 Fire Fuel – Ignition Source**

Upon inspection after the fire, a collapsed Centre Carrying Idler (bearing) on M171 conveyor (located at the very top of the bunker) proved to be the ignition source and with the assistance of extremely high wind speeds and presence of Pulverised Fuel, the fire spread quickly through the South end of the bunker and the surrounding areas at ground level.

### **5.3 Emergency Response Protocol**

Emergency response protocol was satisfactory in being established with outside agencies ie. CFA - although Diamond protection was not notified immediately after the fire had been reported. CFA were quick to establish a control point but mine personnel seemed a little unsure exactly where the emergency Command post was located.

### **5.4 Command Identification Apparel**

Command vest and mandatory apparel was used effectively but requires some of the vests to be replaced due to deterioration over the years.

Power station to have Zone Leader for their designated area to wear appropriate vest.

### **5.5 Personnel Protection Equipment**

Basic fire fighting equipment along wit PPE equipment was in good supply – Aided by the introduction of 2 new emergency response trailers.

### **5.6 Breathing Apparatus**

Breathing Apparatus (B/A) equipment was used in the early stages of fire fighting with sufficient Mine/CFA personnel located at the scene with equipment at hand if

further required. B/A units have not been installed in bunker as recommended from previous fire back in Nov2003.

#### **5.7 Bunker - Fire Prevention**

Compulsory washing down of bunker was only completed 2 weeks prior to the fire –

Current wash down periods are from 4-6 weeks over the summer period and 10-12 weeks over the winter period. Existing wash down procedure to be reviewed due to continued presence of Pulverised Fuel around the internal structures of the bunker.

#### **5.8 Mine Control Centre – Log Sheets**

Control Centre Operator time based log of events list could be simplified enabling the operator to conduct a quick and accurate account of events as they occur. The presence of an additional operator to the Control Centre at the time of emergency to help out with the influx of calls could be advantageous.

#### **5.9 Electrical Isolations**

Emergency Commander on site needs to be in immediate contact with the shift electricians if Isolations to plant are required.

#### **5.10 Water Supply**

Water supply into the top end of the bunker was initially in-sufficient due to the high commitment of water usage at ground level – (this occurred in the early stages of the fire) – Adequate water supply to the bunker was restored once alternative supply was sourced from TP5 manifold and additional pumps were activated. Existing water supply system needs to be reviewed and more clearly identified.

#### **5.11 CFA**

CFA personnel were still using bunker lift up to 2hrs after the fire had commenced; subsequently the fire did take hold in the lift and eventually was shut down.

Comment from many of the witness statements was the CFA lack of knowledge in fighting coal fire's in particular a Pulverised Fuel Fire.

#### **5.12 ESLO**

The ESLO on duty was not contactable and eventually an alternative ESLO was sourced some 4hrs after the fire had commenced.

#### **5.13 Internal Fires**

The tin flashing currently covering many of the internal wall girts of the bunker to prevent the build up of pulverised fuel were harbouring fires underneath making it difficult to extinguish or find.

#### **5.14 Traffic Management**

No traffic management procedure exists which would control all traffic surrounding the bunker or subsequent emergencies (within the mine) indicating restricted access and possible detours. (This fire commenced 2 hrs before a shift handover period, which saw an increase in traffic volume throughout the area both from the station and mine – further training is required with Emergency Commanders).

### **5.15 Roof Access**

Existing roof access to the bunker roof area is limited and the existing timber walkway on the Southern was alight. This area required CFA specialised elevated platform tankers to extinguish.

## **6: RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **6.1 Improve Emergency Response Procedures**

**6:1.1** Emergency commanders to ensure zone leader representatives are clearly identified on site defining zone leader area representation for the Mine and Station when combating fire at the bunker.

**6:1.2** Emergency response instigation procedures to be updated and clearly identified in all control rooms. - Notification of an emergency is to include Diamond Protection and the Mines Inspector ( DPI).

**6:1.3** Mine Control Centre / Control Points and Emergency Response trailers to include simplified log of event sheet documents.

**6:1.4** Investigate the possibility of having automatic recording of all incoming and outgoing calls whilst emergency is in progress at control point locations.

**6:1.5** Annual refresher courses for all Emergency Commanders/Zone Leaders reviewing the Emergency Response Procedures including water management traffic management and general protocol.

**6:1.6** Existing Command/Zone leader vests to be checked and updated if necessary. Vest to be located at all Control Points , Fire/service , Emergency Response Trailers and with Station Shift Managers.

**6:1.7** The Emergency response procedure detailing use of the bunker lift in the case of emergencies to be more clearly defined

### **6.2 Improve Fire Fighting Ability**

**6:2.1** Alternative water supply to be established at the base of the bunker West Side consisting of a manifold and 4 hydrants at ground level.

**6:2.2** Review of existing water supplies to the bunker and clearly identify all valve/hydrant points within the bunker and surrounding ground level.

**6:2.3** Current wash down procedure for the bunker to have greater emphasis on cleaning of the spill conveyors located at the West Wall entry of the bunker with a more concentrated effort in the removal of accumulated pulverised fuel deposits. (this includes operations and fire service)



**6:2.4** Liaise with CFA officials to discuss issues associated with fighting a Pulverised Fuel Fires and the possibility of further training for CFA members.

**6:2.5** As a precaution when fighting bunker fires all personnel are to wear the appropriate face mask and or Breathing apparatus unless directed otherwise by the CFA incident controller.

### **6.3 Fire Fuel Reduction**

**6:3.1** Ensure M170's spill belts are always operational – Or remove the spill belts and eliminate the build up of coal in this critical area. An engineering solution is required to achieve this.

**6:3.2** Review existing requirement for the tin flashing covering the steel structures preventing coal build up. (flashing harbours fire making it difficult to extinguish or find)

### **6.4 Improve Safety in and Around Bunker**

**6:4.1** Replace timber walkways on roof with steel replace the burnt translucent sheets on the roof with steel sheets. An assessment will be made as to the need for additional artificial lighting in the bunker.

**6:4.2** Bunker Lift – Access to a key for the control door cubicle to be made easily accessible if required.

**6:4.3** Install illuminated emergency exit signs in the bunker and an emergency light on the outside of the bunker to indicate a emergency or fire alert is in progress.

**6:4.4** Breathing Apparatus units to be installed in the Emergency Response Trailers. This eliminates the need for B/A units to be located at the bunker.


## **7: ACTION PLAN**

The recommendations are to be reviewed by management and agreed recommendations will be implemented.

For each action an "Opportunity For Improvement" will be raised in Paradigm. An appropriate IPRH manager will be assigned responsibility for the implementation of the required action. Agreed deadlines for completion will be set. The Safety Audit Review Committee (SMAC) will monitor progress on the implementation of the action plan.

