

Visit Nbr: V01017400246L - AUSTRALIAN POWER PART

Date: 13/06/2012



ENTRY REPORT

WorkSafe Victoria is a division of
the Victorian WorkCover Authority

Date: ♦ 13/06/2012 Visit Number: V01017400246L

Issued by Inspector: Kevin Shepard Hayes

Phone: 5173 8925

Fax: 5174 9086

Service Method: ♦ Left for a person

Entry Time: 13/06/2012 11:30 AM Departure Time: 13/06/2012 03:30 PM

PLACE ENTERED

ABN: AUSTRALIAN POWER PARTNERS B V & OTHERS
40924759557
Tenement No: MIN5004
BRODBRIBB ROAD
HAZELWOOD 3840
HAZELWOOD POWER

Phone No: 5135 5700 Fax No: 5135 5758

This report given to: ♦ Luc Dietvorst Position: ♦ Employer Representative

Copies to: ♦ Daniel Tabone (Belle Banne) Position: ♦ Health and Safety Representative

Other people who attended as part of the inspection:

WorkSafe Staff:

Other Persons: John Robinson, Adrian Marshall, Luke Morris, Shane Ashworth, and Andrew Hooton.

Purpose for entry:

I entered this place to follow up on matters dealt with at a previous visit.

Under section 98(1) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004, I entered your workplace during working hours.

Observations and Actions of the Inspector

- OHS-190325-1 : Incident Assessment
AUSTRALIAN POWER PARTNERS B V & OTHERS is a partnership that is listed as AUSTRALIAN POWER PARTNERS B V & CISL (HAZELWOOD) PTY LIMITED &

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HAZELWOOD INVESTMENT COMPANY PTY LIMITED & HAZELWOOD PACIFIC PTY LTD & NATIONAL POWER AUSTRALIA INVESTMENTS LIMITED under the ABN 40924759557, also trading as IPR-GDF SUEZ HAZELWOOD.

2. OHS-0274 : Incident Assessment

1. Reported Incident Follow-up

I attended this workplace to make enquiries into a reported incident that occurred at this workplace on the 19th of May 2012. WorkSafe attended the incident scene (visit no. V01017400239L). RTL MINING AND EARTHWORKS P/L and AUSTRALIAN POWER PARTNERS B V & OTHERS have conducted an investigation into this matter, this was obtained today and outcomes documented in Entry Report V01017400247L.

In summary RTL MINING AND EARTHWORKS P/L Management informed me that the driver has been released from hospital and is expected to recover. The driver has no recollection of the incident, photos (included in the investigation) do not indicate skidding / heavy braking / sudden loss of control / excessive speed, the road surface was in good condition and an inspection of the haul truck (post incident) indicated that the hydraulics, steering and braking system to be serviceable and in working order.

An incident investigation has been conducted and it appears that from evidence obtained throughout the investigation that some form of distraction / impairment to the driver is likely to have caused the haul truck to veer across the road, mount a earth bund/mound and collide into a drain.

Recommendations include:

- reviewing 'Traffic Control and Haul Road Management Procedure';
- reviewing current pre-employment medical assessment process; and
- enhancing the ongoing monitoring / management of workers health.

3. OHS-0274-02 : Incident Assessment

2. Reported Incident Follow-up

In addition, I made enquiries into a reported incident that occurred at this workplace on the 15th of May 2012. The incident involved an employee who was allegedly in the vicinity of a fire. The fire allegedly occurred when the employee opened a fuel (petrol) container located in the rear tray of a work vehicle. No injuries were sustained or reported, WorkSafe was notified of this incident on the 16th of May 2012 approximately 20 hours after the incident had occurred, the incident scene was disturbed without direction from a WorkSafe Inspector.

AUSTRALIAN POWER PARTNERS B V & OTHERS have conducted an investigation into this matter and this was obtained today. In summary:

A number of actions (12) have been generated from the investigation including (but not limited to) conducting risk assessments, developing procedures, review and investigate use of alternative equipment, incident management training, JSA reviews and review of supervisor duties and responsibilities. The majority of these actions have yet to be completed, an Improvement Notice was issued on the 22nd of May and is not due for compliance today. I have informed Management that I will follow up on these activities during Improvement Notice V01017400241/111-01 follow-up.