**APPENDIX 1 – HAZELWOOD SLOT BUNKER**

Seat Of Fire  
West Wall Entry point  
M171 / M172  
Conveyors



## APPENDIX 2 - CONTROL CENTRE LOG OF EVENTS

### **Phone Log Hazelwood Slot Bunker fire 03-04-05**


0510 P. Felstead reported fire in bunker  
0512 L/H and R/R called to assist  
0514 RR after arriving on scene (G Crisp) requested CC to contact CFA, AUC and Diamond Protection and informed he will pick up our tanker from CC  
0515 Contacted CFA Morwell Via 000  
0516 Contacted AUC reporting fire and requesting assistance  
0521 K Lovett rang I Quail from site on his mobile  
I Quail contact S Rienets  
0540 I Quail requested B Pedder be contacted to dispatch fires service personnel  
0555 G Crisp requested the RTL tankers  
0558 P Quin called confirming 2 tankers had been dispatched from RTL  
0612 contacted Belbane (S Revees) to have spill belt under M182 cut  
0620 'B' team personnel requested to attend fire with Breathing apparatus  
SHIFT CHANGE  
0640 Water Requested (drinking??) arranged with D Suars  
0646 C Lipman took Personnel and B/A equipment to fire (BA from maint)  
0700 S Reeves arrives to cut M182 spill belt  
0703 Escort vehicle sent to escort CFA vehicles (I Smith)  
0725 Notified Power Station Manager fires were on rising conveyors to stage 1&2  
0900 M182 spill belt removed  
0921 Lift not working  
0927 I quail requested lift key  
1013 I Quail Lift fire sparkie required  
1440 J Sestokas spot fires south end of bunker. Tanker required  
1621 Fire above cubicle room (G Jacobs)  
1626 BA Equipment at Diamond protection ready to be picked up.  
END OF LOG

Note: This report was transcribed by G Crisp from the original log and consultation with K Lovett and J Tyburski


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### APPENDIX 3 - WEATHER LOG'S


#### WIND DIRECTION



### HIGH WIND SPEED



### OUTSIDE TEMPERATURE



**APPENDIX 4 – REVENUE LOSSES**

ACTUAL		THEORETIC AL		DIFFERENCE	
REVENUE TOTALS	\$ 1,496,544	REVENUE TOTALS	\$ 1,877,168	REVENUE TOTALS	\$ -380,624
DATE_TIME	TOTAL	DATE_TIME	TOTAL	DATE_TIME	TOTAL
03/04/2005 0:30	\$ 17,095	03/04/2005 0:30	\$ 17,095	03/04/2005 0:30	-
03/04/2005 1:00	\$ 16,371	03/04/2005 1:00	\$ 16,371	03/04/2005 1:00	-
03/04/2005 1:30	\$ 16,603	03/04/2005 1:30	\$ 16,603	03/04/2005 1:30	-
03/04/2005 2:00	\$ 16,149	03/04/2005 2:00	\$ 16,149	03/04/2005 2:00	-
03/04/2005 2:30	\$ 15,005	03/04/2005 2:30	\$ 15,005	03/04/2005 2:30	-
03/04/2005 3:00	\$ 14,508	03/04/2005 3:00	\$ 14,508	03/04/2005 3:00	-
03/04/2005 3:30	\$ 14,343	03/04/2005 3:30	\$ 14,343	03/04/2005 3:30	-
03/04/2005 4:00	\$ 14,164	03/04/2005 4:00	\$ 14,164	03/04/2005 4:00	-
03/04/2005 4:30	\$ 13,943	03/04/2005 4:30	\$ 13,943	03/04/2005 4:30	-
03/04/2005 5:00	\$ 14,113	03/04/2005 5:00	\$ 14,113	03/04/2005 5:00	-
03/04/2005 5:30	\$ 14,162	03/04/2005 5:30	\$ 14,162	03/04/2005 5:30	-
03/04/2005 6:00	\$ 14,123	03/04/2005 6:00	\$ 14,123	03/04/2005 6:00	-
03/04/2005 6:30	\$ 14,010	03/04/2005 6:30	\$ 14,010	03/04/2005 6:30	-
03/04/2005 7:00	\$ 13,560	03/04/2005 7:00	\$ 13,560	03/04/2005 7:00	-
03/04/2005 7:30	\$ 13,597	03/04/2005 7:30	\$ 13,597	03/04/2005 7:30	-
03/04/2005 8:00	\$ 13,795	03/04/2005 8:00	\$ 13,795	03/04/2005 8:00	-
03/04/2005 8:30	\$ 14,014	03/04/2005 8:30	\$ 14,014	03/04/2005 8:30	-
03/04/2005 9:00	\$ 13,474	03/04/2005 9:00	\$ 15,854	03/04/2005 9:00	\$ -2,381
03/04/2005 9:30	\$ 12,931	03/04/2005 9:30	\$ 16,762	03/04/2005 9:30	\$ -3,831
03/04/2005 10:00	\$ 12,609	03/04/2005 10:00	\$ 17,205	03/04/2005 10:00	\$ -4,596
03/04/2005 10:30	\$ 12,443	03/04/2005 10:30	\$ 17,434	03/04/2005 10:30	\$ -4,991
03/04/2005 11:00	\$ 12,244	03/04/2005 11:00	\$ 17,529	03/04/2005 11:00	\$ -5,285
03/04/2005 11:30	\$ 12,202	03/04/2005 11:30	\$ 17,508	03/04/2005 11:30	\$ -5,305
03/04/2005 12:00	\$ 12,118	03/04/2005 12:00	\$ 17,490	03/04/2005 12:00	\$ -5,372
03/04/2005 12:30	\$ 11,933	03/04/2005 12:30	\$ 18,321	03/04/2005 12:30	\$ -6,388
03/04/2005 13:00	\$ 11,876	03/04/2005 13:00	\$ 18,057	03/04/2005 13:00	\$ -6,181
03/04/2005 13:30	\$ 11,814	03/04/2005 13:30	\$ 17,410	03/04/2005 13:30	\$ -5,596
03/04/2005 14:00	\$ 11,731	03/04/2005 14:00	\$ 17,925	03/04/2005 14:00	\$ -6,194
03/04/2005 14:30	\$ 11,075	03/04/2005 14:30	\$ 19,305	03/04/2005 14:30	\$ -8,230
03/04/2005 15:00	\$ 10,947	03/04/2005 15:00	\$ 19,305	03/04/2005 15:00	\$ -8,358
03/04/2005 15:30	\$ 11,009	03/04/2005 15:30	\$ 17,884	03/04/2005 15:30	\$ -6,876
03/04/2005 16:00	\$ 10,770	03/04/2005 16:00	\$ 17,947	03/04/2005 16:00	\$ -7,177
03/04/2005 16:30	\$ 10,574	03/04/2005 16:30	\$ 19,058	03/04/2005 16:30	\$ -8,484
03/04/2005 17:00	\$ 10,599	03/04/2005 17:00	\$ 19,084	03/04/2005 17:00	\$ -8,485
03/04/2005 17:30	\$ 10,473	03/04/2005 17:30	\$ 17,623	03/04/2005 17:30	\$ -7,150
03/04/2005 18:00	\$ 9,666	03/04/2005 18:00	\$ 19,830	03/04/2005 18:00	\$ -10,164
03/04/2005 18:30	\$ 2,315	03/04/2005 18:30	\$ 21,992	03/04/2005 18:30	\$ -19,677
03/04/2005 19:00	\$ 4,762	03/04/2005 19:00	\$ 21,793	03/04/2005 19:00	\$ -17,031
03/04/2005 19:30	\$ 9,087	03/04/2005 19:30	\$ 21,531	03/04/2005 19:30	\$ -12,444
03/04/2005 20:00	\$ 10,641	03/04/2005 20:00	\$ 21,436	03/04/2005 20:00	\$ -10,795
03/04/2005 20:30	\$ 11,172	03/04/2005 20:30	\$ 19,233	03/04/2005 20:30	\$ -8,061
03/04/2005 21:00	\$ 10,486	03/04/2005 21:00	\$ 18,165	03/04/2005 21:00	\$ -7,678
03/04/2005 21:30	\$ 10,430	03/04/2005 21:30	\$ 17,092	03/04/2005 21:30	\$ -6,663
03/04/2005 22:00	\$ 10,480	03/04/2005 22:00	\$ 17,360	03/04/2005 22:00	\$ -6,880

Fire Started

Fire Contained - Mopping Up

03/04/2005 22:30	\$ 10,338	03/04/2005 22:30	\$ 15,102	03/04/2005 22:30	\$ -4,764
03/04/2005 23:00	\$ 10,146	03/04/2005 23:00	\$ 16,064	03/04/2005 23:00	\$ -5,918
03/04/2005 23:30	\$ 10,198	03/04/2005 23:30	\$ 16,391	03/04/2005 23:30	\$ -6,193
04/04/2005 0:00	\$ 10,879	04/04/2005 0:00	\$ 15,551	04/04/2005 0:00	\$ -4,672
04/04/2005 0:30	\$ 11,242	04/04/2005 0:30	\$ 14,955	04/04/2005 0:30	\$ -3,712
04/04/2005 1:00	\$ 11,463	04/04/2005 1:00	\$ 14,802	04/04/2005 1:00	\$ -3,339
04/04/2005 1:30	\$ 11,983	04/04/2005 1:30	\$ 15,188	04/04/2005 1:30	\$ -3,205
04/04/2005 2:00	\$ 12,212	04/04/2005 2:00	\$ 14,626	04/04/2005 2:00	\$ -2,413
04/04/2005 2:30	\$ 12,308	04/04/2005 2:30	\$ 13,865	04/04/2005 2:30	\$ -1,557
04/04/2005 3:00	\$ 12,250	04/04/2005 3:00	\$ 13,709	04/04/2005 3:00	\$ -1,459
04/04/2005 3:30	\$ 12,032	04/04/2005 3:30	\$ 15,043	04/04/2005 3:30	\$ -3,011
04/04/2005 4:00	\$ 11,959	04/04/2005 4:00	\$ 15,003	04/04/2005 4:00	\$ -3,044
04/04/2005 4:30	\$ 11,935	04/04/2005 4:30	\$ 14,744	04/04/2005 4:30	\$ -2,808
04/04/2005 5:00	\$ 11,985	04/04/2005 5:00	\$ 14,913	04/04/2005 5:00	\$ -2,928
04/04/2005 5:30	\$ 12,202	04/04/2005 5:30	\$ 15,081	04/04/2005 5:30	\$ -2,880
04/04/2005 6:00	\$ 12,522	04/04/2005 6:00	\$ 15,199	04/04/2005 6:00	\$ -2,676
04/04/2005 6:30	\$ 13,418	04/04/2005 6:30	\$ 16,437	04/04/2005 6:30	\$ -3,019
04/04/2005 7:00	\$ 13,201	04/04/2005 7:00	\$ 16,764	04/04/2005 7:00	\$ -3,563
04/04/2005 7:30	\$ 21,216	04/04/2005 7:30	\$ 26,132	04/04/2005 7:30	\$ -4,917
04/04/2005 8:00	\$ 20,390	04/04/2005 8:00	\$ 26,417	04/04/2005 8:00	\$ -6,027
04/04/2005 8:30	\$ 19,922	04/04/2005 8:30	\$ 26,691	04/04/2005 8:30	\$ -6,769
04/04/2005 9:00	\$ 19,585	04/04/2005 9:00	\$ 26,997	04/04/2005 9:00	\$ -7,412
04/04/2005 9:30	\$ 19,646	04/04/2005 9:30	\$ 26,934	04/04/2005 9:30	\$ -7,289
04/04/2005 10:00	\$ 20,238	04/04/2005 10:00	\$ 26,792	04/04/2005 10:00	\$ -6,554
04/04/2005 10:30	\$ 20,444	04/04/2005 10:30	\$ 26,832	04/04/2005 10:30	\$ -6,388
04/04/2005 11:00	\$ 20,703	04/04/2005 11:00	\$ 27,224	04/04/2005 11:00	\$ -6,521
04/04/2005 11:30	\$ 20,442	04/04/2005 11:30	\$ 26,646	04/04/2005 11:30	\$ -6,204
04/04/2005 12:00	\$ 20,358	04/04/2005 12:00	\$ 26,666	04/04/2005 12:00	\$ -6,308
04/04/2005 12:30	\$ 20,546	04/04/2005 12:30	\$ 26,723	04/04/2005 12:30	\$ -6,177
04/04/2005 13:00	\$ 20,688	04/04/2005 13:00	\$ 26,703	04/04/2005 13:00	\$ -6,016
04/04/2005 13:30	\$ 20,766	04/04/2005 13:30	\$ 26,721	04/04/2005 13:30	\$ -5,955
04/04/2005 14:00	\$ 20,863	04/04/2005 14:00	\$ 26,683	04/04/2005 14:00	\$ -5,820
04/04/2005 14:30	\$ 21,358	04/04/2005 14:30	\$ 26,686	04/04/2005 14:30	\$ -5,328
04/04/2005 15:00	\$ 21,827	04/04/2005 15:00	\$ 26,647	04/04/2005 15:00	\$ -4,821
04/04/2005 15:30	\$ 22,410	04/04/2005 15:30	\$ 26,612	04/04/2005 15:30	\$ -4,203
04/04/2005 16:00	\$ 23,431	04/04/2005 16:00	\$ 26,570	04/04/2005 16:00	\$ -3,138
04/04/2005 16:30	\$ 24,608	04/04/2005 16:30	\$ 26,527	04/04/2005 16:30	\$ -1,919
04/04/2005 17:00	\$ 25,107	04/04/2005 17:00	\$ 26,530	04/04/2005 17:00	\$ -1,424
04/04/2005 17:30	\$ 25,164	04/04/2005 17:30	\$ 25,164	04/04/2005 17:30	-
04/04/2005 18:00	\$ 25,056	04/04/2005 18:00	\$ 25,056	04/04/2005 18:00	-
04/04/2005 18:30	\$ 25,012	04/04/2005 18:30	\$ 25,012	04/04/2005 18:30	-
04/04/2005 19:00	\$ 24,939	04/04/2005 19:00	\$ 24,939	04/04/2005 19:00	-
04/04/2005 19:30	\$ 24,948	04/04/2005 19:30	\$ 24,948	04/04/2005 19:30	-
04/04/2005 20:00	\$ 25,016	04/04/2005 20:00	\$ 25,016	04/04/2005 20:00	-
04/04/2005 20:30	\$ 24,992	04/04/2005 20:30	\$ 24,992	04/04/2005 20:30	-
04/04/2005 21:00	\$ 25,006	04/04/2005 21:00	\$ 25,006	04/04/2005 21:00	-