4. OHS-0274-03 : Incident Assessment

3. Incident Follow-up

I also continued enquiries into an incident that occurred at this workplace on the 11th of May 2012. An employee reported to me that his car had been hit by coal falling from a conveyor (approx 4mts in height) as he was driving out the 'rear' gate on Friday (the 11th of May) in the afternoon. Enquiries with other employees involved (stated) that

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their cars have also been hit by falling coal/debris, in one instance - a car was hit by a 'hard hat' size lump of coal. Two employees confirmed that they had reported these incidents to their Management (Belle Banne) immediately after the incident occurred, their Management immediately informed AUSTRALIAN POWER PARTNERS B V & OTHERS Management on Friday the 11th of May (as per the AUSTRALIAN POWER PARTNERS B V & OTHERS Incident Management Process)

AUSTRALIAN POWER PARTNERS B V & OTHERS Management were aware that an incident occurred, however AUSTRALIAN POWER PARTNERS B V & OTHERS Management have failed to notify the Authority (WorkSafe) immediately after becoming aware that an incident had occurred.

AUSTRALIAN POWER PARTNERS B V & OTHERS have now completed an investigation into this matter, a copy was obtained during this visit

A number of actions (7) have been generated from the investigation including (but not limited to) establishing clear roles for 'Responsible officers' when managing contractors and their activities, reviewing traffic management controls and traffic management procedure, reinforcing the Incident Management process to Supervision and Management and other employees (training and tool box awareness sessions to be included) - all actions are yet to be completed as per the provided time table.

I reminded Management of their duties under s38 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 - Duty to notify of incidents and s39(1)(a) and (b) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 - Duty to preserve incident sites. A finding (from the M53 Conveyor Incident Investigation) documents that the scene of the incident was not effectively controlled immediately post incident. Enquiries with Belle Banne employees involved in the incident indicated that they have not yet received instruction as to how to "effectively control" an incident scene immediately post incident. Management have agreed to provide this information to these employees tomorrow at the morning 'tool box' meeting and issue the 'Safety Blimp' as documented in action no.3 as soon as possible.

I informed Management that WorkSafe will continue to monitor the progress of the listed actions.

5. OHS-0274-04 : Incident Assessment

4. Incident Follow-up

In addition, I attended your workplace to follow up on a visit I conducted on the 14th of Feb 2012 (Entry Report V01017400225L).

INCIDENT:

On the 21st of Jan 2012, at approximately 06.15 am smoke was seen to be coming from the D11 Dredger. It appeared to be located in the central chute area (transfer point between the bucket wheel boom and the discharge chute to the conveyor). The fire continued to escalate and burnt the ropes holding the 'A' frame which resulted in the discharge conveyor boom collapsing to the ground.

The fire engulfed this area and burnt upwards toward the walkway located between the last bay of the tower and the electrical switch room.

The fire was initially extinguished with assistance from the CFA. Small spot fires were managed by onsite personnel. The cable conduit located above the fire area continued to smoulder for some time post the incident.

The cause of the fire was unknown at the time.

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Management has now completed a comprehensive investigation into the above matter titled "11 Dredger Centre Chute Fire Incident Final Investigation Report". The 'probable' cause as documented within the 'HRL Technology Pty Ltd report - Metallurgical Assessment of Discharge Conveyor Impact Idlers' states "that the fire could have started at one of the bearings on idler String 49B, probably the LHS bearing. It is believed that this was caused by rubbing the outer race against shell generated hot spots in which temperatures were above 800C"

Seventeen recommendations have been documented within an action plan on page 39 of the above mentioned investigation. A number of these will be followed-up (by WorkSafe) during the scheduled annual site Verification commencing 20th June 2012.