<b><u>APPENDIX 5 – Nov 2003 Recommendations</u></b>	<b>ACTION</b>	<b>STATUS</b>
<b>2003 RECOMMENDATIONS</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Replace timber walkways on roof with steel; replace the burnt translucent sheets on roof with steel sheets. An assessment will then be made as to the need for additional artificial lighting in the bunker.</li> </ul>	J.Beckman	Partially complete – work still in progress
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>High fire risk days and/or reports of conveyor fires in the mine to trigger a wet down spray program in the bunker. Wet down spray program to be developed.</li> </ul>		complete
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Install two high volume fog type sprays in the bunker one at the north end and one at the south.</li> </ul>		complete
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conduct challenge exercises for bunker operators for improved response for activation of spray lines.</li> </ul>		complete
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Bunker wash-down program to be increased to monthly from November to February.</li> </ul>		complete
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Extend the number of operators trained in the use of Breathing Apparatus (BA)</li> </ul>		complete
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Additional spare (BA) air cylinder to be stored at the mine control centre.</li> </ul>		complete
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Store two sets of BA in the bunker crib (meal) room.</li> </ul>	J. O'bryan	To be stored in emerg. Response trailers
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Train fire service operators as to the location of all fire fighting equipment at the fire depot.</li> </ul>		complete
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consider purchasing CFA type hose kits (12 off).</li> </ul>		complete
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mount mobile crane spray monitors on a trailer. The crane monitor and crane/s to travel to the fire scene separately for subsequent coupling.</li> </ul>	R.Prezioso	Commenced, completion due end Nov 05
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Additional routine liaison with CFA incident Controller – site familiarisation, information of coal fires (fireballs), and information on critical areas and critical equipment.</li> </ul>		complete
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>IPRH trained person with CFA teams at all times.</li> </ul>		complete
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Safety blimp Persons detecting a fire must always call for help first before trying to fight it</b></li> </ul>		complete

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Set up Emergency Response Trailer with emergency response materials. Trailer to be used as a field control point. The emergency response trailer to be stored at the mine control centre.</li> </ul>		complete
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>All potential Field Officers to be training in Breathing Apparatus (BA) use to assist in gaining accurate field assessment for reporting back to the Emergency Commander.</li> </ul>		complete
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>All potential Emergency Commanders/Field Officers/ESLO's to have own emergency vest and kit including documentation.</li> </ul>		complete
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mobile phones of key emergency personnel to be programmed with all required contact numbers and be replaced with new units on a regular basis to ensure they remain in a reliable condition.</li> </ul>	S.Rieniets	Requires further investigation due to practicalities
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Review current methods of logging radio and phone emergency calls.</li> </ul>	R.Prezioso	Formal request to be made to IT/BAE to provide options
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Carry out additional emergency response training for emergency personnel.</li> </ul>	S.Rieniets	Requires further training
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Change the emergency response protocol for the mine similar to that of the power station. First emergency call from the mine to be to Diamond Protection. However, if assistance from the CFA is also required, the mine to make this emergency call too.</li> </ul>		complete
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Authorised vehicle parking in designated hard-standing areas only around the bunker.</li> </ul>		complete
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Install illuminated emergency exit signs in the bunker</li> </ul>	W.Estrada	To Be completed
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Bunker attendants to have and carry mobile radios at all time.</li> </ul>	I.Quail	Still to be investigated due to practicalities
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Bunker attendants to activate bunker siren from bunker.</li> </ul>	I.Quail	Under review
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Rotating beacons to be installed inside the bunker at fire escape stairs, operators cabin, top and bottom of lift.</li> </ul>	W.Estrada	Under review

## **APPENDIX 6 – WITNESS STATEMENTS**

### **Hazelwood Slot Bunker Fire 3/4/05**

#### **Record of Witness Statement**

**Name:** Alan Laine

**Position Held:** Operator - Station

**Yrs Experience:** 26

**Where were you working at the time?**

Stage 2 Ash Plant.

**How were you notified of the incident?**

Doug McFarlane, who received a call from Rob Sharrock asking all spare men to attend.

**When were you notified and by whom?**

5.25 AM by Doug.

**What did you do?.**

Went to the Slot Bunker

**What did you see when you arrived?.**

Flames coming out of roof / smoking embers on grass / shack on fire / Line 7 wagon had fire embers underneath the paddle.

**What did you do when you arrived?**

Grabbed 40 mm hose and sprayed water from the Line and then cable side to extinguish Line 7 wagon.

**What do you think caused the fire?**

Lack of maintenance.

**Where do you think the fire started?**

Conveyor from Open Cut into Slot Bunker

**What worked well?**

Me.

**What do you think could have been improved?**

Hydrant pressure. It was pathetic.

**Any other information?****Hazelwood Slot Bunker Fire 3/4/05****Record of Witness Statement****Name:** Alex Cooper**Position Held:** Operator**Yrs Experience:** 10 years**Where were you working at the time?** Roadrunner**How were you notified of the incident?** By team leader**When were you notified and by whom?** 5.05am by team leader**What did you do?** Attended fire**What did you see when you arrived?** Area around bunker and M171 and M172 on fire.**What did you do when you arrived?** Help operators fight fire in bunkers.**What do you think caused the fire? ?****Where do you think the fire started? ?****What worked well?** Operators worked well as a team in saving plant.**What do you think could have been improved?** More fire protection apparel eg. Jackets, Helmets**Any other information?**

## Hazelwood Slot Bunker Fire 3/4/05

### Record of Witness Statement

**Name:** Brett Key

**Position Held:** Operator - Station

**Yrs Experience:** 18

**Where were you working at the time?**

No 2 Crusher House.

**How were you notified of the incident?**

Through a phone call from Mick Shields who was in No 1 Crusher House at the time.

**When were you notified and by whom?**

As above at 5.25 AM.

**What did you do?.**

I went out to the short ramps and started hosing all around that area because the wind was quite strong at the time, hence we were getting spot fires everywhere, from the embers coming out of the Slot Bunker.

**What did you see when you arrived?.**

**What did you do when you arrived?**

**What do you think caused the fire?**

We heard later in the morning the cause of the fire was due to a idler rubbing.

**Where do you think the fire started?**

@ the top South side of the Slot Bunker.

**What worked well?**

"All the hands on deck" personnel who quickly offered assistance. Hosing in the immediate area.

**What do you think could have been improved?**

**Any other information?**

Hazelwood Slot Bunker Fire 3/4/05

**Record of Witness Statement**

**Name:** Brian Hicks

**Position Held:** HLH

**Yrs Experience:** 11 years as operator

**Where were you working at the time?** I worked as HLH rotating thru and Dredger Hopper. 7pm – 10pm Hopper, 10pm – 1am HLH, 1am – 4am HLH and 4am – 7am Hopper.

**How were you notified of the incident?** I heard at end of shift in muster room.

**When were you notified and by whom?** At change of shift by on coming shift (B Roster).

**What did you do?** Did not know how larg incident was so changed and went home.

**What did you see when you arrived?** Did not attend.

**What did you do when you arrived?**

**What do you think caused the fire?**

**Where do you think the fire started?**

**What worked well?**

**What do you think could have been improved?**

**Any other information?**

**Hazelwood Slot Bunker Fire 3/4/05**

**Record of Witness Statement**

***Name:*** Brian Kerr

***Position held:*** Services Assistant Unit Controller

***Years Experience:*** 17 years in Power Station Operations

***Where were you working at the time?*** Coal Supervisory Centre (Ski Lodge)

***How were you notified of the incident?*** Telephone call.

***When were you notified and by whom?*** At approximately 0515 by an unidentified caller (presumably Top of Slots operator) requesting that our operators attend a fire in the bunkers. A question ascertained that it was in fact the 'Slot' bunkers and not inside the Power Station.

***What did you do?*** Telephoned Crusher House operators and requested they investigate the reported fire. Telephoned Power Station Shift Manager to inquire what he knew of a fire, He didn't know. C/H operator rang and reported South Transfer Stations in danger. I attended the fire to investigate further.

***What did you see when you arrived?*** The head end of M171 and 172 conveyors enclosing structure was alight, especially under the floor. Burning embers were falling onto the coal / briquette piles on the concrete apron underneath and the wind was blowing burning fragments in all directions and through the Slot Bunkers causing spot fires in the piles, the conveyor structures and belts, the old 'Atco' crib room and on the grass to the South of the Slot Bunkers.

***What did you do when you arrived?*** Checked that C/H operators were O.K, grabbed a hose and commenced to extinguish spot fires on grass, coal/briquette piles, Line 7 and 8 Coal Plant conveyors and structures and damped down smouldering coal at bottom of West bunker above belts. Set hose nozzle on 'fog' and stood inside Slot Bunker wall attempted to extinguish smouldering embers as they entered at Slot bunker floor level. Continued to do so until 0650 when my relief turned up.

***What do you think caused the fire?*** Metal rubbing on metal (possibly bearing failure) producing sparks or sufficient heat to ignite built up coal dust and the wind did the rest.

***Where do you think the fire started?*** Near the head end of M171/172 conveyors, possibly spillage conveyors.

***What worked well?*** Diamond Protection, Country Fire Authority and Hazelwood personnel all responded promptly and effectively minimised the extent of the fire.

***What do you think could have been improved?*** Communications, the TMR handsets are useless and more communication between the Mine and Power Station at Shift Manager level might have been of value.

***Any other information?*** The west wall of the slot bunkers is missing quite a bit of cladding and these openings have been utilised for bobcat access to clean up coal spills at the bottom of the slot bunkers. These openings provided easy access for

**burning fragments into the floor level of the bunkers. Perhaps a spray system could be devised to produce a 'wall' of water along the west wall to minimise the amount of burning fragments entering the area and damaging Power Station Coal Plant (Slot Bunker Conveyors 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 36 and 42 and associated BDW's and Transfer Stations.**



## Hazelwood Slot Bunker Fire 3/4/05

### Record of Witness Statement

**Name:** Brian Pirotta

**Position Held:** Operator

**Yrs Experience:** 20 years

**Where were you working at the time?** Hazelwood L/H

**How were you notified of the incident?** By radio

**When were you notified and by whom?** 5.12am by off sider

**What did you do?** Got picked up by off sider and attended fire.

**What did you see when you arrived?** Fire burning at rising section at the top of M171/M172 conveyor.

**What did you do when you arrived?** Attended fire and helped put out fire with other operators.

**What do you think caused the fire?** Don't know.

**Where do you think the fire started?** Don't know.

**What worked well?** Working as a team, with operators and team leader.

**What do you think could have been improved?** Better hose set ups (had to run around bunker to find hoses).

**Any other information?** To have rubber hoses at head ends off M171/M172/M173/M174 and spill belts on a hose reel set up so after finish hosing, hoses can be reeled back on hose reel

## Hazelwood Slot Bunker Fire 3/4/05

### Record of Witness Statement

**Name:** Colin Lipman

**Position Held:** Shift Supervisor – Sunday d/shift

**Yrs Experience:** 24

**Where were you working at the time?**  
Commenced start of D/shift

**How were you notified of the incident?**  
Soon as arrived to work

**When were you notified and by whom?**  
Shift manager on d/shift

**What did you do?.**  
Went to muster and collevted operators with B/A training – Got B/A equip and went across to fire scene – Instructed by I Quail to get together the B/A equip and trained operators ready if required.

**What did you see when you arrived?.**  
Lots of fire trucks and lot of wetting down with many CFA personnel standing around

**What did you do when you arrived?**  
Asked question of where to find the CFA rep in charge of B/A equip and he was found and notified of the B/A availability and personnel trained in B/A

**What do you think caused the fire?**  
Not sure

**Where do you think the fire started?**  
Seemed to be under M181 spill belt

**What worked well?**  
Most of everything went well

**What do you think could have been improved?**  
Internal sprays on top of roof would not activate at all – valves were all opened not sure about the solenoids.

**Any other information?**  
Could do with more hydrant connections at the roof access points.

**Hazelwood Slot Bunker Fire 3/4/05****Record of Witness Statement**

**Name:** Con Koumis

**Position Held:** Operator

**Yrs Experience:** 7

**Where were you working at the time?**

Came into work as start of D/shift Sunday

**How were you notified of the incident?**

Team Leader

**When were you notified and by whom?**

At 7:45am

**What did you do?.**

Attended the fire in bunker

**What did you see when you arrived?.**

Lot of wet areas – Spot fires everywhere

**What did you do when you arrived?**

Commenced washing and wetting areas down

**What do you think caused the fire?**

Weather conditions with a faulty idler

**Where do you think the fire started?**

M170's conveyors

**What worked well?**

Tremendous effort from all people involved

**What do you think could have been improved?**

On hot days and extreme weather conditions deluge system saturating the bunker floor be installed

**Any other information?**

Sprays on roof not adequate

Water pressure not sufficient

Wetting of coal as it enters the bunker

## Hazelwood Slot Bunker Fire 3/4/05

### Record of Witness Statement

**Name:** Eddy Webster

**Position Held:** Bunker Attendant

**Yrs Experience:** 13

**Where were you working at the time?**

Called in for D/shift

**How were you notified of the incident?**

Shift Manager In Morning

**When were you notified and by whom?**

At the start of the d/shift

**What did you do?.**

Request to Gather additional overalls from stores and went accorss to scene of fire with overalls in hand

**What did you see when you arrived?.**

Surprised to see CFA personnel still using the lift for access in and out of the bunker

**What did you do when you arrived?**

Delivered new overalls to control cubicle and looked for additional hoses to spray roof area at northern end of bunker – around the roof top areas.

**What do you think caused the fire?**

Not sure at time – Possibly M171 h/end area idlers

**Where do you think the fire started?**

M171 h/end area

**What worked well?**

Mine personnel were very good

CFA worked well came as a group and stayed together till directed otherwise

**What do you think could have been improved?**

Tin Flashing covering steel structure to prevent coal build up harbours fire's behind it – Clearly pointed out by the CFA heat sensor gun.

**Any other information?**

Lot of time spent putting out fires under the tin areas – Under the direction of the CFA heat imaging camera.

## Hazelwood Slot Bunker Fire 3/4/05

### Record of Witness Statement

**Name:** Geoff Crisp

**Position Held:** Operator Level 3

**Yrs Experience:** 14 years

**Where were you working at the time?** Roadrunner

**How were you notified of the incident?** Via radio from C/C

**When were you notified and by whom?** At about 5am from C/C operator

**What did you do?** Made my way to H5B via Fairy Martin Drive and Hazelwood Road.

**What did you see when you arrived?** Large fire falling from under M171 M172.

**What did you do when you arrived?** Notified C/C to contact CFA, AUC and Diamond Protection. Contacted TL, notified him of large fire. Returned to C/C to pick up tanker to control fire on ground outside bunker.