**6. OHS-0407 : Incident Assessment
Reported Incident Follow-up**

I attended this workplace to make enquiries into a reported incident that occurred at this workplace on today. The incident involved a collision between Dredger 24 and Hopper 1802. No injuries were reported, minor damage was sustained to the hopper handrail. The hopper lump guard was hit and this activated an emergency stop which shut down the plant as per design, thus reducing further impact, damage and risk to employee health and safety. I released the scene (at 10:25 AM) an investigation has commenced, operating proximity and travel of plant will be included in the investigation. WorkSafe was notified of this incident notification no 247993.

7. OHS-0616 : Incident Assessment

Representative arrangements have been discussed and verified during previous visits including the latest visit conducted on the 19th of Dec 2011 (ER V01017400222L). On the 19th of Dec 2011 I was advised by Management and Employees that there are formal representative arrangements in place. Consultative mechanisms include, but are not limited to: daily pre-start meetings, tool box meetings and Health and Safety Committee meetings.

8. OHS-190754-1 : Incident Assessment

The above mentioned enquiries, discussions and observations does not indicate that AUSTRALIAN POWER PARTNERS B V & OTHERS complies with all health and safety requirements, nor does it affect the continuing obligation to ensure workplace health and safety.

9. OHS-0659 : Incident Assessment

You are hereby notified that under Section 99(a) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004, during an inspection at BRODBRISB ROAD HAZELWOOD 3840, I inspected, examined and made enquiries.

10. OHS-0660 : Incident Assessment

You are hereby notified that under Section 99(b) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004, during an inspection at this workplace I examined and inspected those documents referenced in the body of this Entry Report or as follows:

- Fire Service Utility - F/S 21 Incident Investigation dated 25/05/2012, 11 pages;
- M53 Conveyor Incident dated 11/05/2012, 9 pages;
- 11 Dredger Centre Chute Fire Incident Final Investigation Report dated 21/01/2012, 67 pages and
- one A4 size photo of D24 / H1802 collision damage to hand rail.

During my visit at the above workplace AUSTRALIAN POWER PARTNERS B V & OTHERS voluntarily provided to me the following:

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- Fire Service Utility - F/S 21 Incident Investigation dated 25/05/2012, 11 pages;
- M53 Conveyor Incident dated 11/05/2012, 9 pages;
- 11 Dredger Centre Chute Fire Incident Final Investigation Report dated 21/01/2012, 67 pages and
- one A4 size photo of D24 / H1802 collision damage to hand rail, which I have taken away from site.

Inspectors proposed follow up action:

Other actions taken:

Status of Notices that were monitored during this entry:

Additional Details:

I gave you these documents:

Additional Details:

INTERNAL REVIEW OF CERTAIN INSPECTOR DECISIONS

If you want to apply for internal review of a decision made by an inspector during this visit, you must lodge the approved application form with the Internal Review Unit within 14 days of the date the decision came to your notice. WorkSafe Victoria (WorkSafe) must conduct the internal review within legislated time frame of either 7 or 14 days depending on the category of reviewable decision. If WorkSafe does not notify you of the internal review decision within the required time, WorkSafe is taken to have made a decision to affirm the reviewable decision. Not all decisions can be internally reviewed and in order to seek internal review of a decision you must be an eligible person.

Application forms for internal review, a list of reviewable decisions and a list of eligible persons are available upon request from a WorkSafe Inspector, WorkSafe Advisory Service on 1800 136089 or they can be downloaded from the website worksafe.vic.gov.au

All applications are to be in approved form and must be received by WorkSafe's Internal Review Unit, Ground Floor, 222 Exhibition Street, Melbourne 3000 in order to be considered

If you lodge an application for internal review and you do not receive a decision within the required time frame or you receive an Internal Review decision that you are not happy with, you can then apply to Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal for external review within 14 days of the date the Internal Review decision or non-decision first came to your attention. Applicants seeking external review must be an eligible person.

You can contact the Internal Review Unit on telephone (03) 8663 5450, fax (03) 8663 5451 or by email at internalreviewunit@worksafe.vic.gov.au

OFFENCE

The following Acts, including any regulations made under them carry varying offences such as failure to meet duties and obligations, non compliance with a notice or direction issued or made by an inspector and hindering or obstructing an inspector in the exercise of their powers:

- * Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004