**What do you think caused the fire?** Not sure but could have been an idler.

**Where do you think the fire started?** M171

**What worked well?** Both ground attack as well as bunker attack.

**What do you think could have been improved?** Response by Hazelwood Power Station I think was poor, I ended up fighting fires under bunker. No station people were there.

**Any other information?** Senior Management need to be trained in Emergency Response Plan and activities. There were a few holes in the response.

## Hazelwood Slot Bunker Fire 3/4/05

### Record of Witness Statement

**Name:** Graeme Vaux

**Position Held:** Operator

**Yrs Experience:** 6 years

**Where were you working at the time?** Hazelwood Leading Hand

**How were you notified of the incident?** By radio

**When were you notified and by whom?** 0505 Sunday C/C operator

**What did you do?** Picked up mate and went to fire.

**What did you see when you arrived?** South end and coal at bottom of bunkers on fire.

**What did you do when you arrived?** Notified foremen by radio to call CFA, then went to top of bunker (floor) and started to extinguish the fire around M172 from M191.

**What do you think caused the fire?** Don't know

**Where do you think the fire started?** Don't know

**What worked well?** The confusion. Individual operators taking initiative to control the situation.

**What do you think could have been improved?** Communication between CFA, Operations and Diamond. Better clothing than overalls, protection from fire and water, eye protection.

**Any other information?** More hydrants along 150mm line on West wall would be an advantage.

## Hazelwood Slot Bunker Fire 3/4/05

### Record of Witness Statement

**Name:** Ian Quail

**Position Held:** Ops Manager

**Yrs Experience:** 18 years

**Where were you working at the time?** Home

**How were you notified of the incident?** K. Lovett. 5.10am

**When were you notified and by whom?** 5.10am

**What did you do?** Came to work and rang S. Rieniets on way to work.

**What did you see when you arrived?** Fire under M171/M172 spill belts. Spot fires on ground. CFA trucks. Water cart hosing grass.

**What did you do when you arrived?** Arranged for Fire Officer to be called in. Spoke to K. Lovett and picked up Emergency Response Trainer.

**What do you think caused the fire?** Idler off M171.

**Where do you think the fire started?** M171 H/end.

**What worked well?** Good communication between CFA and mine. Mine people knew exactly how to handle the situation. CFA prepared to listen.

**What do you think could have been improved?** CFA leaders to come in and discuss how to educate CFA people in fighting fires.

**Any other information?** Recording of people entering and exiting bunker to be conducted.

**Hazelwood Slot Bunker Fire 3/4/05**

**Record of Witness Statement**

**Name:** John Tyburski

**Position Held:** Operator

**Yrs Experience:** 10 years

**Where were you working at the time?** Control Centre

**How were you notified of the incident?** Phone

**When were you notified and by whom?** At 5.10am by G. Crisp

**What did you do?** Implemented Emergency Response

**What did you see when you arrived?**

**What did you do when you arrived?**

**What do you think caused the fire?**

**Where do you think the fire started?**

**What worked well?**



## Hazelwood Slot Bunker Fire 3/4/05

### Record of Witness Statement

**Name:** Kevin Lovett

**Position Held:** Shift Manager – Sunday n/shift

**Yrs Experience:** 25

**Where were you working at the time?**

Control centre - Office

**How were you notified of the incident?**

Phone call first from P Felstead and radio call from Shaun Oneil

**When were you notified and by whom?**

5.05am Peter Felstead

5.10am Shaun O'Neil

**What did you do?.**

Instigated Emerg Response Plan – Called 000 Morwell fire Brigade

Instructed J tubersky (c/c attendant) to call diamond protection

Put on emerg commander jacket and proceeded to fire scene and notified I Quail at which stage the mobile phone went dead.

P/Station was called whilst at the scen from vehicle radio and notified Rob Sharrock then rang AUC general to find where people were but call was not answered.

Short time later Rob arrived and I kept command of scene – Rob arranged for additional personnel from stn to fight fire approx 10 people.

**What did you see when you arrived?.**

Looking from btm up M171/M172 appeared to be on fire – surrounding area on conc floor and roadway outside bunker walls on the west side was on fire – scrub across the road was on fire – very strong winds with warm temp – Predominately Westerly winds.

**What did you do when you arrived?**

Took command and arranged for small party to enter bunkervia lift and do head count - B/A was called for once initial inspection of bunker was done

**What do you think caused the fire?**

No idea at that stage

**Where do you think the fire started?**

H/end area of M170's

**What worked well?**

Mine operators handled situation very well with main objective to save plant

**What do you think could have been improved?**

Command at scene of emergencies could be better identified – Forgot to arrange for the emergency response trailer to be brought across – CFA require greater knowledge in fighting of coal fires.

**Any other information?**

Unable to contact the rostered ESLO – Unsure who was on call at 5:30am  
Lewft scene @ 9am and handed over to I. Quail

## Hazelwood Slot Bunker Fire 3/4/05

### Record of Witness Statement

**Name:** Mark Warr

**Position Held:** Bunker Attendant

**Yrs Experience:** 18 years

**Where were you working at the time?** Bunker Attendant

**How were you notified of the incident?** Other Bunker Attendant told me he could smell smoke. We then noticed a major fire totally out of control.

**When were you notified and by whom?** By self.

**What did you do?** After trying to fight the fire we could see we were losing control. I then ran back and rang Control Centre that the fire was way out of control and advised him of the situation and asked for more help.

**What did you see when you arrived?** A major fire rapidly getting out of control and beyond our means to control.

**What did you do when you arrived?** Attempted to control the fire but rapidly ran out of water pressure.

**What do you think caused the fire?** A u/s idler on 171 conveyor.

**Where do you think the fire started?** Behind L/area on M171 conveyor.

**What worked well?** Once fellow operators arrived a real team effort was achieved.

**What do you think could have been improved?** Better training for CFA Officers and a much better supply of water pressure.

**Any other information?** We had to fight the fire with some hoses which in a major fire do not supply enough water.

## Hazelwood Slot Bunker Fire 3/4/05

### Record of Witness Statement

**Name:** Peter Felstead

**Position Held:** Operator

**Yrs Experience:** 8

**Where were you working at the time?**

Topping up south end M193

**How were you notified of the incident?**

Smelt coal burning

**When were you notified and by whom?**

I noticed smell at first – I went up to the operations cubicle – Informed Ray Murphy and Mark Warr that I could smell something burning around M171/M172 H/end

**What did you do?.**

Had to resume topping up as south end of bunker was becoming quite full

**What did you see when you arrived?.**

I had to continue topping up as the shuttle would have snowed in which would have left loaded belt in the area of the fire. ( I could see Ray/Mark trying to contain the fire.

**What did you do when you arrived?**

At first chance I turned on birdsmouth sprays(191/M192) I asked C/C operator call off D9 as soon as possible – I shifted shuttles to N/end of Bunker.

**What do you think caused the fire?**

Supervisor requested me to check on d/shift M171 spill belt and I found a C/C idler with collapsed bearing rubbing on frame causing sparks. ( I am positive that caused the fire) Very bad wind conditions made fire spread rapidly from smelling smoke to huge flames – took 5 min

**Where do you think the fire started?**

M171 spill belt area as the damaged C/C was at the top of the rising section right in the doorway

**What worked well?**

I haven't seen a fire that big before in my view looking back I could not believe we were able to limit the damage to such an extent – so I guess most things worked well

**What do you think could have been improved?**

A few more fire fighters initially – Once CFA arrived not such a problem.

**Any other information?**

I think on any day or night (without the west wind) I'm reasonably confident fire could have been contained by us. I set up M191 shuttle at s/end just 5-10 mins before I smelt the initial fire. I.E I walked directly underneath and didn't smell anything. What I'm trying to say is the fire started very very quickly.

## Hazelwood Slot Bunker Fire 3/4/05

### Record of Witness Statement

**Name:** Peter Tsebelis

**Position Held:** Assistant Unit Controller

**Yrs Experience:** 18 @ Hazelwood

**Where were you working at the time?**  
Stage 3 Unit Control Room.

**How were you notified of the incident?**  
**Station Warning Hooter**

**When were you notified and by whom?**  
By Unit Controller @ approx 5.30 hrs.

**What did you do?.**  
Was requested to attend Slot Bunker to assist.

**What did you see when you arrived?.**  
CFA fire Units in attendance . Smoke from West side of Bunker.

**What did you do when you arrived?**  
Contacted CFA Controller. Attended to spot fires around the Bunker basement and conveyors.

**What do you think caused the fire?**  
Not Sure.

**Where do you think the fire started?**  
N/A

**What worked well?**

**What do you think could have been improved?**  
Identification of Controllers, CFA and HP.

**Any other information?**

## Hazelwood Slot Bunker Fire 3/4/05

### Record of Witness Statement

**Name:** Ray Murphy

**Position Held:** Trainee

**Yrs Experience:** 3 days

**Where were you working at the time?** Bunker

**How were you notified of the incident?** Saw smoke from M171 conveyor. P. Felstead informed me he could smell smoke.

**When were you notified and by whom?** 0430 am saw smoke and sparks as per P. Felstead's directions.

**What did you do?** Went over to investigate cause of smoke and sparks.

**What did you see when you arrived?** I saw sparks pouring in from M171 West side of bunker, down onto spill belt and walkways.

**What did you do when you arrived?** Located hose at West side of M171 spill belt. Turned on hydrant and tried to control fire in spill belt and control sparks coming into bunker from above myself.

**What do you think caused the fire?** I believe a return idler on M171 had a collapsed bearing creating sparks/high winds driving fire into dry coal build-up.

**Where do you think the fire started?** The fire started in the spill belt due to the build up of dry powdered coal. The wind conditions helped to create the fire.

**What worked well?** The actions by all personnel in bunkers and out in field to get to bunkers to contain/control fire.

**What do you think could have been improved?** Lot of areas in bunkers to be washed down and cleared of dry coal build up.

**Any other information?** I think that on days or nights when weather conditions are going to be hot with high winds more emphasis be put to fire watch every few hours.

## **Hazelwood Slot Bunker Fire 3/4/05**

### **Record of Witness Statement**

**Name:** Rob Sharrock

**Position Held:** Shift Manager - Station

**Yrs Experience:** 23 years in Power Station. 12 years as Shift Manager.

**Where were you working at the time?**

Power Station Shift Managers Office.

**How were you notified of the incident?**

Telephone call from Services General – Brian Kerr.

**When were you notified and by whom?**

Approximately 0510 – 0515 hrs Sunday April 3<sup>rd</sup> 2005.

**What did you do?.**

Immediately contacted the Hazelwood Mine Shift Manager (Kevin Lovett), who advised that he was already aware of the situation and had been in contact with the CFA. I advised Kevin that I would meet him down at the Slot Bunker to assess the degree of assistance required from Station personnel.

**What did you see when you arrived?.**

The Top of the riser section of Conveyors 171 and 172, was on fire at the point where the Risers enter the Slot Bunker. A fairly strong breeze was also blowing and this was having the effect of fanning the fire. Burning powdered coal was raining down at several points and causing a large number of spot fires to break out underneath and a pile of approximately 30 tonnes of Briquettes nearby were burning vigorously.

**What did you do when you arrived?**

Immediately liaised with the Mine Shift Manager and offered the assistance of Power Station personnel. Kevin advised that Mine Operations personnel and CFA Units were attending to the fire on the conveyor but was thankful for any help we could offer. I then phoned the Hazelwood Emergency no (3333), gave details of the fire and requested the Operator, (Daryl Radnell) to sound the Emergency Siren. I also gave instructions for all available personnel to lend assistance with controlling the spot fires which were threatening to spread the fire to the Power Station Coal lines.

**What do you think caused the fire?**

From the position of the fire, I would hazard a guess that burning material either came up the Conveyor with the coal or a hot Idler or bearing on either of the Spill conveyors caused powdered coal in the area to ignite.

### **Where do you think the fire started?**

Conveyors 171 or 172 Spill conveyors.

### **What worked well?**

The efficiency of the CFA in the speed in which they were in attendance and the teamwork displayed by Mine and Power Station personnel.

### **What do you think could have been improved?**

As with all Brown Coal fire, CFA personnel appear to have little knowledge on how to best fight the fire. I.e using a full water spray on powdered brown coal has the effect of spreading the fire, whereby a misted spray tends to dampen it down and prevent it spreading. This could be easily resolved by Hazelwood and the other Generators putting together a training video on how best to fight coal fires and inviting the CFA to be on site during its making.

I also felt that our Emergency Services provider , (Diamond Protection), should have been included in the loop when the fire was first reported. As I understand, this is not part of the Mine fire fighting procedures. As a result of this inadequacy, Diamond Protection were not officially notified of the existence of a fire until after the sounding of the Power Station fire alarm.

### **Any other information?**

As the fire was in the top of the Slot Bunker and surrounding areas, some personnel have indicated their concern that some of the burning material falling within the area possibly contained asbestos dust from the Wall and Roof cladding material. This will need to be investigated and if the material is found to contain asbestos dust, all personnel, including CFA personnel within the area, will need to be notified of the possible risk of contamination.

## Hazelwood Slot Bunker Fire 3/4/05

### Record of Witness Statement

**Name:** Scott Roberts

**Position Held:** Road Runner and Hopper Attendant

**Yrs Experience:** 9 years

**Where were you working at the time?** Hopper on D9

**How were you notified of the incident?** Dredge driver (M. Payne) notified me over intercom.

**When were you notified and by whom?** M. Payne as above at approx. 5.20am.

**What did you do?** Stayed at dredge as requested.

**What did you see when you arrived?** N/A

**What did you do when you arrived?** N/A

**What do you think caused the fire?** N/A

**Where do you think the fire started?** N/A

**What worked well?** N/A

**What do you think could have been improved?** N/A

**Any other information?** From discussion with operators involved CFA seemed to be limited in knowledge of problems associated with fighting fires in our work environment.



## Hazelwood Slot Bunker Fire 3/4/05

### Record of Witness Statement

**Name:** S. O'Neill

**Position Held:** Team Leader

**Yrs Experience:** 28 years

**Where were you working at the time?** M720 Tail End

**How were you notified of the incident?** By radio

**When were you notified and by whom?** Approx. 5.05-5.10am by Geoff Crisp

**What did you do?** Picked up 3 B.A. sets from C/G on the way to bunkers. When I arrived at the bunkers my immediate concern was the safety of personnel. When I assessed the state of the fire I put my into teams of 2 to fight the fire.

**What did you see when you arrived?** M171 and M172 spill belts on fire. Briquettes on fire below west side of bunkers. Sparks flying under, in and over bunker.

**What did you do when you arrived?** I immediately called K. Lovett on phone and we agreed that he would stay on the ground to organise fire units and personnel and equipment while I took control of bunker area. I also made sure that roof sprays and conveyor sprays were turned on.

**What do you think caused the fire?** Unknown

**Where do you think the fire started?** M170's somewhere or briq pile at West side of bunker.

**What worked well?** Liaison between K. Lovett, J. Tyburski, Geoff Crisp and myself, also operations personnel fighting the fire to save plant.

**What do you think could have been improved?** C.F.A did an excellent job but some off the men hit the fire with a solid jet of water spreading the fire.

**Any other information?** The personnel that fought the fire did an excellent job containing the fire and restricting the amount of damage to plant.

## Hazelwood Slot Bunker Fire 3/4/05

### Record of Witness Statement

**Name:** Sid Cook

**Position Held:** Shift Electrician

**Yrs Experience:** 12 years

**Where were you working at the time?** S.E. shed

**How were you notified of the incident?** Phone

**When were you notified and by whom?** At 5am by S. O'Neill

**What did you do?** Went to check and noted fire tanker starting up.

**What did you see when you arrived?** Fire on 171 and 172 spill belt area. Fire on roadway under risers and lots of sparks going under bunker.

**What did you do when you arrived?** Got hose and started putting out spot fires under bunker – line 7 and 8.

**What do you think caused the fire? ?**

**Where do you think the fire started?** 171 or 172 around spill belt area.

**What worked well?**

**What do you think could have been improved?** People in groups maybe could have separated and looked for more spot fires.

**Any other information?** As nobody else was visible under bunker I decided to stay there and attend fire. Then requested to go into bunker and see CFA officer. Spoke to him made some isolations and continued to attend fire in bunker.

## Hazelwood Slot Bunker Fire 3/4/05

### Record of Witness Statement

**Name:** Steve Rieniets

**Position Held:** Mine Manager

**Yrs Experience:** 20 years

**Where were you working at the time?** I was at home asleep.

**How were you notified of the incident?** By phone call from I. Quail at approx. 5.20am.

**When were you notified and by whom?** By I. Quail at approx. 5.20am.

**What did you do?** Came into work. Arrived on site at approx. 5.40am.

**What did you see when you arrived?** CFA on site, IPRH personnel in attendance, fire and embers coming off spill belts at HSB. Very strong winds.

**What did you do when you arrived?** Spoke to IQ, EC – K. Lovett, went to Slot Bunker and spoke to CFA – IC.

**What do you think caused the fire?** Probably a hot idler on rising conveyor.

**Where do you think the fire started?** Rising conveyors/spill belt area.

**What worked well?** EC – Emergency response.

**What do you think could have been improved?** Traffic control at end of shift. Station personnel.

**Any other information?**

## Hazelwood Slot Bunker Fire 3/4/05

### Record of Witness Statement

**Name:** Tony Briffa

**Position Held:** Training ( Bunker Attendant)

**Yrs Experience:** 3.5

**Where were you working at the time?** Bunker

**How were you notified of the incident?**

Shift supervisor at start of shift

**When were you notified and by whom?**

At start of shift

**What did you do?.**

Attended to the fire

**What did you see when you arrived?.**

CFA trucks – mine Trucks

Fire Not noticeable outside of the bunker

**What did you do when you arrived?**

Given instruction by I. Quail/Supervisor to enter bunker and commence fighting fire – which entailed hosing down and smothering fire.

**What do you think caused the fire?**

Not sure – hard to tell but found M172 spill conv tail pulley was seized

**Where do you think the fire started?**

Top end of rising conveyors

**What worked well?**

Co – ordination was good – F/fighting equip was very adequate – positive attitude in everyone putting out fire

**What do you think could have been improved?**

The installation of a deluge system on the rising conv. – On entry to bunker house east and west walls

**Any other information?**

Not really

**Hazelwood Slot Bunker Fire 3/4/05****Record of Witness Statement**

**Name:** Wayne Ponton

**Position Held:** Operator

**Yrs Experience:** 20

**Where were you working at the time?**

Assigned to F/Tanker

**How were you notified of the incident?**

Shift sup. At atert of shift

**When were you notified and by whom?**

As above

**What did you do?.**

Attended to fire immediately

**What did you see when you arrived?.**

Many fireman and tankers

**Noticed sparks coming from spill belt area**

**What did you do when you arrived?**

Went to command centre and requested was requested by I.Quail to find alternative water supply due to lack of pressure in bunker

**What do you think caused the fire?**

Idlers

**Where do you think the fire started?**

M171 H/end area

**What worked well?**

Mine personnel handled the coal fore better than CFA people

**What do you think could have been improved?**

More training for CFA on fighting coal fires

Inside walls angle iron with tin cover should be removed could not get to fires under covers

**Any other information?**

Fire man were still operating with lift early in the fire

## Hazelwood Slot Bunker Fire 3/4/05

### Record of Witness Statement

**Name:** Wayne Vanderkoogh

**Position Held:** Team Leader – Diamond Protection

**Yrs Experience:** 15

**Where were you working at the time?**

On coming d/shift – team leader

**How were you notified of the incident?**

Phone call in early

**When were you notified and by whom?**

OSIS – n/s Team Leader (Maurie Copal)

**What did you do?.**

**What did you see when you arrived?.**

0540 R.C.B Area (ground) smoke filled (p/p and rubber) several operators hosing spot fires around RCB, west and sth sides. Brew hut on conveyors at Sth end of RCB fully alight. Possibly 2 CFA and 1 Open cut tanker as well as Diamond Pumper.

**What did you do when you arrived?**

Assumed control of diamond resources. Sent 2 additional E.S.O with B.A to head end of M171/M172. Found Ian Quail (Haz mine commander) infromed him of resources and current actions.

**What do you think caused the fire?**

Not sure

**Where do you think the fire started?**

Not sure

**What worked well?**

7 additional D.P Personnel onsite within 30 min of initial assessment. No major injuries electrical isolations when requested were executed rapidly. Our protek fire nozzels were very effective in combating volitile P.F fire. It would be beneficial to supply 2 for use in the RCB fire equip. panels

**What do you think could have been improved?**

Early access to remove burnt spill belts would allow access to burning coal which is continually blown into the main bunker area causing further fires. A battery operated jigsaw would aid in early removal. This could be kept in our truck or RCB control room.

**Any other information?**

Instalation of 4 hose reels at H/E feed from the new high pressure line. These should be located on the spill belt (M171-M174). Consideration to food/drink for employees at appropriate times.Again early notification of RCB fires. We were not notified of fire our N/S team leader happened upon it on routine patrols. This was the 2<sup>nd</sup> time in a row with late or no notification.